


**Review of  
Psychological Operations  
Lessons Learned from  
Recent Operational Experience**



**Review of  
Psychological Operations  
Lessons Learned from  
Recent Operational Experience**

*by* Christopher J. Lamb

*with a contribution from*  
Paris Genalis



National Defense University Press  
Washington, D.C.  
September 2005

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.

First printing, September 2005

# Table of Contents

Foreword .....	1
Précis .....	2
Study Charter .....	6
Executive Summary .....	8
Specific Recommendations .....	22
Main Report .....	25
1. Definition and Mission .....	25
2. Standards of Performance .....	26
Comparison with Industry Standards for Persuasive Communication .....	29
Applicability to PSYOP: Four Caveats .....	40
Observations on Reasonable Goals for PSYOP Efforts .....	43
3. Actual PSYOP Performance in Recent Operations .....	45
Operation <i>Enduring Freedom</i> .....	45
Operation <i>Iraqi Freedom</i> .....	48
Stability Operations: The 1990s and Operation <i>Iraqi Freedom 2</i> .....	51
Assessment of Effects .....	58
4. PSYOP Lessons Learned: Operations .....	60
Operations <i>Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom</i> : Summary of Official Lessons Learned .....	61
Stability Operations: Historic Lessons Learned .....	64
5. Findings on Critical Issues .....	68
National Integration of Themes and Messages .....	69
Leadership Priority Accorded to PSYOP .....	73
PSYOP Mission Definition .....	77
PSYOP Integration with Information Operations .....	82
Quantity of PSYOP Planners .....	85

Approval Process .....	86
Theater- and Tactical-Level PSYOP Forces Divide .....	91
Quality of PSYOP Products .....	101
Specific Resourcing Shortfalls and Equipment Performance Issues .....	110
General Underresourcing of PSYOP and Its Impact.....	115
6. Technology and Equipment .....	120
Current PSYOP Equipment .....	120
Observations About Current Equipment .....	123
SOCOM Processes .....	124
Current Opportunities to Exploit Technology .....	132
Technology Conclusions .....	134
7. Comparison of Findings with <i>Information Operations Roadmap</i> .....	135
8. Conclusions .....	137
9. Recommendations .....	142
Glossary .....	149
Appendix A: Study Terms of Reference .....	151
Appendix B: PSYOP Equipment Inventory .....	155
Appendix C: PSYOP On-Hand Inventory.....	170
Appendix D: Hardware Performance in Recent Operations and Recapitalization Plan .....	172
Appendix E: PSYOP Basis of Issue Plan and Unit Procurement Costs Rollup .....	176
Appendix F: Review of the Defense Science Board Report, the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, and <i>Information Operations Roadmap</i> Recommendations .....	177
Notes .....	188
Bibliography .....	202

## Illustrations

### Figures

Figure 2–1. Product Development Process .....	33
Figure 3–1. PSYOP Support, Operation <i>Iraqi Freedom</i> .....	49
Figure 5–1. Fault Lines and Options .....	99
Figure 5–2. PSYOP Tactical Force Structure .....	101
Figure 6–1. PSYOP Systems Taxonomy .....	121
Figure 6–2. SOCOM Equipment Disposition .....	122

### Tables

Table 3–1. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations .....	52
Table 5–1. Designated Approval Levels for PSYOP Mission Categories .....	90
Table 6–1. Comparison of DOD, SOCOM, and PSYOP FY05 Funding .....	127
Table 6–2. Actuals and POM 06 PSYOP Funding .....	128





## Foreword

This work is dedicated to LTC Charles Buehring, SPC Adam Kinser, SPC Joseph A. Jeffries, SPC Jonathan J. Santos, and SGT Michael G. Owen, and their families. These psychological operations soldiers lost their lives in Iraq and Afghanistan while practicing their chosen profession, which so often saves the lives of U.S. military personnel as well as other combatants and noncombatants. Our hope is that this report will honor their sacrifice by providing insights on means to sharpen psychological operations capabilities.

Dr. Chris Lamb, a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS),<sup>1</sup> led the research team, which was comprised of Dr. Paris Genalis, the National Defense University Chair for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Joel Wiegert, INSS research assistant; and Jason Barden, Ellen Chou-Gu, Ellen Corbin, and Francisco Escalante, research assistants from Booz Allen Hamilton. Dr. Genalis was responsible for the chapter on “Equipment and Technology.” Dr. Lamb was responsible for the other chapters. The research assistants collected and analyzed data and drafted major sections of the report, including those on PSYOP equipment, PSYOP experience in recent operations, and historic PSYOP lessons learned from stability operations.

The findings in this study are based on a range of primary and secondary sources that are identified in the bibliography and footnotes. Without imputing responsibility for any of the report’s conclusions, the research team would especially like to thank COL Jack Summe and the members of the 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group who so ably and professionally responded to requests for assistance. In addition (and again without suggesting that they ascribe to any conclusions), we would like to thank some members of the psychological operations community (active duty, reserve, and retired) who made extra efforts to assist with the research: SFC James Adam, SGT Brandon Ames, LTC Carl Ayers, SFC Jeff Bierman, LTC Curt Boyd, COL James Brenner, COL Al Bynum, SFC Robert Carroll, LTC Mike Ceroli, COL Steve Herczeg (ret.), SPC David Horning, Mr. Robert Jenks, COL Stephen Keeling, Lt Col David Lamp, SSG Michael Lindsay, COL Tony Normand (ret.), Major Allen McCormick, SGT(P) Lance Putnam, LTC Fredric W. Rohm, Jr., MSG Ken Sablan, LTC Marcel A. Schneider, COL Bob Schoenhaus, 1SG Scott Henry, SFC Christopher Sims, COL James Treadwell, LTC Kenneth Turner, and SSG Christopher Vasatka. We greatly appreciate the assistance rendered and insights provided by these dedicated servicemen. Thanks to their contributions, the accuracy and value of the report are much greater than they otherwise would have been.

## Précis

Extant lessons learned and guidance are correct but inadequate. Currently, psychological operations (PSYOP) are able to produce modest effects, particularly at the tactical level, with minimum resources. The Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, and the 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (POG) produced joint lessons learned about PSYOP from recent operations that identify factors constraining its ability to produce greater effects. These lessons learned are accurate and consistent with the four lessons repeatedly revealed in postoperational assessments of PSYOP—namely, that PSYOP performance suffers from:

- a lack of national-level themes to guide message formulation
- slow product approval process that renders some products irrelevant
- questionable product quality with uncertain effects
- an overall lack of resources, including insufficient force structure.

However, these official lessons learned are not sufficiently comprehensive or detailed to form the basis for remedial action to improve PSYOP performance. The *Information Operations (IO) Roadmap*, published in late 2003, made a series of recommendations to improve PSYOP and its ability to produce effects. However, the conclusion of this report is that the *IO Roadmap* recommendations also are helpful but insufficient to make a substantial difference in the ability of PSYOP to produce greater effects for commanders.

There are shortfalls in both capabilities and resources. PSYOP is currently overextended and conducts neither theater nor tactical operations at peak effectiveness. Theater PSYOP does not have sufficient target audience analysis and feedback sources. Forces cannot really do theater broadcasts to general audiences, but substantial resources are poured into a marginal capability for that mission (no around-the-clock radio/television content and limited dissemination capability). PSYOP has a more comprehensive ability to conduct tactical missions but cannot meet the demands of maneuver commanders for timely, tailored products. Tactical PSYOP forces have insufficient intelligence, production, and dissemination capability to support fast-moving maneuver commanders well. The lack of cooperation between theater and tactical PSYOP forces further reduces the effectiveness of the overall campaign.

Finally, in both theater and tactical areas, the community is falling behind the technological trends. A promising advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) could correct this deficiency, but ACTDs typically do not transition to major acquisition programs. Given that PSYOP investment is already significantly underresourced, expecting the ACTD to produce major operational capability when it comes to fruition at the end of the decade looks like a poor bet. Therefore, absent a major infusion of resources, PSYOP will continue to compensate poorly by buying off-the-shelf solutions to its materiel needs.

The imbalance between theater and tactical PSYOP exacerbates resource shortfalls. Currently, PSYOP expends considerable effort in areas where it lacks a comparative advantage. To illustrate this point, the report makes a distinction between PSYOP requests to narrow target audiences for specific behaviors (largely but not exclusively conducted by tactical forces) and PSYOP messages to broad audiences that attempt to change attitudes or beliefs as a prelude to

behavioral changes (largely but not exclusively the focus of theater-level PSYOP forces). PSYOP has a comparative advantage at the tactical level against specific target audiences when it leverages the ability of the U.S. military to compel compliance with behaviors that appear in the narrow self-interest of the target audience (such as surrender, safety instructions, and so forth). Yet the bulk of limited PSYOP resources go into theater-level efforts to shape attitudes and beliefs about broad issues, an area in which PSYOP can make a valued contribution but often operates at a comparative disadvantage because target audiences do not consider the American military a credible source and because PSYOP receives such limited national-level support for this endeavor. In short, and contrary to the opinion of many PSYOP professionals and to other recommendations made on PSYOP reform, this report emphasizes that PSYOP can not compensate for an admittedly weak U.S. public diplomacy effort by absorbing more of that mission; it simply is not competitive in that arena, and the politics of strategic communications in the United States will not permit it in any case.

The rewards and challenges of fixing theater and tactical PSYOP are different. If the status quo (modest effects for minimum cost) is not satisfactory, PSYOP capabilities and the quality of PSYOP products can be improved relatively easily. PSYOP currently does not follow relevant industry best practices for high-quality plans and products, mostly for lack of resources. Doing so would improve the likelihood of producing greater effects in support of military operations. Any attempt to upgrade either theater- or tactical-level PSYOP must begin with some fundamental improvements, such as more resources and greater attention to target audience analysis and linguistic support. However, there are major differences in the challenges and rewards of improving theater and tactical PSYOP.

Significant resources (approximately \$100 million annually) and uncertain national-level support would be needed to substantially improve theater PSYOP for general audiences, including a national commitment to organizing for successful strategic communications, a reformed approval process, and contractor support for commercial quality programming.

- By comparison, improving tactical PSYOP would be less difficult, requiring doctrinal changes and more modest resources to correct shortfalls in intelligence, communications, and production and dissemination capabilities.
- U.S. forces in both major combat operations and stability operations would benefit from improved PSYOP, but it is more critical to overall success in stability operations. This heightened success, in addition to reduced casualties and more efficient performance in major combat operations, would constitute the biggest returns on new investments in improved PSYOP performance.

Given all these considerations, and absent a national-level commitment to provide for the several key prerequisites for success in theater PSYOP, this report concludes that the commander, Special Operations Command (SOCOM), should focus on what is most easily improved, controlled, and measured: tactical PSYOP. The most important actions that could be taken in this regard would concern:

- vision, doctrine, and concept of operations. Update Joint and service doctrine, and the SOCOM PSYOP Vision and Concept of Operations, to be consistent with the findings in this report and guidance in the *IO Roadmap*, particularly with respect to the relationship between PSYOP and public diplomacy and public affairs.
- intelligence and target audience analysis. Take steps to improve intelligence support to PSYOP, including redesigning the Strategic Studies Detachment to better support tactical target analysis, with the assumption that national-level institutions will conduct strategic studies and share them with the 4<sup>th</sup> POG. An examination of how the broader Intelligence Community and the Strategic Studies Detachment capture, assess, and segment target audiences in advance could be useful as well.
- tactical product development support. Direct a plan to integrate personnel assigned to the Joint PSYOP Support Element (JPSE) and the Media Operations Center with a mission of immediate (less than 24 hours), tailored product support to tactical PSYOP forces in the field and institutional memory of products and effects.
- theater to tactical communications. Direct a broad architectural look at PSYOP communications with a mandate to recommend short-term means of improving communications between the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) and tactical PSYOP, ensure that all PSYOP communications network nodes have connectivity appropriate to the mission, and guarantee interoperability of equipment at all echelons through vigorous configuration management.

Because of the value of PSYOP for success in stability operations, the report recommends a national-level commitment to substantially improve theater PSYOP for general audiences by better organizing for strategic communications, reforming the approval process, and contracting for commercial-quality, general audience programming. If this national-level support were available, SOCOM should:

- produce a detailed reform plan consistent with the recommendations in this study, laying out a specific action plan to improve the quality of PSYOP products with estimated costs (assuming a tripling of PSYOP resources on an annual basis).
- detail PSYOP planners to support an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Field Agency for Support to Public Diplomacy, the purpose of which would be to create commercial-quality, policy-consistent radio/television and print content for general foreign audiences that could be disseminated by PSYOP forces in support of military operations.
- support national-level efforts to develop means to temporarily suppress adversary communications, in addition to the presumptive national-level reform efforts mentioned above.

Just as SOCOM ought not to undertake reform of theater PSYOP for general audiences without national support, national leadership ought not to allocate substantial new resources for any

PSYOP reform (theater or tactical) without a specific SOCOM plan for doing so. Improving the ability of PSYOP forces to produce desired effects is as much a matter of non-materiel reforms as of additional resources. Currently, the PSYOP mission is defined vaguely, and PSYOP resources are not focused where they have the greatest comparative advantages. PSYOP leadership resists integration with IO even though such integration would disproportionately benefit PSYOP. A concrete plan that identifies and proposes affordable solutions to the greatest impediments to quality PSYOP programs and products is lacking. Absent a specific and abiding commitment to eliminate such shortcomings, additional investment in PSYOP is not likely to produce commensurate improvements in effects. Hence, the report recommends that SOCOM be tasked to produce an implementation plan to carry out the report's reform agenda for PSYOP doctrine, recruitment, training, force structure, and acquisition (summarized in the executive summary to the report). Additional resources should be provided contingent upon the quality of the plan.

## Study Charter

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense commissioned this report on the recommendation of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-level Information Operations Steering Committee. The Committee decided in its March 9, 2004, meeting that a review of PSYOP lessons learned from Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) was in order.<sup>2</sup>

- **Objective.** The purpose of the study was to obtain an independent look at the performance of psychological operations forces in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and to determine whether improvements were possible. Specifically, results from the research were to be compared with recommendations for reform of psychological operations from the *Information Operations Roadmap*. In particular, the research was to assess whether and how new technology might affect PSYOP performance.
- **Scope and Timeline.** The study began on April 16, 2004. Initially, it was limited to a review of PSYOP lessons learned in OIF, but the mandate was expanded to include Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) on the grounds that it was a significantly different operation that might yield important insights on PSYOP performance. On June 22, 2004, an interim progress report was made to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-level Information Operations Steering Committee. During that briefing, the scope of the report was expanded to include lessons learned from stability operations, including OIF Stability Operations (commonly known as OIF 2). In addition, the project timeline was extended from 90 to 180 days. The output from the research effort was to be a final briefing and a report.

## Study Methodology

The methodology adopted for this study was straightforward and largely spelled out in the terms of reference provided for the study effort (see appendix A). First, official lessons learned for OIF were obtained and reviewed, and those specific to PSYOP were identified. Then, after reviewing other informal lessons learned<sup>3</sup> and identifying issues that seemed to merit further exploration, a set of additional hypotheses about PSYOP performance was circulated to informed parties for comment. These hypotheses included research and technology issues as well as several specific to PSYOP performance in stability operations. The research team used all relevant evidence available to resolve these issues, including primary documents and interviews with participants in recent operations. A series of conclusions were developed based on the key issues identified and then compared to the *IO Roadmap* recommendations to identify discrepancies. Further, as invited in the terms of reference, a series of recommendations were made to correct shortcomings.

## Sources

To conduct this research, a large body of primary and secondary source material was obtained. The study team conducted a background survey of secondary sources, including historical literature reviews and doctrine, to help develop an understanding of PSYOP employment

standards and issues over the past few decades. Since the overarching objective of the study required an accurate assessment of PSYOP performance for which existing measures of merit are considered inadequate, the team explored industry standards that could be used to gauge the quality of the PSYOP process and products. To assess lessons about PSYOP performance, the team reviewed all official lessons learned, including service as well as joint lessons, and informal lessons captured in briefings and after-action reports, either on information operations generally or on PSYOP specifically.

In addition, the study team mined briefings, informal assessments of performance by PSYOP personnel, daily situation reports, and products to gather evidence that would either substantiate or challenge emerging consensus on lessons learned. More specifically, these materials included briefings from SOCOM, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (ACOPOC), and the 4<sup>th</sup> POG; the interview database at Joint Forces Command; research on Iraqi perspectives about PSYOP effects; PSYOP situation reports for OIF and OEF; and data on PSYOP equipment and budgets provided by SOCOM. Most helpful were the results from online surveys and interviews (by phone or in person) with PSYOP specialists and subject matter experts directly in response to the postulated hypotheses.

All interviews conducted were for nonattribution unless specified otherwise by the interviewee. The research team met with commanders of active duty PSYOP units, members of the nascent JPSE, former PSYOP commanders of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG, commanders of Joint PSYOP Task Forces (JPOTFs) in recent operations, members of the Joint Forces lessons learned team, members of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses, experts at the Central Intelligence Agency, and PSYOP experts in the Pentagon. The research team also exchanged insights with allied PSYOP practitioners and traveled to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the Special Operations Command to discuss data and findings with PSYOP professionals. The report was circulated in draft for comment from PSYOP professionals before being produced in this final version.

## Executive Summary

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense commissioned this report. He did so at the recommendation of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-level Information Operations Steering Committee. The Committee decided in its March 9, 2004, meeting that a review of psychological operations (PSYOP) lessons learned from Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) was in order.

The intent of the study was to obtain an independent look at the performance of psychological operations forces in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and to determine whether improvements were possible. Specifically, results from the research were to be compared with recommendations for reform of psychological operations from the *IO Roadmap*. In particular, the research was directed to assess whether and how new technology might affect PSYOP performance.

The study began on April 16, 2004. Initially, the study was limited to a review of PSYOP lessons learned in OIF, but the mandate was expanded to Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF) on the grounds that it was a significantly different operation that might yield important insights on PSYOP performance. On June 22, 2004, an interim progress report was made to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-level Information Operations Steering Committee. During that briefing, the scope of the report was expanded to include lessons learned from stability operations, including OIF Stability Operations as well as stability operations over the last 10 to 20 years.

For decades, post-operations assessments of PSYOP have identified the same set of lessons learned:

- a lack of national-level themes
- a slow or unresponsive product approval process
- questionable product quality
- an overall lack of resources, including insufficient force structure.

Some of these shortcomings have not been addressed because they are politically difficult to correct. Others remain unresolved because there is uncertainty about the precise nature of the problem, or a lack of confidence in the ability of prescribed solutions to generate improved PSYOP effects that would be roughly estimated as cost-effective. The insights gleaned from recent lessons learned efforts, as well as the results of this study, should provide enough insight on the precise origin of factors limiting PSYOP performance to allay some of these concerns.

### Categories and Terminology

Establishing some categories and clarifying some terminology facilitate the presentation of findings.

*Missions and objectives.* The terms *missions*, *objectives*, and *tasks* are often confused or used interchangeably. In this report, the study team asserts that psychological operations is a mission distinct from public affairs and support to public diplomacy. A second assertion is that a variety



of objectives assigned to PSYOP over the past decades can be condensed into a set of four overarching PSYOP objectives that apply to both major combat operations and stability operations:

- isolate the adversary from domestic and international support
- reduce the effectiveness of the adversary's forces
- deter escalation by adversary leadership
- minimize collateral damage and interference with U.S. operations.

*General and specific audiences.* The distinction is often made between general and specific audiences in the report, but rather than a dichotomy, the distinction represents a range of target audiences. The broadest audience is the entire theater of operations, and the most fundamental partition of that general audience into more specific ones is between combatants and noncombatants. The most specific audience is the individual decisionmaker.

*Direct and indirect behavior modification.* To obtain any of the four goals identified above, PSYOP must modify behavior, inducing someone to either take action or refrain from it. However, PSYOP may request specific behaviors directly, or it may attempt to obtain the desired behaviors indirectly. If indirectly, then PSYOP attempts to change knowledge, beliefs, or attitudes by informing, instructing, or interpreting information for the target audience as a prelude or contribution to behavioral changes. The assumption is that behavior that correlates with American interests is more likely to be induced if it is based on a favorable set of beliefs or attitudes resident within the target audience.

*Levels of PSYOP.* This report discusses three levels of PSYOP, only two of which actually exist (theater and tactical) and which are repeatedly differentiated.

- Strategic PSYOP and “support to public diplomacy.” This level of PSYOP refers not to the significance of any given PSYOP activity, but rather to its geographic scope. Strategic PSYOP would be transregional, if not global. However, the *IO Roadmap* asserts that the U.S. military does not practice strategic PSYOP, and this report concurs with that finding. Any information provided by military sources to such a wide-ranging audience would constitute “support to public diplomacy” or to “public affairs,” if the audience included the U.S. public.
- Theater/operational PSYOP. Theater-level PSYOP refers to forces and activities under the direct control of the theater commander. Theater PSYOP often is directed toward general audiences and typically tries to modify general attitude sets as a prelude to behavior changes rather than requesting behavior changes directly. The dominant approach for theater or operational PSYOP will involve rational argumentation designed to achieve longer lasting effects. However, by engaging the target audiences' thought processes to a greater extent, the PSYOP effort will inspire stronger counterarguments. PSYOP can increase the audience's ability to receive the message by adapting it to the receiver's understanding and experience and by eliminating or reducing distractions. Delivery vehicles for messages at this end of the continuum include the Internet, television, radio, newspapers, and journals.

- Tactical PSYOP. Tactical PSYOP refers to forces and activities under the direct control of individual maneuver force commanders. Typically, tactical PSYOP is directed against specific target audiences and often asks for specific behaviors. Messages used in tactical psychological operations must be concise and to the point, often attempting to persuade an audience for short-term behavior modification in a brief statement on a leaflet or other paper product. Because the PSYOP professional wants the target audience to act rather than to think about the message being conveyed, there may be relatively more emphasis on emotion than reason. Many tactical products also derive a comparative advantage by leveraging the coercive power of the U.S. military and its reputation. Delivery vehicles well suited for tactical PSYOP include face-to-face interaction, loudspeakers, posters and handbills, leaflets, and emails. These products must attract attention and make the principal point quickly.

*Links between level, audience, and method.* There is no necessary linkage between the level of PSYOP and its audience (general or specific) or its method of seeking behavior modification (directly or indirectly). For example, theater PSYOP forces might have access to a mechanism that would target a specific decisionmaker (for example, a computer network operations tool), and it could use messages that either directly or indirectly try to modify behavior. Alternatively, a small tactical PSYOP team could develop and run a Web site for general audiences in Iraq that attempts to change behavior indirectly. However, the observable tendency is for neither of these examples to happen, and understanding why is important for a full appreciation of the results of this study.

- Theater PSYOP/general audience/indirect behavior modification linkage: Generally speaking, in recent operations, theater PSYOP forces under the control of the JPOTF prepared theater products (primarily radio, but also printed products) for general audiences that tended to support public diplomacy (conveying the legitimacy of U.S. policy and objectives to the general population). The JPOTF also prepared tactical operations that requested specific behaviors (for example, desertion and surrender of enemy forces), but these generally were the focus of tactical PSYOP once the fast-moving operations began. Therefore, in this report the tendency of theater PSYOP to focus on general audiences and indirect behavior modification is remarked upon, even while it is understood that the connection is a current, but not a necessary, characteristic.
- Tactical PSYOP/specific audience/direct behavior modification linkage: Currently, tactical PSYOP forces tend to represent the needs of tactical maneuver units that, especially in combat operations, are only interested in direct and rapid behavior modification for the specific target audiences directly in their path of advance. Even in stability operations, tactical forces focus on the target audience in their area of operation and most often require specific behaviors—the quicker the better. Moreover, tactical PSYOP forces do not normally control means of addressing general audiences. Finally, their distance from policymakers militates against indirect behavior modification, since such messages often have political content that requires approval. Therefore, in this report, the tendency of tactical PSYOP to focus on specific audiences and direct behavior modification is remarked upon. Again, it is understood that the connection is a current characteristic rather than a necessary attribute of tactical PSYOP.

## Official Lessons Learned

The only officially sanctioned (approved by a commander for dissemination) joint lessons learned on PSYOP were those completed by the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and the 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Operations Group (Airborne). With minor exceptions reviewed in the body of the report, the official lessons learned were substantiated by the sources reviewed in this study. The lessons officially sanctioned by these three sources are outlined here.

The Joint Staff lessons learned reported the need to:

- fix interagency coordination to harmonize all national “perceptual assets”
- coordinate operational-level IO (and thus PSYOP) with national efforts
- consolidate IO policy oversight in OSD to facilitate such coordination (this lesson is implied but not actually asserted directly in the Joint Staff’s lessons)
- have Public Affairs counter adversary disinformation around the clock in overseas as well as domestic audiences.

The Joint Forces Command lessons learned pointed out that:

- theater-level PSYOP must be integrated with national efforts (similar to the point made by the Joint Staff but with slightly more emphasis on the role of the Combatant Commander in accomplishing this objective)
- PSYOP must build a competitive, responsive live theater–radio–television capability. More specifically, the JFCOM lessons learned noted that PSYOP execution was marked by friction, assessment difficulties, and, at times, a lack of sophistication in spite of its contribution to strategic and operational objectives.
- the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) [USD(P)] should publish guidance that effectively incorporates interagency coordination and national-level guidance for PSYOP themes
- the Joint PSYOP Support Element, a PSYOP unit supported by commercial sector contractors as recommended in the *IO Roadmap*, should be activated more quickly to improve integration with national themes and messages
- the quality and quantity of PSYOP broadcasting capabilities and platforms should be improved, from the strategic to the tactical level.

The 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group lessons learned indicated that:

- personnel increases are needed and should be addressed in the current Force Design Update process
- training is needed for PSYOP personnel for Internet/Web site development
- equipment needs should be aligned with increases in force structure and addressed in the Force Design Update process
- contracting funds are needed for satellite connections, PSYOP support elements (PSEs) assigned to embassies, linguists, and the use of products subject to copyright protection.

*Historic lessons.* The lessons learned from the Joint Staff, JFCOM, and the 4<sup>th</sup> POG are consistent with previous PSYOP lessons learned from operations over the past two decades. Historically, PSYOP lessons learned have lamented the:

- lack of national guidance on themes
- flawed approval processes that render PSYOP products less timely and less effective
- lack of sufficiently high-quality PSYOP products
- limited resources to address all PSYOP requirements.

*Other lessons learned.* From the review of the official lessons learned and informal discussions with PSYOP participants in OEF, OIF, and OIF 2, ten critical issues emerged for further investigation. They are grouped into the major categories of resources, improved decisionmaking, and PSYOP reform.

## **Resources**

*General underresourcing.* A frequent observation from previous reports, lessons learned, and after-action reports is that PSYOP forces simply do not have enough resources to do all of their assigned missions. The issue of contention is whether PSYOP is so systematically underfunded that it cannot fulfill its increasingly important mission objectives or, if so, whether gross underfunding forces PSYOP to cut corners that have negative effects on mission execution. In short, the issue is whether decisionmakers should consider a wholesale increase in resources for PSYOP as opposed to just examining individual, specific shortfalls that are particularly egregious.

Arguments reviewed suggest that PSYOP cannot currently meet the requirements of the defense strategy. It cannot fulfill its missions across multiple contingencies, and it is falling behind general technology trends. During OEF, OIF, and OIF2, for example, PSYOP was not able to broadcast or produce live television feeds in-theater. The conclusion of this report is that while better PSYOP planning and resource management may be necessary and desirable, PSYOP

simply cannot meet mission requirements and substantially improve its ability to produce effects without a substantial increase in resources.

*Critical specific shortfalls.* PSYOP labored under a variety of specific resource shortfalls while conducting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Shortfalls included a lack of connectivity between tactical PSYOP units supporting theater maneuver commanders and the JPOTF; an inability to rapidly produce and disseminate radio and television content; a number of tactical PSYOP limitations involving force protection and tactical equipment; the inability to benefit from seizure of adversary communications facilities; and a lack of fungible resources for translation, tactical dissemination, target audience analysis, and other tasks. In addition, PSYOP equipment experienced operational problems in the desert terrains of Iraq and Afghanistan due to extreme heat and sand penetration and the aggressive operating schedule.

The optimal solution to addressing PSYOP resource shortfalls is to pursue a cost-benefit analysis that would evaluate the range of PSYOP equipment and capabilities against their associated costs. This would serve as a quantifying element in determining actual costs (to include potential risks for non- or under-investments) as well as providing a sound basis for the distribution and placement of PSYOP inventory. However, PSYOP study resources are exceedingly limited for these kinds of acquisition analyses. The alternative recommended in this report is an internal implementation plan from SOCOM that addresses the shortfalls.

*Quality of PSYOP products.* A recurrent complaint throughout the period covered by this study concerns the quality of psychological operations products. The quality of the overall PSYOP campaign, standard PSYOP processes, and individual products does not meet industry standards and could be improved with internal efficiencies and through steps that would require additional resources. The report indicates specific areas for improvement, the most important of which are the need for high-quality translation and better target audience analysis. Concerning target audience analysis, PSYOP generally does not have the resources to do extensive product testing, focus groups, and market surveys; nor does it have freedom of movement in nonpermissive or semipermissive environments. However, it could compensate for these limitations by better accessing open sources, by using its Strategic Studies Detachment differently, and by more systematically using red-teaming efforts to improve product quality and assist with damage limitation when a product generates unintended effects. Timing of product dissemination, quality product control sheets, and more easily useable product templates for field use could improve PSYOP product quality as well.

## **Improved Decisionmaking**

*National themes.* The absence of national-level guidance on themes reduces the effectiveness of PSYOP plans, and the lack of coordinated national information activities also can undermine the overall effectiveness of an information campaign. National guidance on information themes and the desired end state, which was provided in OEF but not in OIF or OIF 2, improves the likelihood of a robust and effective PSYOP campaign. Without such guidance, PSYOP products conveyed to general audiences at the theater level are likely to be a less specific formulation of broad U.S. public policy positions. PSYOP efforts may still counter adversary disinformation and provide information generally favorable of U.S. policies and operations, but they are less

likely to provide strong argumentation in defense of U.S. policies for fear of getting ahead of them. The ability of Pentagon authorities to affect the coordination of a national strategic communications is uncertain, but doing so would clearly increase the likelihood of PSYOP generating desired effects

*Approval process.* A dilatory PSYOP product approval process is detrimental to the execution of an effective PSYOP campaign. Before operations begin, a delayed process inhibits PSYOP planning and rehearsal time, while slow approval during an actual campaign can render some military and political products useless, since they may be overcome by events. Unless the approval process is reformed, both at the theater and tactical level, PSYOP effectiveness will be seriously compromised.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict [ASD(SO/LIC)] should be tasked to author a DOD Directive and the Joint Staff to draft a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) that would codify the following approach to PSYOP product approval, the details of which are in the body of this report.

- First, the concept for risk management would accept the possibility of an occasional poor product and would identify means of mitigating the consequences.
- Second, a general scheme for preapproval of tactical products would be adopted that includes a discrete set of product categories with designated approval levels.
- Third, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) would delegate the approval process to someone with day-to-day access to contingency policy who can review products for approval on a by-exception basis. The JPOTF would forward products to the Pentagon with more detailed product control sheets that would be logged in with an “expiration” time, after which their approval is assumed. The Policy official charged with approval would check only for policy consistency, not quality. If the Pentagon does not generate national-level themes and messages or participate in a process that allows expeditious interagency review on a recurring basis, then all product approval would be delegated to the combatant commander on the assumption that Policy guidance was stable and broad enough that the oversight provided in the original review and approval of the combatant commander’s plan would be sufficient.

The same general process should apply for tactical products. However, the JPOTF would check for consistency with policy and planning as well as for minimum quality standards, since the JPOTF presumably would have more resources available for that purpose than would individual PSYOP company commanders.

*Leadership priority.* Below the level of combatant commander, flag officer attitudes about the ability of PSYOP to create effects remain mixed. It is not surprising that in combat, many commanders will place greater confidence in kinetic weapons with which they are more familiar and which have more easily demonstrated effects. For many, substituting kinetic options with PSYOP products amounts to targeting on faith, since their actual effects are so difficult to observe and quantify. The impact of PSYOP activities will always be more obscure than that of

kinetic weapons, but much more could be done to systematically assess PSYOP effects through dedicated intelligence support and interrogation of target audiences.

## **PSYOP Reform**

*Mission confusion.* Many informal and formal lessons learned offered about PSYOP raise the question of whether it is properly focused on its priority mission. In general, PSYOP missions have been alleged to be construed too broadly with negative effects. PSYOP needs to be coordinated with public diplomacy and public affairs efforts to avoid conflicting and/or dissipated effects. PSYOP doctrine and mission statements that could easily be confused with mandates to conduct public diplomacy and public affairs are not helpful. The broader Special Operations community clearly defines its primary missions and distinguishes between primary and collateral missions. PSYOP would be well advised to do the same.

*PSYOP integration with IO.* As part of its recommendation set, the *Information Operations Roadmap* suggested that PSYOP become integrated with broader IO efforts. At issue is whether this integration actually benefits or weakens PSYOP and its effects. Specifically, a major problem documented in OEF, OIF, and OIF 2 lessons learned is that IO planners did not adequately understand PSYOP and thus failed to appreciate its capabilities sufficiently or employ them appropriately and effectively.

Based on the evidence collected, PSYOP integration with IO apparently produced historically unprecedented levels of cooperation between PSYOP, electronic warfare (EW), and computer network operations (CNO). There was also evidence of normal PSYOP cooperation with other IO core capabilities as well. It cannot be said that this integration was to great effect, but it does bode well for the future vision of information operations as a core military capability. It is also true that many IO officers were not well trained or well informed, but these shortcomings caused relatively few and minor problems for PSYOP. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that PSYOP integration into IO will improve when the *IO Roadmap* recommendations are fully implemented.

*Quantity of PSYOP planners.* A widely recognized problem in OIF was the insufficient number of PSYOP planners available to support component commanders. It was asserted that the lack of PSYOP planners contributed to poor planning and execution of PSYOP missions. Specifically, the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) and the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander had insufficient PSYOP planning support within their respective commands. PSYOP integration in mission planning was hampered by this shortfall.

Service component commanders believed that the lack of PSYOP planners had a significant and negative impact on their operations. PSYOP must be prepared to meet this demand in the future. The creation of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters and standard operating procedures for integrating information operations in all combat operations would go a long way toward rendering this issue moot by providing for the integration of PSYOP and IO with all other operations as a normal joint staffing process. Until then, the other services must either offer up personnel for training in joint PSYOP, or PSYOP must provide for them by forward deploying more of its own personnel to support operations within the theater.

*Theater-tactical gap.* A gap exists between the missions and capabilities of theater-level and tactical-level PSYOP forces that undermines the effectiveness of the overall PSYOP effort. Tactical PSYOP forces, located predominantly in the reserves, are not as well equipped or trained as the Active Component, which is organized mainly to support theater-level PSYOP. Tactical PSYOP, once on the move, cannot communicate readily with the JPOTF, which is overseeing the theater-level effort, and they have scant resources to actually produce and disseminate products. Because of the communications gap, the JPOTF is not well informed by the tactical forces on the effects their products have on target audiences. This gulf that exists between the mission focus, capabilities, and, ultimately, cooperative intent of theater and tactical PSYOP degrades the overall effectiveness of the effort.

It is important to close this gap to improve PSYOP effectiveness for the combatant commander. Tactical PSYOP in support of major combat operations is more cost effective and easier to fix but is less critical for the success of overall combat operations. In contrast, theater PSYOP to general audiences is harder and more expensive to fix but is more critical for the success of stability operations. Given the other reforms necessary to make PSYOP effective at the theater level for general audiences, senior leaders might want to consider focusing PSYOP on the tactical PSYOP mission, executed by either forces controlled by the JPOTF or tactical maneuver units. Doing so would help reduce the variance in theater-tactical missions and lay the groundwork for greater cooperation between the JPOTF and tactical forces. If senior leaders consider the theater PSYOP mission targeting general audiences worth the required expenditure of political and fiscal capital, it still might be advisable to have the content produced by another entity to allow the JPOTF to better balance its responsibilities for theater and tactical PSYOP support and oversight.

## **Stability Operations**

All PSYOP lessons learned for past stability operations may be summarized in nine functional areas.

- Coalition cooperation and interagency coordination (critical to success): Information must be shared between agencies and with coalition partners to ensure that PSYOP is part of a well-orchestrated information effort that generates consistent messages across multiple media outlets.
- Understanding PSYOP (needs improvement): Appreciation for the importance of PSYOP varies among individual U.S. commanders, with some using PSYOP well, and others, hardly at all.
- Planning (early and continuous is best): PSYOP must be involved early in the planning stage of operations in order to maximize its effects.
- Operations (integrated efforts magnify effects): PSYOP effects can be greatly enhanced when they are carefully integrated with conventional forces application. Similarly, the effects of conventional forces are enhanced when supported by PSYOP.



- Products (timeliness and quality need improvement): Securing product approval in a timely manner is an ever-present problem. Prepared and preapproved products offer a ready solution, since many themes and messages are consistent across the range of military operations and can easily be anticipated.
- Training (needed to improve PSYOP capabilities): An insufficient number of well-trained PSYOP specialists is commonly identified as a weakness in stability operations.
- Force structure (insufficient Active Component forces): The high operations tempo of the Active Component PSYOP forces over the past two decades has led to frequent observations that their numbers are insufficient to meet the demands of operational requirements.
- PSYOP equipment (insufficient quantity and quality): PSYOP units are chronically short of the quantity and quality of equipment needed to accomplish their tasks efficiently and effectively.
- Other resource issues: PSYOP lacks both strategic and tactical organic mobility. Forces frequently arrive late to theater because they are accorded a low priority for movement. In addition, PSYOP has insufficient fungible resources to purchase short-notice support elements, particularly in the area of translator support.

In general, these nine sets of PSYOP lessons learned from stability operations apply equally well to major combat operations. However, digging deeper into the specifics, the report identifies three PSYOP lessons learned for stability operations that deserve to be highlighted as distinct (either in application or criticality) from PSYOP lessons for major combat operations:

- The center of gravity in stability operations is popular support, so PSYOP must focus on the general population as well as enemy combatants and leaders.
- Early and continuous theater-level PSYOP integration with other agencies to ensure consistent themes and messages is essential.
- Face-to-face PSYOP with the host population is critical, and PSYOP forces must use conventional forces to support this objective.

In addition to these three lessons, an overarching observation is that the entire role of PSYOP is more critical for success in stability operations than in major combat operations where the struggle will largely be determined by a clash of arms rather than changes in popular support for contending agendas.

*Acquisition and technology.* PSYOP investment is significantly underresourced. Moreover, PSYOP has no in-house analytical capability and only minimal resources to identify new technological directions to enhance its capabilities. PSYOP compensates in part for these shortcomings by rapidly acquiring any new commercial off-the-shelf equipment that supports its current mode of operation. Absent a major infusion of resources, PSYOP will continue to fall

behind technological trends. However, the SOCOM investment process reflects all the directives and regulations of the Department of Defense. It emphasizes jointness, capabilities-based thinking, high leveraging of others' programs with emphasis on industry, short acquisition cycles, and high warfighter involvement. The mechanics of the process are logical and provide ample opportunity for leadership involvement. Therefore, the resulting investment program reflects the priorities of SOCOM, both in total investment funds distribution and in near-total reliance on technology advances pursued largely by others. Finally, the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) sponsored by SOCOM is moving slowly and perhaps could benefit from some expansion, but it appears to cover all the most glaring shortfalls identified in this study and by the Defense Science Board.

If the Department feels justified in expanding PSYOP resources, it does not need to reform SOCOM processes so much as it needs to communicate that intent clearly to command leadership. PSYOP requirements repeatedly fail to make the cut with SOCOM's leadership. If DOD wants a higher priority attached to PSYOP, it must provide the additional funding to SOCOM or provide direct guidance on the subject. If additional resources are made available, a better resource distribution will be needed to reflect longer time horizons and steady program execution. Improvements over the present situation would be easily achievable—including more support for analyses to better understand how technology can support requirements, more work in research and development (R&D) to develop requisite technology or better adapt commercially available technology, and steady funding for acquisition supporting efficient buy profiles.

*IO Roadmap recommendations.* In general, the results of this research are consistent with the findings of the *Information Operations Roadmap*. For example, this report reinforces *Roadmap* recommendations on training, career force, analytic support, standardized IO planning tools, and a virtual Major Force Program for all IO components. In other respects, however, this report concludes that the *IO Roadmap* did not go far enough in its recommendations. In particular, this report:

- urges an acceleration of the PSYOP Global Reach ACTD effort, which is addressing denied-area dissemination concerns as one of its primary pursuits. In addition, this report supports the continued emphasis of the ACTD on tactical PSYOP dissemination as well as the expansion of the Psychological Operations Broadcast System (POBS) to provide for a second theater capability.
- notes that the recommendation on the JPSE in the *IO Roadmap* is not aggressive enough to make a difference at the theater level for general audiences, and that the *Roadmap* does not fully address the need to provide more responsive, tailored product support to tactical PSYOP units.
- argues that the *Roadmap*'s recommendation for approval reform is also insufficient, especially at the tactical level, to ensure timely delivery of products for the best effect. Approval authority reform should be extended to the JPOTF and division levels and should be more specific on product categories.

- concludes that the *IO Roadmap* did not pay enough attention to the need to provide tactical-, as opposed to theater- or national-level, intelligence support to PSYOP.
- indicates that the *IO Roadmap* is not aggressive enough on reform of PSYOP doctrine, recruitment, training, force structure, and acquisition. Where the *Roadmap* generally pushed resources at PSYOP to bridge the most glaring capability gaps, the PSYOP lessons learned review provides more detailed insight into needs and longer-term solutions.

## Overarching Conclusions

The review of PSYOP lessons learned from OEF, OIF, OIF 2, and stability operations from the past two decades yields six major conclusions that provide context for recommendations.

*Current PSYOP missions are overextended.* The rising demand for PSYOP, coupled with inadequate resourcing, has resulted in an overextension of PSYOP missions. PSYOP is incapable of mounting a competitive theater-wide effort targeted at general audiences or of meeting the current demand from commanders for timely, tailored tactical PSYOP products and dissemination.

*Improving tactical and theater PSYOP will have different costs and benefits.* The analysis of PSYOP performance in major combat operations versus stability operations suggests that tactical-level PSYOP in major combat operations is the most cost effective and generates the greatest return for the least amount of investment. Similarly, tactical-level PSYOP in stability operations is also cost effective but is more difficult to execute because it requires substantial changes in operating concepts and doctrine. In contrast, theater-level PSYOP in both major combat operations and stability operations demands even greater resources and generates less visible effects. A well-coordinated national information strategy is needed in order for theater-level PSYOP to facilitate a noticeable impact. In short, improvements in theater-level PSYOP are both more costly and more difficult to accomplish.

*PSYOP is critical to the success of stability operations.* PSYOP forces are increasingly employed to support stability operations because of their ability to isolate the adversary from domestic and international support. PSYOP is more critical to success in stability operations than in major combat operations. Success in stability operations requires changes to tactical-level joint doctrine that would enable PSYOP to leverage infantry during their face-to-face interactions with the general populace. It would also require a robust ability to engage the general target audience in the face of competing information sources, which requires around-the-clock broadcasting and sophisticated print materials. PSYOP cannot currently produce this content and has difficulty disseminating it. Improving PSYOP for stability operations is an arduous and expensive undertaking that would significantly improve the likelihood of success in such operations.

*PSYOP is a major force multiplier in major combat operations.* Assessments of its effects in recent and previous operations indicate that PSYOP in major combat operations serves as an important force multiplier by helping to reduce the effectiveness of adversarial forces and

detering escalation by adversarial leadership. PSYOP reform and improvements in tactical-level major combat operations can be accomplished at relatively low cost by providing better intelligence support and communication equipment that would reduce the theater-tactical divide and improve the quality of products. Resources permitting, PSYOP at the theater level for major combat operations could be improved by investing in the capability to provide and disseminate products that support public diplomacy. Theater-level PSYOP for general audiences could be left to the realm of public diplomacy, where integration of national themes and messages can best be achieved. Doing so would not have a direct or deleterious impact on combat operations.

*Improvements in PSYOP decisionmaking are essential.* National themes and coordinated information activities would improve PSYOP, but the most important decisionmaking reform is an improved product approval process. This process essentially breaks down in two areas: between the JPOTF and the Pentagon, and between the JPOTF and tactical forces. Poor communication between the JPOTF and OSD Policy contributed to significant delays in the approval of theater-level PSYOP products during the initial phase of OEF. Similarly, tactical-level products encountered delays in obtaining JPOTF approval prior to development and distribution. Unless the approval process is reformed at both the theater and tactical levels, PSYOP effectiveness may be seriously compromised.

*A three-pronged approach must be adopted to improve decisionmaking in PSYOP.*

- First, the risk of an occasional poor product must be accepted and mitigated with a rapid effects assessment and product revision process that limits the damage by quickly revising and reissuing it as an improved product. This approach should be codified in both policy and doctrine and resourced accordingly.
- Second, a process for preapproval of tactical programs and products should be adopted.
- Third, the USD(P) should delegate the approval process to someone with day-to-day access to contingency policy who can review products expeditiously.

In the case of both tactical product approval by the JPOTF and of JPOTF products by the Pentagon, products should be forwarded with product control sheets that log an expiration time, after which their approval is assumed and handled accordingly. The sole responsibility of the approval authority should be to check for consistency with policy and the combatant commander's plan. Quality control would be the sole responsibility of the JPOTF and, for tactical products, the JPOTF with assumed confidence in the tactical forces' knowledge of the specific target audience. For this approach to be effective, the JPOTF would need direct liaison authority with the Policy official designated with product approvals in order to resolve outstanding issues expeditiously, and tactical PSYOP forces will need around-the-clock connectivity with the JPOTF.

Given the range and complexity of the many recommendations made in this report, it would be unwise simply to allocate more resources for PSYOP forces. Without a genuine and abiding commitment to eliminating the shortcomings that constrain PSYOP effectiveness, there is much less reason to expect a significant improvement in its ability to produce effects for the combatant

commander. Decisionmakers should solicit a detailed reform plan from the PSYOP community and leadership that provides specific details and timelines for reform consistent with the recommendations made here. If the proposed reforms are approved, then senior decisionmakers should provide the appropriate level of resources needed to realize the reform plan.

## Specific Recommendations

This report provides an independent assessment of the lessons learned from OEF, OIF, OIF 2, and the stability operations of the past several decades that contribute to the body of understanding concerning PSYOP. No doubt there are multiple ways of addressing the issues raised herein, many of which depend on the level of political and fiscal capital available. For this reason, the study team has crafted a set of recommendations that would offer decisionmakers a menu of options that, taken collectively, would substantially increase the quality of PSYOP performance.

- Create an OSD-led field agency for support to public diplomacy with a large contractor base in the Washington, DC, area, run by Policy personnel and with content oversight from Policy regional deputy assistant secretaries, depending on the contingency in question. The organization's mandate would be to obtain or create commercial-quality, policy-consistent radio/television and print content for general foreign audiences that supports public diplomacy with priority attention to support of U.S. military operations, and to help assess the effects of this material. It would have a fly-away capability to assist political authorities managing stability operations in the field. This content would be disseminated through PSYOP forces.
- Recommend to the National Security Advisor that the President establish an authoritative mechanism for determining longer-term national themes and for interagency coordination on target audience analyses.
- Reform the PSYOP approval process. Consistent with recommendations in this report, have the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict [ASD(SO/LIC)] draft a DOD Directive, and the Joint Staff develop a supporting CJCSI, to establish the new procedures.
- Formulate a well-articulated PSYOP operating concept and a vision for how that concept will evolve as part of the Department's push toward transformation. Such a concept would clear up any confusion over the PSYOP mission and how it related to public diplomacy and public affairs and would clarify the relative importance of PSYOP at the theater and tactical levels and in support of major combat operations and stability operations. Additionally, the concept would make it easier for PSYOP to harness technology effectively. PSYOP should develop a supporting concept that would help to inform planning, doctrine, and acquisition. Consistent with the findings in this report and DOD guidance, the PSYOP concept should have the following attributes:
  - focused on support to the combatant commander
  - fully exploiting cooperation with public diplomacy and public affairs
  - fully exploiting cooperation with other IO core capabilities
  - full-spectrum PSYOP
  - multi-mission capable
  - cross-cultural
  - theater-tactical balance

- diversified delivery
  - fully integrated
  - expeditionary
  - rapid, responsive end-to-end planning and product cycles.
- Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to modify Joint PSYOP doctrine to reflect the more specific depiction of the PSYOP mission first enumerated in the *IO Roadmap* and reinforced in this report. Ensure that all relevant instructions and directives are consistent with it. Specifically enumerate the tasks PSYOP performs as opposed to those conducted by public diplomacy and public affairs. Include the permissibility and the desirability of PSYOP cooperating with public diplomacy and public affairs within these guidelines, to include exchanging information on target audience analysis, raw media materials such as video clips, and facilities.
  - Direct Policy to work for legislative changes that would exempt PSYOP product development from copyright laws. This would expedite product development and provide a broader array of potential themes, images, logos, and icons for use in PSYOP leaflets and handbills.
  - Direct SOCOM to quickly produce a detailed PSYOP reform plan consistent with the recommendations in this study, laying out a specific action plan to improve the quality of PSYOP products with estimated costs (assuming a tripling of PSYOP resources on an annual basis) that gives priority attention to:
    - integration with IO and representation on combatant commander staffs. PSYOP personnel should have a prominent place in IO command slots and planning staffs since they are more numerous than the other IO core capability specialists, benefit disproportionately from integration with other IO core competencies, and are accustomed to command of personnel experts in both the hard and soft IO disciplines (human and electronic or automated decisionmaking) and to their integration in planning. PSYOP personnel prefer isolation from IO, largely in the mistaken hope that they will be accorded direct access to commanders. PSYOP needs leadership willing to embrace IO, oversee a general reform of PSYOP, and, on occasion, deploy to command a JPOTF to ensure PSYOP is well represented at the combatant commander staff level. Serious consideration should be given to creating a flag officer for PSYOP to support the commander, ACAPOC, for these purposes.
    - a plan to integrate the JPSE into the Media Operations Center with a mission of immediate (less than 24 hours), tailored product support to tactical PSYOP forces in the field and institutional memory of products and effects
    - a new recruitment process to draw in more functional experts in persuasive communications, similar to the direct accession program for Special Forces
    - a revised set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that provides more user-friendly templates for field use, and a revised training program (reserve and

active) that includes greater familiarization with cross-cultural communication techniques and overall multimedia campaign planning with the TTP templates that are easily exportable to the field. The plan must include the possibility of expansion to take in officers from other services.

- options for force structure redesign that would make PSYOP units more modular while providing more tactical PSYOP capability consistent with the Army evolution to transformed, approximately brigade-sized, units
  - an option for redesigning the Strategic Studies Detachment to better support tactical target analysis, with the assumption that national-level institutions will conduct strategic studies and share them with the 4<sup>th</sup> POG
  - procedures for increasing the number of PSYOP planners available for contingencies and facilitating training of other service PSYOP planners in the context of the IO career force
  - specific revisions to all SOCOM mission statements for PSYOP and to Army PSYOP doctrine to ensure their consistency with revised Joint PSYOP Doctrine (see above) and the *IO Roadmap*, and to PSYOP tactics, techniques, and procedures to provide field-friendly templates for tactical product development
  - means to contract for world-class translation and linguistic services, at home and abroad
  - a plan for online data management of all PSYOP personnel biographies that will permit the commander, 4<sup>th</sup> POG, to immediately determine sociological profiles and skill sets resident in all active and reserve PSYOP forces at either Fort Bragg or the Army's Human Resources Command
  - production of budget estimates for meeting the specific recommendations in this report, and in particular those required for exploiting the PSYOP ACTD for product dissemination in denied areas, expanding the Wind Supported Aerial Delivery System (WSADS) program so that every tactical company has three at its disposal, and producing a communications architecture study with options to fix the theater-tactical communications problem.
- Direct a team of national laboratories, led by Lincoln Laboratories and supported by service laboratories, to initiate an urgent examination of the technical challenges involved in the interdiction of an adversary's national communications infrastructure.
  - Direct the military services to develop concepts and requirements for new platforms that evaluate the feasibility of including PSYOP broadcast and leaflet delivery requirements.



# Main Report

To assess the validity of lessons learned concerning PSYOP performance in recent operations, some basic questions must be asked and answered upfront. First, what is PSYOP's mission; what are PSYOP forces supposed to be prepared to do? Were they asked to doing anything different in recent conflicts? What effects were PSYOP forces expected to produce, and could those effects be measured? What standards should PSYOP meet in executing its missions? Finally, how did PSYOP actually perform in recent operations? What effects did it produce, and is there room for improvement? The first few sections of this report address these issues in order to establish a foundation for discussing specific lessons learned from recent operational experience.

## 1. Definition and Mission

Historically, the Pentagon has defined *psychological operations* quite broadly:

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.<sup>4</sup>

This definition specifies that the audience is foreign but does not distinguish between friend or foe, individuals or governments. Moreover, the goal is wide-ranging, from behavior modification to "influence." Slightly more specifically, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's Web site states that PSYOP's mission is to "disseminate truthful information to foreign audiences in support of U.S. goals and objectives."<sup>5</sup> Similarly, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command defines the ultimate objective of U.S. military psychological operations as the ability "to convince enemy, neutral, and friendly nations and forces to take action favorable to the United States and its allies."<sup>6</sup> In order to accomplish this goal, ACAPOC pursues the PSYOP missions set forth in Joint Doctrine. Joint Publication 3-53 outlines the missions of PSYOP units as:<sup>7</sup>

- advising the supported commander through the targeting process regarding targeting restrictions, psychological actions, and psychological enabling actions to be executed by the military force
- influencing foreign populations by expressing information through selected conduits to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or non-interference with friendly military operations
- providing public information to foreign populations to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order
- serving as the supported commander's voice to foreign populations by conveying the Joint Force Commander's intent

- countering adversary propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and opposing information to correctly portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others the ability to polarize public opinion and affect the political will of the United States and its multinational partners within an operational area.

Again, these missions are quite broad and are essentially the same ones enumerated in Army doctrine.<sup>8</sup> Under these general mandates, the Army's 4<sup>th</sup> POG provides a more specific set of sub-missions or tasks:<sup>9</sup>

- rapidly deploy assigned forces to support Army conventional or Special Operations forces and U.S. Marine Corps maneuver forces
- develop PSYOP campaign plans and integrate them with operational-level plans or theater peacetime PSYOP programs. These could include non-PSYOP military information support missions such as humanitarian assistance, refugee control operations, or noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).
- conceive, develop, and produce PSYOP media products, to include: aerially delivered leaflets, posters, handbills, audio-visual products, video tapes, AM/FM radio broadcasts, and tactical loudspeaker broadcasts (via manpack, vehicle, boat, or helicopter)
- conduct operational-level PSYOP campaigns: establish a Joint PSYOP headquarters, direct and employ the full range of multiservice PSYOP assets, and conduct liaison with service components (for example, U. S. Air Force for leaflet drops) and host nation or coalition cells to effect dissemination of the products
- conduct tactical-level PSYOP in concert with ground operations
- provide PSYOP linguists with cultural expertise to assist commanders in planning and executing PSYOP missions
- prepare basic and special PSYOP intelligence assessments and studies for CJCS, unified commanders, and other Government agencies, as directed by SOCOM.

A more constraining definition of the PSYOP mission is provided in the *IO Roadmap*. This specifies that the PSYOP objective is “aggressive behavior modification of adversaries at the operational and tactical level of war,” in “support of military endeavors in non-permissive and semi-permissive environments.” As a collateral mission, the *IO Roadmap* assigns PSYOP responsibility for supporting public diplomacy as part of the approved security cooperation guidelines.<sup>10</sup>

## 2. Standards of Performance

Senior decisionmakers need to better understand the contribution that PSYOP makes to military operations in order to decide whether to spend marginal defense dollars on PSYOP or some other type of military capability. They need to know whether PSYOP produces effects, to what extent,

and how best to improve those effects. In short, defense decisionmakers need measures of effectiveness. Although quantitative measures of effectiveness for PSYOP are difficult to obtain and not fully reliable, it is possible to make qualitative assessments of PSYOP effects, and it is possible to hold PSYOP accountable for standards of performance that are more rather than less likely to produce desired effects. The purpose of this section is to explain how.

*Causation not the standard.* Establishing a direct causal relationship between PSYOP messages and their intended behavioral effects is often difficult and subjective. The assumption in this study is that it is impossible to prove causation when assessing the effect of PSYOP on target audiences. In Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, more than 40 million leaflets were dropped before the commencement of fighting. The leaflets urged Iraqi citizens to ignore the directives of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party leadership and encouraged Iraqi soldiers to voluntarily surrender. The subsequent behavior of Iraqis suggests that many may have complied with the PSYOP requests, but their compliance might not have been caused by the PSYOP efforts. It is possible they ultimately acted irrespective of PSYOP. For example, many might have surrendered in the face of overwhelming U.S. military superiority even without a PSYOP campaign. Extensive post-conflict surveys could provide a better indication of what motivated Iraqis to desert their posts, but surveys could not prove causation.

*Direct behavioral correlation the standard for audience and behavior-specific PSYOP.* While causation cannot be proved, it is possible to substantiate a correlation between PSYOP efforts and PSYOP effects, both directly and indirectly. Direct substantiation of PSYOP effects is best seen when PSYOP requests specific behaviors that then materialize in close proximity (time and distance) to the operations (usually at the tactical level). For example, in recent fighting in OIF, Iraqi insurgents hid among women and children while engaging in combat operations with coalition forces. In order to cull out the insurgents, the U.S. military broadcast loudspeaker messages denouncing the insurgents as cowards. Often the insurgents responded by emerging to fight more directly. It is possible that they felt trapped and were moving to extricate themselves or for some other reason. However, the extremely close proximity between the loudspeaker broadcasts and the dramatic change in the target audience behavior suggests a strong correlation between the two. Interviewing captured insurgents might further substantiate this correlation.

Psychological operations conducted on Faylaka Island in the first Persian Gulf War provide another example of a close correlation between a conveyed PSYOP message and the recipient's observed behavior. In this example, a tactical PSYOP team operating from a helicopter broadcast instructions for surrendering to an Iraqi unit on the island. The next day, the Iraqi unit complied with the broadcast instructions, and the U.S. Marines were able to take control of the island without firing a shot. The short time period between the execution of the PSYOP message (helicopter broadcasts) and the resulting behavior (surrender of the Iraqi unit) demonstrates a strong relationship between the two, albeit less direct and immediate than the preceding example of the insurgents.

Less direct and immediate correlation between tactical PSYOP efforts and target audience behavior may still be substantiated after the fact, especially by means of polling and interviews. For example, in the Korean War, approximately one-third of the total prisoner of war (POW) population polled by the United Nations (UN) forces claimed to have surrendered at least in part

because of the propaganda leaflets.<sup>11</sup> The contributions of PSYOP in the first Persian Gulf War have also been corroborated through POW interviews. Ninety-eight percent of the 87,000 POWs captured either possessed or had seen PSYOP leaflets that provided them with instructions on how to approach U.S. troops to surrender. Fifty-eight percent of the prisoners interviewed claimed to have heard coalition radio broadcasts, and 46 percent believed that the coalition broadcasts were truthful despite coming from their enemy.<sup>12</sup> Again, some portion of the surrenders might have occurred even without PSYOP encouragement; but certainly, there would appear to be a correlation between PSYOP, which offered the enemy a way to escape the onslaught of U.S. military power, and their compliance with those instructions.

*Indirect substantiation of audience and behavior-specific PSYOP effects.* Less direct substantiation of PSYOP effects can come in the form of expert opinion, based on a thorough knowledge of an operation and its many variables. General Charles Wilhelm, commander of the Marine division during Operation *Restore Hope* in Somalia, believed “PSYOP loudspeaker teams were a combat reducer. . . . They reduced the incidents of combat, and saved the lives of my Marines and the lives of the Somalis as well.”<sup>13</sup> Less direct substantiation also comes in the form of expert opinion verified by the *absence* of PSYOP. When the 200-plus PSYOP personnel supporting the Marines in Somalia were replaced with a UN force of less than 10 public affairs personnel, some experts predicted that General Mohamed Farah Aideded would quickly prevail in the “information war,” and they felt vindicated by ensuing events.

*Indirect attitudinal correlation the standard for general audience and non-behavior-specific PSYOP.* Frequently, PSYOP attempts to shift attitudes in a target audience as a prelude or contribution to behavioral changes. The simple logic is that behavior that correlates with American interests is more likely if it is based on a favorable set of beliefs or attitudes resident within the target audience. Instead of directly requesting behavior, PSYOP disseminates messages designed to change attitudes in a manner favorable to U.S. interests, with the presumption that favorable attitudes will contribute to positive behavior.

Attempts to change attitudes or reinforce existing positive attitudes are made by PSYOP at the tactical level with small and specific audiences, and at the theater level with broad and amorphous general audiences. Polling, interviews, focus groups, general intelligence assessments, and other techniques may provide indications of whether there is any demonstrable correlation between the PSYOP efforts and shifts in attitudes favorable to the United States. With smaller, more specific audiences, the assessment of effects is easier. At the theater level with general populations, the presence of many additional independent variables that could potentially influence the target audience makes it much more difficult and resource-intensive to establish a correlation between PSYOP efforts and shifts in attitude within the target audience. The assumption here is that an indirect substantiation of PSYOP effects based on expert opinion with access to multiple information sources is the best assessment possible for PSYOP directed at general audiences that attempts to influence general attitudes rather than requesting specific behavior (which normally describes theater-level PSYOP).

In summary, the assumption in this study is that the best evidence of tactical PSYOP performance against a specific audience is direct observable evidence of compliance with the requested behavior in close proximity to PSYOP efforts. The best evidence of PSYOP

performance against a general audience that does not request specific behaviors, but rather attempts to change attitudes and beliefs, is indirect evidence of changes in attitudes (or stable attitudes when other indicators are turning negative) through surveys, polls, and anecdotal but expert opinions on population moods. This is particularly true for theater-level PSYOP that targets very broad and diverse population groups.

As with many areas of military endeavor, it is not possible to establish quantitative standards of effectiveness for PSYOP that can be reliably measured. However, it is possible to establish qualitative performance standards for PSYOP effects that can then be assessed with the use of direct observation, polling, surveys, interviews, and other methods. Both the standards and the means of assessing PSYOP performance against them should be derived from a review of other persuasive communications disciplines insofar as they are reasonably transferable to PSYOP given its objectives, means available, and operating environment. These issues are addressed in the following section of the report.

### **Comparison with Industry Standards for Persuasive Communication**

To determine extant best practices in the persuasive communications field that are relevant to PSYOP, the study team requested specialists at Booz Allen Hamilton to review such practices and summarize them for assessment of their relevance to PSYOP. The results of that effort can be discussed in two parts.

- The analytical framework for communications strategy, decisionmaking, execution, and evaluation is well established and might be referred to as the “science” of persuasive communication since these processes are generally agreed upon, easily observable, and produce results that can more or less be measured. It will be discussed below under the rubric of “campaign processes.”
- The use of images, messages, and sensory stimuli to motivate target audiences is still very much a creative process, the results of which are less certain but that can be evaluated qualitatively if not quantitatively. The creative process of product development might be referred to as the “art” of persuasive communications. It will be discussed below as “product development guidelines.”

Eight best commercial and social marketing practices were identified and then examined for relevance to PSYOP.

*Have a strategic communications planning process.* Accepting a message is a process. Individuals move through the stages of the process: awareness, understanding, adoption, and internalization. A strong communications program builds awareness, shapes attitudes, and ultimately serves as a catalyst for action. Strategic communications planning requires strong integration and cohesion between resources, processes, product execution, and measurement effectiveness. It is a performance-driven approach to communications management that relies on strategy, accountability, and continuous improvement in support of tangible, measurable goals and outcomes.

- Potential relevance to PSYOP:
  - PSYOP has fewer opportunities to measure its impact, but it must maintain a constant process of qualitative assessment backed by quantitative measures wherever possible.
  - Specific products and assessments of their effects must be linked to an overarching strategy (that is, theater and tactical PSYOP must be in constant communication, with theater PSYOP updating tactical PSYOP on evolving objectives and feedback from other locales, and tactical PSYOP feeding tactical assessments of product effectiveness back to theater PSYOP planners).

*Segment and then re-segment your audience.* Marketers often limit the success of their programs by targeting too broad an audience. Effective marketing begins with a strong understanding of *which* audiences the program is intended to effect and which is most likely to help the organization achieve its specific goals. Good marketers identify their audiences, then re-segment, evaluating priority audiences versus related stakeholders before targeting their audience with products. Good market segments are accessible, winnable, homogeneous within the segment, heterogeneous across segments, and have the characteristics conducive to being “profitable.”

- Potential relevance to PSYOP:
  - Since PSYOP must be prepared to go on short notice, it often does not have the luxury of a lengthy target audience analysis. Therefore, to be successful, it must be able to rapidly assess target audiences and quickly segment them. An overview of the target audience may be possible from analytic skills either resident in the Intelligence Community broadly or within the Strategic Studies Detachment, but the local knowledge that will permit refined target audience segmentation probably must be provided through other means. Rapid predeployment access of open sources through conferences and other mechanisms might help, but PSYOP will need to perform ongoing assessments in theater, using allies or contracting resources.
  - PSYOP also may not have the luxury of “writing off” market segments that are not “profitable,” but it can certainly concentrate on those that are most winnable. Knowing the sub-segments of target audiences will make both theater and tactical PSYOP efforts more effective. The need to segment and re-segment an audience to be effective underscores the point that theater-level efforts aimed at general audiences alone, while important in their own right, are not sufficient.

*Become a customer-centric marketing organization.* Best practices in marketing are centered on the “customer” that the programs are trying to reach. Marketers must have a strong understanding of their customers’ behavior, motivations, perceptions, and preferences *before* marketing to them. This requires not only thoughtfully and deliberately analyzing norms, culture, and demographics, but also listening to customers to discover needs, values, and

motivations over time. Being customer-centric requires a shift in mindset—speaking to benefits and values, not specifications and the product the marketer wants to sell.

- Potential relevance to PSYOP:
  - To formulate an effective overall campaign, PSYOP personnel must have a deep understanding of the target audiences at all levels, including their culture and sub-cultures, and be able to communicate to the audience in terms of its perceived needs as well as PSYOP’s desired effects. In this respect, culture is more important than geography, which raises a question as to whether organizing PSYOP around geographic distinctions makes sense. It also reinforces the need for rapid and ongoing development of target audience analysis in the context of well-articulated campaign objectives.

*Become results-oriented; pre-test concepts and measure results.* All goals should be expressed in quantifiable, measurable terms. Research that reveals the return on investment and success of marketing efforts is necessary. Fact-based research not only affects and informs decisionmaking but also creates efficiency through shared best practices. Marketers must position work in terms of baseline results to help predict success of future efforts. The challenge is to shift from “We communicated/sent X kind of messages” to “We achieved these results.”

- Potential relevance to PSYOP:
  - The challenges of PSYOP measures of effectiveness are well understood, but PSYOP can and must conduct ongoing qualitative assessments of its effects. Currently, PSYOP does not have the resources to do much in this regard. The absence of such resources would be an argument in favor of focusing on tactical PSYOP (or more specifically, audience- and behavior-specific PSYOP, the effects of which are easier to assess).
  - The need to assess and record effects and change over time from baseline results, both at the tactical and theater level, speaks to the need for PSYOP to maintain institutional knowledge of its efforts. If the turnover in military personnel prohibits the development of such knowledge, the tasks should be given to civilian staff or contracted out.

*Balance long-term brand image with short-term promotions.* Beyond building brand recognition and equity to spur commercial success, addressing long-term brand management is critical. Over time, the identification of characteristics with a particular brand greatly affects the success of products in the field. A brand can be an asset or a liability, depending on the target market. However, even in cases where a target audience is resistant to a brand’s message, use of relationship-building promotional activities in addition to transactional promotions is the practice of good marketers and integrated marketing programs.

- Potential relevance to PSYOP:
  - PSYOP is both assisted and limited by the fact that it is an organ of the U.S. Government and of the U.S. military in particular. This relationship enhances the credibility of PSYOP, but it will greatly diminish that credibility for some target audiences. In such cases, PSYOP can still be effective if judiciously allied with relationship-building promotional activities—for example, assisting individual soldiers to better communicate with local populace or advertising the good work of civil affairs units.

*Become a local player.* Companies must determine the right balance of standardization and customization in their products and marketing mix. Strong companies consciously evaluate the tradeoffs and efficiencies to be gained from localizing their media and messages while keeping the corporate brand and key corporate messages consistent and integrated. Good marketers develop an appropriate level of adaptation based on in-depth audience, finances, and cultural analysis. They determine what barriers and tradeoffs exist and what level of customization is appropriate from market to market in order to create the highest returns on investments.

- Potential relevance to PSYOP:
  - This best practice reiterates the importance of target audience knowledge and linking specific PSYOP efforts to an overarching plan. It also again highlights the importance of a balance between theater PSYOP (which tends to target general audiences with non-behavior-specific products) and tactical PSYOP (which tends to target much more local and specific audiences with specific behavior requests).

*Create and engage in communities.* Companies aim to fill the need individuals have for acceptance, belonging, and connectedness that often is at the psychological core of their consumers. Commercial marketing attempts to create communities of needs in consumers through product identification, and social marketers use a sense of community to create identification with the shared needs of a group.

- Potential relevance to PSYOP:
  - PSYOP often makes straightforward appeals to individual self-interest: self-preservation or self-improvement through rewards of various kinds. This best practice suggests that PSYOP also should target even more fundamental emotional needs of individuals. PSYOP should promote group identities that would be appealing to the target audience but that would undermine affiliation with, or stand as an alternative to, target audience identification with U.S. enemies.

*Use alternative channels and evaluate when to bypass traditional ones.* Alternatives to traditional marketing vehicles include a range of word-of-mouth marketing techniques, often referred to in the private sector as “buzz marketing,” “street marketing,” or “diffusion marketing.” Social marketing also exploits a range of new and creative advocacy channels, each




attempting to reach the consumer while bypassing traditional media channels. These includes emerging electronic media such as Weblogs and chat rooms, as well as the use of a range of third-party “influencers” and “evangelists” to persuade through increased credibility.

- Potential relevance to PSYOP:
  - PSYOP forces that establish a good contact net within local communities could exploit these alternative advocacy channels. For example, informal, face-to-face communications with trusted and credible local sources could be used to help squelch or start rumors<sup>14</sup> favorable to U.S. objectives. To be most effective, PSYOP would have to coordinate such efforts with a wider set of distribution channels available to information operations. In particular, where alternative channels require nonattribution of the message to PSYOP sources, they likely would be better and more appropriately exploited by other U.S. Government agencies.

*PSYOP science: persuasive communication campaign processes.* Most of the best practices enumerated above could be captured in a PSYOP campaign process that continuously defines, analyzes, measures, and improves product quality.

Figure 2–1. Product Development Process

**A communications strategy that is reflective of best practices is supported by a process that continuously defines, analyzes, measures and improves product quality.**



(U) Source: Booz, Allen & Hamilton, “Discussion Document: The Science and Art of Persuasive Communications,” September 2, 2004.

The processes outlined in Joint and Army PSYOP doctrine, and more specifically in Army PSYOP TTPs, generally reflect this industry cycle. Joint doctrine describes PSYOP plan development as consisting of four steps: research and analysis, development, production requirements, and dissemination. Army doctrine highlights four phases of PSYOP planning: planning, target audience analysis, product development and dissemination, and test and evaluation. Army TTPs emphasize intelligence preparation, planning, target audience analysis, product development, and evaluation of product effectiveness.<sup>15</sup> Doctrine and TTPs could place more emphasis on the requirement to assess results that can then be used to inform the next cycle, but the process steps are essentially similar. Both doctrine and industry processes emphasize well-defined objectives, careful research and feedback, clear products, and attention to timing and repetition in product dissemination.

More specific guidelines for a successful persuasive communication campaign are less agreed upon than the overarching process itself. There are numerous communication strategies and tactics,<sup>16</sup> and their merits may depend on the culture of the target audience. Below is an illustrative set consistent with, but more detailed than, the best practices identified above.<sup>17</sup>

- Knowledge of Target Audience
  - Identify the segments of the audience that are easiest to persuade and focus efforts on them.
  - Identify the fears, resentments, and desires of the target audience and build the themes to take advantage of them.
  - Identify the media to which the target group is most receptive and employ them.
  - Aim persuasive messages directly at opinion leaders; they are more effective in securing changes among followers than are the mass media.
- Message Formation (some subtlety can improve effectiveness)
  - Use cultural symbols that elicit intense emotional reactions in the audience and motivations that are important within the target society (achievement, power, affiliation, intimacy, unity) to express the desired message.
  - A message that seems close to the audience's core beliefs is more likely to be adopted than one that does not.
  - In constructing the message, use pre-existing attitudes to establish agreement with what is being said (resonance), and then provide the concept you wish to be accepted.
  - Laying out the evidence in a way that makes it natural for the audience to draw the desired conclusion on their own is more persuasive than providing them with that conclusion explicitly.

- If the target audience can comply with a small request, it is more likely to comply with larger ones later—even ones they previously would not have complied with—since a cooperative mode will have been established.
- Present the message as a “right” or a “choice” so the audience feels it is retaining freedom or control.
- Use of Emotion (a powerful tool, but one difficult to master)
  - Use imagery (television or other images) to make emotional appeals and print media when appealing to logic and reason.
  - Using slight levels of fear in messages is persuasive for most people, especially if the message also provides a way to alleviate that fear (by taking some actions).
  - Humor can increase message retention but does not usually increase persuasion, and it is one of the most difficult concepts to translate from one language to another.
- Source of Message (source credibility matters)
  - Use authority figures for the target culture and use them authentically to convey the message.
  - Positions that appear contrary to the source’s self-interest are more persuasive.
  - Use individuals who are considered attractive to the target culture, and who do not seem to be motivated by self-interest, to convey the message.
  - An attractive source is more credible and more persuasive than an unattractive source.
  - Dogmatic and authoritarian groups are most likely to respond to authority figures.
- Message Environment (volume, in comparison with competition, is important)
  - Create an environment in which adopting the desired attitude or belief is considered socially desirable.
  - Expose the audience in advance to your opponent’s counterarguments (inoculation) and show the audience how to refute them so they are more inclined to resist the opponent’s arguments.

- The ability of inoculated people to resist attitude change is greater than for non-inoculated people, even when they are exposed to counterarguments they have never heard before.
  - Conversely, target audiences that are acclimated to countervailing messages will be harder to affect and will demonstrate a higher level of cognitive dissonance, even to truthful messages.
- The more the audience learns and remembers about a message, the more likely it is to be persuaded by it.
  - Controlling the majority of communication avenues better allows a communicator to affect behaviors with misrepresentations and at odds with the target audience's self-interests.<sup>18</sup>

The point to take from these illustrative examples of communication principles is that an effective PSYOP campaign requires sophistication. That is not to say that each product must be elaborate, but rather that the overall campaign requires functional knowledge in some key areas: better means to access target audiences, deliberate nuance in themes and messages, careful but systematic use of emotion, attention to means to improve credibility, and volume of output in comparison with the competition.

*Comparing industry best practices with PSYOP tactics, techniques, and procedures.* A review of Army TTPs for PSYOP demonstrates that the PSYOP community, or at least the writers of TTPs, understands many of industry's best practices.<sup>19</sup> However, the Booz Allen Hamilton review recommended a few areas for improvement:

- The TTPs do not discuss the strategic marketing planning process but focus instead on individual products.
- Tools and techniques for measurement of product effectiveness are extensive and thorough but do not provide effective "how-to" steps or a template to facilitate the process.
- Audience segmentation is discussed extensively, but the target audience analysis worksheet is insufficient to gauge audience characteristics, values, and motivations.
- The TTPs do not provide tools to integrate messaging across communications activities and products.
- The TTPs could be made more user-friendly for personnel operating in a fast-moving field environment.

To help correct some of these shortcomings (particularly the first and last ones), Booz Allen Hamilton suggested a set of criteria for systematic evaluation of PSYOP process and individual products quality. Each factor would be evaluated on a scale of 1 to 5:

- 1 = criteria not considered
- 2 = criteria not met
- 3 = criteria believed to have been met
- 4 = criteria met with reasonable level of certainty
- 5 = criteria met and validated through testing.

The criteria for the overall plan and process were the following questions:

- Is there a comprehensive plan that details objective, strategy, target audience, media channel, resources, and tactical rollout plan in support of this communications product?
- Does the plan clearly identify realistic, achievable, audience-focused, and concrete objectives of your communications product? Does it:
  - inform (raise awareness of an issue)
  - instruct (tell the audience how to do something)
  - interpret (help the audience develop its own perception of value or use)
  - persuade (prompt desired behavior or induce specific actions)?
- Is there a greater campaign strategy that integrates products?
- Is this communication the most cost-effective means of reaching the target audience when compared to other media? Has this comparison been done?
- Is this communication product or plan consistent with other communications that also support this key message? Has there been cross-functional collaboration with other key players?
- Does this communications product support the organization's brand values?
- Did you have a strong understanding of the target audience's attitudes, perceptions, motivations, and preferences to develop an appropriate baseline for product development?
- Did you identify the segments of the audience that are easiest to persuade and focus product efforts on them?
- Did you clearly identify preferences, opinions, and specific barriers to message acceptance and behavior change?
- Did you determine whether logical or emotional appeals would be more effective in persuading members of the target culture?
- Was the media selected aimed at the specific audience that you are trying to reach?
- Were alternative outlets (such as town hall meetings, electronic vehicles, presentation at appropriate local function) considered?
- Did you build relationships with local influencers to support the credibility of this product and increase its effectiveness with the target audience?

*PSYOP art: product development guidelines.* By comparison with best practices for process, best practices for individual products are more a matter of art than science. There are general rules depending on the type of media in question, but the ultimate success of a product is in large part due to creative talent and intuition based on knowledge of a target audience. Moreover, the specialists at Booz Allen Hamilton found that the PSYOP TTP manual generally did a good job of providing guidelines for individual products. However, to summarize and simplify the TTPs to facilitate product evaluation in the field, a subjective set of criteria, organized by message, persuasiveness, and effectiveness, was recommended. The critical success factors for each category follow.

- Product message:
  - Is the message clear? Does it involve the reader directly?
  - Does the communication include a specific call to action if appropriate? Is the audience given a choice to make?
  - When concepts are relevant, have you found a simple, straightforward means of presenting the information?
  - Is the copy written to support key mission objectives? Is the messaging consistent with other communications?
  - Is the message targeted at getting the attention of the specific audience? Is it what you want to say, or is it what they want to hear?
  - Do the key messages focus on the audience needs and values? Did you consciously evaluate both a positive approach that speaks to audience benefits as well as a negative approach that speaks to audience consequences?
  - Is the tone targeted to the audience and the objective of the piece? Have you had the piece proofed for local language use and style? Have you removed all unessential technical terms?
  - Does this product include captive statements to give readers a sense of urgency?
  - Does the product have the right amount of information to motivate the behavior/change the perception? Can it be reduced in size for impact? Are sentences tight and brief?
  - Have you personalized tone where appropriate to speak directly to the target audience?
- Product persuasiveness:
  - Did you decide how to apply and combine the six basic principles of persuasiveness to communicate with your audience?
    - Liking: people like those who are similar to them and who like them. To influence people, uncover real similarities and offer genuine praise.
    - Reciprocity: people repay in kind. Give what you want to receive.
    - Social proof: people follow the lead of similar others. Use peer power whenever and wherever available to influence horizontally, not vertically.

- Consistency: people align with their clear commitments. Make others' commitments active, public, and voluntary.
  - Authority: people defer to experts who provide shortcuts to decisions requiring specialized information. Do not assume your expertise is self-evident.
  - Scarcity: people value more what they can have less of. Highlight unique benefits and exclusive information to persuade.
- Product effectiveness:
  - Did you develop two or three key messages and test them prior to copywriting?
  - Was the proposed creative concept/visual/messaging tested prior to execution?
  - Was the design of the product visually appealing to the target audience?
  - Was the product delivered at the right time to the target audience?
  - Did you determine optimum timing for message delivery and identify obstacles?
  - Does the plan for this product include a direct or indirect mechanism to evaluate its success?
  - Was qualitative or quantitative research conducted to demonstrate the product's ability to achieve the desired objective?
  - Was the product effective? Did it meet its established objective?
  - Did you weigh the cost against the value of the measurement tools you used for pre- or post-testing?
  - Were the results of the campaign captured and communicated to serve as a tool for future PSYOP missions?
  - Product gross rating points (reach times frequency)
    - Reach: will the communication reach the target audience with a high level of certainty?
    - Frequency: will the product be disseminated/distributed repeatedly? If not, will the messages be reinforced through another channel in an integrated fashion?

The criteria and rating scheme proposed by Booz Allen Hamilton for both process and products are suggested as a means of correcting the difficulties of using the elaborate TTPs in the field. They could serve as a simplified field-level tool to evaluate PSYOP efforts. They would help focus field personnel on integrating the concepts of effective marketing strategy with the tactical considerations of effective product design in a format that is easy to use, and could serve as both a pre-production/planning tool and a post-production evaluation.

The short list provided by Booz Allen Hamilton elevates and integrates some of the most important criteria for success. Whether PSYOP forces adopt these criteria, some modified version of them, or altogether different ones based on expert functional knowledge and advice, is less important than making evaluation of process, product, quality, and effectiveness a routine in the PSYOP force. Because quality is subjective and effects are difficult to measure, PSYOP

success often is expressed in meaningless terms of simple output (number of leaflets, broadcasts, and so forth). The pertinent observation is that systematic evaluation of both process and product quality and effectiveness must become part of the ethos of PSYOP.

### **Applicability to PSYOP: Four Caveats**

While noting some room for improvement, especially with respect to process, the review here does not indicate that there are any insurmountable hurdles in PSYOP doctrine to adopting best practices. On the contrary, the TTP manual generally supports best practices. Therefore, leaving aside the question of whether current resources would permit the employment of best practices, there is no reason not to evaluate PSYOP effects by their own TTPs. However, it is necessary to assess how PSYOP differs from either commercial or social marketing<sup>20</sup> before simply accepting commercial best practices as the norm for PSYOP. The study team found that in several respects, best practices for persuasive communication need caveats or modification when applied to PSYOP.

*Access to target audience.* PSYOP faces some serious constraints in pursuing communication campaign principles and processes. Most significantly, and depending on the circumstances, PSYOP may have more difficulty in accessing a target audience. PSYOP also is likely to have more trouble establishing credibility with the audience and pushing a substantial volume of product to the target audience than normally would be the case for other forms of persuasive communications. To compensate for these constraints, it is incumbent upon PSYOP to make extraordinary efforts to build a knowledge base or have easy access to a knowledge base of target audiences in the event of a contingency.

- Caveat One: PSYOP access to one target audience for assessment and feedback is more constrained than in other persuasive communications disciplines, and it must compensate with extraordinary efforts to understand the target audience.

*Truth and credibility.* It is generally agreed that the credibility of a source is greater when the source is perceived as truthful, and the inclination to believe the source is telling the truth is greater when the target audience considers the source credible. Yet some PSYOP professionals take this correlation too far and assert that only the truth persuades, and PSYOP only promulgates the truth.<sup>21</sup> Anyone who attempts to persuade others generally asserts that they speak the truth; but truth and credibility are not coincidental, and PSYOP professionals must be cognizant of this fact. A source can be seen as fudging or spinning the facts in a self-serving manner and still be seen as quite credible, especially when the message resonates emotionally with the target audience. Moreover, as noted above, it is generally accepted that if a communicator can control the majority of communication avenues, he can affect behaviors with misrepresentations, even ones that are at odds with the target audience's own self-interests.

Insofar as the threat of military force or the actual use of force is often involved when PSYOP is employed, the presumption is that there is a clash of interests that potentially puts the U.S. military at odds with certain target audiences. As a result, PSYOP often will start from a position of relatively low credibility with a target audience. However, PSYOP can compensate and build credibility with adroit appeals to emotions or self-interests or by underscoring the truth



of certain assertions through a demonstration of their validity. In short, the use of truth may be a policy issue for PSYOP, but it is not an inviolable rule for effectiveness.

- **Caveat Two:** PSYOP must use truth but not only the simple truth, as is sometimes asserted by PSYOP professionals; it must use the full range of persuasive communication techniques to compensate for its credibility deficit (including threats and appeals to emotion).

*Balancing appeals to reason and emotion.* The old marketing adage that reason persuades, but emotion motivates—with the corollary that appeals to reason are more likely to produce longer lasting effects while appeals to emotion are more likely to produce shorter but more immediate effects—is a critical consideration for PSYOP. PSYOP, because of its military context, is primarily interested in tactical effects. If an appeal to emotion, as opposed to reason, will produce the desired effect, this is an acceptable PSYOP tactic, especially in a combat environment. The message “come out and fight like a man,” with its raw appeal to emotion, has little to do with truth but may be very effective in some circumstances. As a tactic, the public will accept such appeals to emotion when employed in a conflict zone against an adversary that is harming U.S. interests and personnel.

The observation that one must manipulate emotion effectively would not surprise marketing specialists, but it would be considered more suspect in U.S. Government persuasive communication disciplines such as public diplomacy and public affairs that deal with the domestic public and friendly or neutral foreign audiences. They would insist that with such audiences, truth and appeals to reason are both more effective and more legitimate. The assertion here is that such is not necessarily the case for PSYOP, which helps to partly explain the unease that exists and unsettles cooperation between these government information activity sets. If short-term appeals to emotion by PSYOP are perceived especially to undermine longer-term appeals to reason, then PSYOP tactics may appear to counter longer-term U.S. Government objectives—a conflict of interest that must be reconciled. Even if there does not appear to be a conflict between short- and long-term objectives, the difficulty for PSYOP is that effective use of emotion requires a deep knowledge of the target audience (the problem raised in caveat one).

- **Caveat Three:** PSYOP’s use of emotion is acceptable when deconflicted with other longer-term information objectives (often pursued in parallel with public diplomacy and public affairs), but it can only be as effective as PSYOP’s knowledge of the target audience.

*Persuasion and coercion.* Appeals of any kind backed by coercion can produce immediate effects, assuming there is freedom to comply with the source’s requests. In this regard some persuasive communication transcends culture by the most basic appeals to self-interest, including survival and well-being. While PSYOP advertises the rewards of cooperation with American forces and objectives, it also has an advantage over other disciplines of persuasive communication in that it supports military operations that may use the ultimate coercive: force. The threat of lethal force, or even the perception of controlling events through the threat of such force, can be a significant inducement to behavior modification, one that helps compensate for lesser knowledge of a target audience.

PSYOP does not differ absolutely from other persuasive communication disciplines in this regard.<sup>22</sup> Even an extreme example of coercion—such as a gun to the head—involves some persuasion. The threatened partner must be persuaded that the gun is real, that it is loaded, and that it will be fired for lack of compliance.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, even the most overt act of persuasion often appeals to a fear in the target audience—for example, implying that friends will like you less if your teeth are not whiter. Some argue that even positive inducements (such as large bounties for information on terrorists) are a form of coercion. Not everyone would agree that coercion necessarily implies force; it could also be linked to rewards, incentives, inducements, flattery, ingratiation, or bribery, and PSYOP professionals are well advised to advertise these inducements as well. In short, persuasion and coercion should be viewed as opposite anchors of an influence continuum, one that PSYOP must fully exploit.

In exploiting coercion, PSYOP must pay attention to timing the message delivery for the moment when the target audience is most susceptible. Timing is important in most persuasive communication efforts, both because a target audience may be more susceptible to a message at certain times, and because a dilatory response can allow disinformation or counterarguments to gain momentum. However, timing is particularly important for PSYOP appeals to the enemy to desert, surrender, or otherwise betray sworn duty and/or feared authorities, as the perceived window of opportunity for compliance may be brief.

- **Caveat Four:** PSYOP has a ready resort to the coercive power of the world's most powerful military and must exploit it when appropriate; indeed, it constitutes PSYOP's comparative advantage vis-à-vis other persuasive communication disciplines. However, successful exploitation of coercion requires exquisite timing.

*Modifications to normal standards.* These four caveats suggest that industry standards are generally applicable to PSYOP but require some modifications. In pursuing its mission, PSYOP has advantages and disadvantages in comparison with other persuasive communication disciplines that must be taken into account.

- **Intelligence support:** PSYOP often will have limited direct access to target audiences before the initiation of operations, for which it must compensate by aggressively exploiting all-source intelligence prior to and during deployment and rapidly assessing effects and adjusting tactics accordingly once direct access is available.
- **Measuring effects:** PSYOP effects will be difficult to measure quantitatively, but every attempt should be made to do so. PSYOP will have to accept qualitative assessments when quantitative data is not possible to obtain.
- **Credibility:** PSYOP is often inherently a less credible source than most other persuasive communication sources, as it is seen as a tool of combat forces that also employ military deception and lethal means to obtain desired results. To compensate, PSYOP must use the full range of persuasive communication techniques, including threats and appeals to emotion.

- Emotion: PSYOP must appeal to emotion as well as reason to compensate for its initial and sometimes continuing credibility deficit and to meet its need to produce short-term effects, but it must do so carefully:
  - Intimate knowledge of its target audiences is necessary for effective employment.
  - PSYOP use of emotion must not conflict with public affairs and public diplomacy objectives. Both public diplomacy and public affairs rely more heavily on reason than emotion, and public affairs is concerned more with domestic than foreign audiences, which makes coordinating “emotion-centric” products with them a challenge.
- Coercion: PSYOP has a comparative advantage in that it can leverage the coercive impact of military force in conflict and the possibility of major rewards from reconstruction assistance and other inducements, but it must time the appeals carefully so that there is an opportunity for compliance.

### **Observations on Reasonable Goals for PSYOP Efforts**

Persuasive communication process standards are generally well understood, whereas the quality of individual products is still largely a function of creativity and deep knowledge of target audiences. Moreover, the process standards are mostly codified in PSYOP doctrine and TTPs, so there is no reason not to hold PSYOP forces accountable to those standards. Assuming sufficient resources are available, one would expect PSYOP campaigns to emphasize careful planning, deep knowledge of target audience, clear messages with a logic train to intended effects, careful timing for greatest effect, repetition, assessment, and modification based on feedback.

A well-executed PSYOP program, especially one that leverages the military’s ability to coerce, reasonably can be expected to produce immediate effects at the tactical level. Using PSYOP to target broad audiences without leveraging coercion, without well-orchestrated and complementary public diplomacy and public affairs campaigns, and in competition with numerous sources that are more credible to the target audiences, is not as likely to produce immediate effects. And any effects that are produced will not be readily evident. The exceptions would be cases where more credible competitors to PSYOP could be shut down or out, and perhaps cases where the target audiences’ self-interests were manifest (for example, health and safety messages).

Beyond these areas where PSYOP generally has a competitive advantage, the foregoing review of industry standards suggests that there are some reasonable expectations that can be applied to every PSYOP plan and set of products.

- Integrated and sophisticated campaign. To produce a quality plan and products, PSYOP objectives must be consistent with other U.S. Government information efforts, clearly linked to the overall military campaign objectives, and updated as the political and military campaign evolves. They also must use a balanced range of techniques that are tailored as feedback becomes available. More specifically, the campaign should:

- link all products and assessments of their effects to an overarching strategy
  - balance theater PSYOP, which tends to target general audiences with non-behavior-specific products, and tactical PSYOP, with its tendency to target much more local and specific audiences with precise behavior requests
  - be carefully coordinated with public diplomacy and public affairs efforts, at least when PSYOP is asked to target broad audiences to produce more favorable attitudes about U.S. policy or operations
  - ensure that theater and tactical PSYOP are in constant communication, sharing updated objectives and assessments of effects
  - use a wide range of techniques, but balance appeals to self-interest, which are especially effective when backed with credible threats, with appeals to the fundamental emotional needs of target audiences by promoting group identities that undermine affiliation with U.S. enemies (consistent with policy and public diplomacy and public affairs efforts)
  - engage in relationship-building promotional activities where target audiences are particularly resistant to PSYOP messages
  - establish good contact nets within local communities to exploit alternative advocacy channels, and maximize their efforts to do so by coordinating with broader U.S. Government information operations efforts.<sup>24</sup>
- Quality process. A timely, repetitive planning process includes intelligence gathering, target audience analysis, product development, media selection, media production, dissemination, and assessment of results to inform the next cycle of product development. The logical connection between objectives, products, and intended effects should be clear and open to modification as feedback from product effects is made available. More specifically, PSYOP should:
    - have access to deep functional expertise of both the persuasive communications discipline in general and PSYOP process and products in particular
    - maintain long-term historical knowledge of its efforts and effects with civilian staff or contractors to inform its practices
    - pay careful attention to timing. Anything that prevents timely delivery of products to the target audience when it is most susceptible to the message will undermine the use of coercion, especially in those cases where compliance is requested on a specific timeline.
    - have ready access to templates that summarize knowledge of effective techniques for frequently encountered missions in easily comprehensible and user-friendly formats. For example, to create tactical products that induce surrender of specific enemy leaders and units, one might posit that the key elements in order of importance are a credible appeal to self-interest (coordinated with demonstrated lethal military effects), exquisite timing (when the enemy is most susceptible), and target audience savvy to ensure that the appeal is a winning one. Such templates for mission success could then be tailored to a specific target audience and operational circumstances.

- Target audience analysis. PSYOP is often handicapped by having only indirect advanced access to a target audience. Analysis of this audience is a critical part of the persuasive communications process in general. PSYOP must compensate for lower credibility, in part, by a stronger appeal to emotion, which requires subtle knowledge of a target audience. This analysis is an especially critical requirement for PSYOP. Extra effort must be made to deepen knowledge of the target audience once it is known and to provide feedback on products once they are disseminated. More specifically, PSYOP should be prepared and enabled to:
  - access deep understanding of the target audiences’ culture and subcultures
  - rapidly assess and segment target audiences, at the theater and tactical levels, with the assistance of allies or contracting resources
  - identify and concentrate on target audiences that are assessed as “winnable”
  - conduct ongoing qualitative assessments of effects, backed by quantitative measures wherever possible, giving priority to audience- and behavior-specific PSYOP, which is more easily measured. (Effects of PSYOP products at the tactical level when specific behavior is requested can be assessed more directly than changes in target audience attitude and whether they lead to changes in behavior, but both should be done frequently nevertheless.)
- Quality products and inputs. PSYOP products should reflect the general TTP guidelines. However, the quality of specific products ultimately can be estimated only by their effects on foreign audiences, not by how elaborate they seem or whether they appeal to U.S. leaders. If the desired effects are not being achieved, it is reasonable to look at the creative input (in terms of training and experience) available to PSYOP, since successful product development is still largely a creative process.

### **3. Actual PSYOP Performance in Recent Operations**

#### ***Operation Enduring Freedom***

Since Operation *Enduring Freedom* required large-scale combat operations to topple a regime, but also included many small unit operations designed to combat terrorists, it has characteristics that reflect both major combat operations and stability operations. However, the focus here is on the role of PSYOP in support of major combat operations. Observations on PSYOP performance in OEF that are specific to stability operations do not differ from the conclusions in the section on stability operations in this report.

*Pre-conflict PSYOP and organization.* PSYOP involvement in OEF began immediately following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The next day, Tactical PSYOP Detachment (TPD) 940 began target audience analysis of Afghanistan, including the Afghan populace, the Taliban, and al Qaeda.<sup>25</sup> On September 22, 2001, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) requested that SOCOM activate a JPOTF in order to prepare PSYOP operations in support of the broader military campaign. The JPOTF was activated on October 4, 2001, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and placed under the operational control of CENTCOM. Its primary objective was to support CENTCOM as it carried out its missions of short-term strike operations,

long-term counterterrorism operations, and engagement activities. By October 10, 2001, the JPOTF totaled 95 personnel, 74 of whom were located at JPOTF Main at Fort Bragg.

Following the establishment of the JPOTF, guidance and tasking were issued to PSYOP forces via the *USCENTCOM Campaign Plan: Enduring Freedom*. This document established planning directions for conducting PSYOP in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).<sup>26</sup> Specifically, the campaign plan defined PSYOP target audiences, objectives, and themes.<sup>27</sup> Primary PSYOP objectives were to:

- shift the debate from Islam to terrorism and to counter adversarial propaganda
- discourage interference with humanitarian affairs activities
- support objectives against state and non-state supporters and sponsors of terrorism
- disrupt support for and relationships of terrorist organizations.

A more detailed enumeration of PSYOP objectives for OEF is available in the classified annex to this report. At an unclassified level, they can be summarized as being quite consistent with the desire to isolate the adversary (both the Taliban and al Qaeda) from domestic and international support, and conversely, to increase the perceived legitimacy of U.S. operations. They also sought to reduce the effectiveness of Taliban and al Qaeda forces by undermining their morale and willingness to perform their missions.

*Pre-hostility PSYOP actions.* Activity focused on the development of leaflets and radio scripts, which occurred at JPOTF Main in preparation for transport to the theater of operations. EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft began to transmit radio broadcasts to Afghanistan, the first mission being executed on October 5, 2001, 2 days before the start of major combat operations.

*PSYOP during combat operations.* OEF major combat operations began on October 7, 2001. During this first stage of the CENTCOM plan, PSYOP forces carried out various missions to help prepare the ground for more substantial air-ground combat operations, including information support, humanitarian assistance, and intelligence collection. In the early stages of the operation, PSYOP was focused on product development and distribution to the theater by air. The radio scripts developed at JPOTF Main were given to Commando Solo crews for broadcast over Afghanistan, and the leaflets were shipped to PSYOP support elements (PSEs) in Diego Garcia to be assembled into leaflet bombs and disseminated via B-52s. The first leaflets were dropped into Afghanistan on October 14, 2001, almost a week after combat operations began. PSYOP units working in the field also distributed small transistor radios so Afghans could hear PSYOP broadcasts. Under the Taliban, possession of a radio was a crime, and thus few were available. More than 7,500 small battery-powered transistor radios were distributed by airdrop and by tactical PSYOP teams operating with Special Forces detachments.<sup>28</sup>

PSYOP messages initially encouraged the Taliban to cease support of al Qaeda and to return to their homes. They demonstrated some sophistication in trying to portray al Qaeda as foreign interlopers who manipulated the Taliban and tried to drive a wedge between the two parties.

But, following national policy, attempts to win over the Taliban were soon dropped, and they were placed in the crosshairs along with the terrorists. The PSYOP messages emphasized the power and determination of the United States to punish and eliminate the terrorists. The PSYOP products increasingly appealed to the Afghan people to support neither al Qaeda nor the Taliban, but rather to join in a common cause with the coalition against those parties. The PSYOP products overtly portrayed the Taliban as lackeys of foreigners (that is, Arabs) who had brought misery to Afghanistan and asserted that the coalition forces were there to help the Afghan people throw off the yoke of oppression. PSYOP put much effort into explaining why the United States and its coalition partners were in Afghanistan. Messages emphasized that the coalition was not there to provoke a conflict with Islam or to occupy Afghanistan, but rather to render it safe from terrorism and then depart.

Reflecting the emphasis on securing some degree of popular forbearance if not overt support for U.S. operations, PSYOP produced far more political than military messages. It even produced more public information, public service, and safety/sanitation products than overt military messages. Presumably to build good will with the Afghan populace, PSYOP produced a disproportionate amount of messages advertising mine avoidance but also many public service messages that advertised the advantages of accepting vaccines for children and the importance of using potable water. Most of these products were generic and could have been used anywhere, but some demonstrated sensitivity to Afghan culture—for example, messages that offered congratulations on an Islamic holiday or advertised that American food donations complied with Islamic dietary restrictions. The military messages PSYOP did produce emphasized U.S. power (airpower in particular) and the inevitable death of America's terrorist enemies. Reflecting the assumption that terrorists could not be persuaded to abandon their cause (but perhaps also mirroring the national mood), the PSYOP messages did not request surrender but sought to demoralize enemy combatants by communicating our intent and ability to destroy them.

In November 2001, combat operations began to include a more substantial U.S. ground presence with PSYOP support. PSYOP units directly supported Special Operations forces with loudspeaker operations and the distribution of handbills that conveyed anti-Taliban messages during the capture of Bagram.<sup>29</sup> Soon after, Kabul fell to coalition forces after the Taliban dispersed. Special Operations forces then turned most of their attention to the hunt for Osama bin Ladin and his al Qaeda operatives. PSYOP supported these operations with products advertising the reward program for information on terrorists. In addition, through their continued face-to-face interaction with Afghan villagers, members of PSYOP teams became a valuable source of human intelligence (HUMINT). They were able to identify influential tribal and village leaders and solicit their support.

In the months after the fall of Kabul, PSYOP units on the ground adapted to carry out missions and tasks to support post-combat operations. PSYOP contributed to humanitarian aid efforts by handing out supplies to local Afghan schools and distributing blankets and medicine to hospitals. PSYOP messages also noted that without stability, delivering aid would be more difficult. In addition, PSYOP produced a bevy of political messages advertising the need for one Afghanistan and eventually portrayed President Hamid Karzai as someone who would bring prosperity to the population rather than the desolation endemic throughout the rule of the Taliban. PSYOP also provided support to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul through a military

information support team, which deployed to the Embassy on June 19, 2002. The team coordinated with Embassy officials and provided support to forces operating in the region.

### ***Operation Iraqi Freedom***

PSYOP objectives for OIF are available in the classified annex to the report. However, the 10 classified objectives may be easily surmised from the products that were initially prepared for operations and that are discussed below. As in OEF, the objectives generally sought to isolate the Iraqi regime from domestic support and to reduce the effectiveness of Iraqi forces by undermining their morale and willingness to perform their missions.

*Pre-conflict planning and organization.* OIF combat operations took place from March 21, 2003, to May 1, 2003. In the planning phase, PSYOP forces benefited from extensive experience conducting operations against Iraq in support of Operations *Southern Watch*, *Northern Watch*, and *Desert Fox*. In addition, much of the PSYOP support, command, and production capability was already in place as a result of Operation *Enduring Freedom*, and key personalities involved in PSYOP planning, production, and product approval were well acquainted.

Since September 14, 2001, a PSE had been located at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida. This PSE consisted initially of the JPOTF commander and four staff. On November 15, 2002, CENTCOM ordered the JPOTF commander to commence pre-hostility PSYOP against Iraq. However, it was not until January 2003 that the JPOTF commander and deputy commander moved to Kuwait to better support preparations for OIF. When CENTCOM headquarters relocated to Qatar in February 2003, the JPOTF commander and three staff members relocated as well to provide direct PSYOP support. The total PSYOP planning phase for OIF was extensive, lasting 9 to 12 months before the start of major combat operations, and the total number of PSYOP personnel committed to the JPOTF in support of OIF fluctuated between 600 and 700 personnel. However, only a handful of these were forward-deployed with the JPOTF commander.

*Pre-hostility PSYOP actions.* The pre-hostility phase of OIF began in December 2002 and concluded when coalition forces entered Iraq on March 21, 2003. During this time, PSYOP forces were tasked with several missions, including:


- establishing an audience for radio broadcasts in Iraq
- undermining the confidence of the Iraqi military and Iraqi security forces in Saddam Hussein's regime
- degrading Saddam Hussein's confidence in his ability to control Iraq
- deterring the use of WMD.

PSYOP executed these tasks through two primary vehicles, radio broadcasts and leaflet dissemination. Broadcasts into Iraq originated from several sources. From Kuwait, PSYOP teams transmitted radio programs via the Special Operations Media System-B (SOMS-B). In addition, there were aerial broadcasts from Qatar-based EC-130E Commando Solo, and maritime broadcasts from aircraft carriers in the Arabian Gulf. PSYOP messages also



specifically attempted to dissuade Iraqis from repairing fiber optic cables that were being bombed to degrade Iraqi communications and warned Iraqi air defense from targeting or shooting at U.S. planes. The radio messages emphasized the legitimacy of UN votes to sanction compliance with resolutions and the American military buildup to enforce compliance if necessary.

Figure 3–1. PSYOP Support, Operation *Iraqi Freedom*



In conjunction with PSYOP broadcasts, leaflet drops were employed to influence the Iraqi target audience. During the pre-hostility phase, PSYOP leaflets were dropped in abundance. By the start of formal combat operations, the number of dropped leaflets totaled more than 20 million. The themes and messages that the PSYOP leaflets conveyed included:

- capitulation
- WMD use deterrence
- preservation of Iraqi oil fields
- radio frequencies for coalition broadcasts.

Leaflet drops and radio broadcasts continued throughout the months before the start of combat operations. The pre-hostilities messages emphasized the futile, dangerous, and counterproductive nature of mining waterways, sabotaging oil installations, blowing up dams, or using weapons of mass destruction.

*PSYOP during combat operations.* On March 21, 2003, coalition forces entered Iraq. In contrast to OEF, most leaflets were directed at military units, which reflects a primary concern with the organized force available to Saddam Hussein's military as opposed to the threat from irregular forces. Leaflets were used to convince Iraqi forces to surrender, desert, or "capitulate." About half of the leaflets prepared for this purpose were generic and about half were tailored for specific Iraqi units (for example, identifying any Iraqi units that failed to comply with coalition instructions and consequently were totally destroyed, and calling on the targeted Iraqi unit to avoid the same fate). Most of the leaflets just encouraged the Iraqi soldier to go home where he was needed and not sacrifice his life for a bad regime. The messages were implicitly sympathetic to the common Iraqi soldier's fate and communicated a coalition preference for not having to kill him. While the majority of messages were directed at military audiences, there were also leaflets that asked Iraqi civilians to avoid combat areas and to listen to the coalition radio broadcasts, which emphasized the incompetence, corruption, and illegitimacy of Saddam and his henchmen.

Commando Solo and SOMS-B broadcasts continued to transmit information radio to both general Iraqi audiences and military units throughout combat operations. PSYOP radio messages were also delivered to military audiences with the assistance of electronic warfare capabilities. In general, Saddam Hussein's incompetence was emphasized for military audiences and his illegitimacy was underscored for the broader public. As usual, the radio broadcasts had more political themes and messages than military messages since they were directed at the general public.

Tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) were attached to ground forces to provide PSYOP support directly to maneuver units and special operations detachments. In the southern region, PSYOP teams were deployed with the Army's 3<sup>d</sup> Infantry Division, the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, and the 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group. In western Iraq, TPTs assigned to support the 5<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group provided assistance in securing the town of Ar Rutbah, while PSYOP units in the north were attached to the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North.

These TPTs played an important support role to infantry and special operations units, particularly through their loudspeaker operations. PSYOP teams supporting ground forces often communicated surrender appeals to enemy units via loudspeakers. They also conveyed messages of noninterference to civilians in order to avoid noncombatant casualties. One example of the value of loudspeaker operations occurred on March 25 at an Nasiriyah. TPT 1141 was supporting Task Force Tarawa assigned to the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). Tarawa was fighting paramilitary forces that threatened to bog down the Marines' advance. Iraqi paramilitary forces hiding in a hospital were sniping and firing mortars and machine guns at Marines crossing the bridge over the Euphrates. TPT 1141 broadcast a surrender appeal and a statement about the inevitability of their defeat, and "told [them that] we would drop bombs and artillery on the hospital if they did not surrender." Approximately 10 minutes into the broadcast, Iraqi personnel emerged from the hospital and complied with TPT 1141's instructions. TPT 1141 also supported Task Force Tarawa by ensuring safe passage of civilians and by obtaining valuable intelligence from civilian sources in the process.<sup>30</sup>

During the month of April, coalition ground forces approached Baghdad. PSYOP was tasked

with a variety of objectives both before and after coalition forces had secured the city. PSYOP's primary missions were to:

- assist in locating enemy forces and weapons
- gain widespread support for coalition forces
- inform Iraqi civilians that coalition forces would not do them harm
- distribute radios to the civilian population so that they could listen to coalition radio broadcasts.

To accomplish these tasks, PSYOP forces dropped additional leaflets, continued coalition radio broadcasts, and engaged in intrusions of Iraqi communication nodes.

In summary, OIF products, especially leaflets, were direct, simple, and to the point. In contrast with OEF, they did not focus on the purpose of military operations or other political messages. Radio broadcasts were the exception in this regard. They argued for the legitimacy of coalition operations but emphasized their legal justification—toward which Iraqi audiences suffering under UN sanctions for many years may not have been sympathetic. Also somewhat in contrast with OEF, the vast majority of OIF products were not culturally specific products. They incorporated some pictures specific to the Iraqi setting but generally they could have been used anywhere for similar purposes. This is especially true of the public service messages on mine awareness, the importance of sanitation, and the need to support the new government once combat operations ended.

### **Stability Operations: The 1990s and Operation *Iraqi Freedom 2***

*PSYOP objectives.* The scope of this report was expanded to include a look at PSYOP performance in a range of stability operations. The study team assessed both Joint and Army doctrine to determine whether PSYOP, in general, is expected to accomplish different objectives in stability operations than in major combat operations. If so, the requirements for success might be different. In turn, both PSYOP lessons learned for stability operations and the corresponding recommendations for remedial action might also be different.

Joint doctrine distinguishes between “broad” PSYOP objectives for stability operations and major combat operations. Army doctrine, on the other hand, states, “There is no difference between PSYOP for stability and support operations and PSYOP for war except themes and messages.” Thus, while Joint doctrine highlights some differences in PSYOP objectives for major combat operations and stability operations, Army doctrine seems to downplay differences. The contradiction is more apparent than real. Unlike Joint doctrine, Army doctrine does not offer broad PSYOP objectives for stability operations in general. However, it does provide some examples of specific PSYOP objectives by type of stability operation.<sup>31</sup> The PSYOP objectives in Joint doctrine are so broad that they could easily accommodate the specific PSYOP objectives offered up in Army doctrine.

Since Joint doctrine explicitly distinguishes between PSYOP objectives in the two types of operations, an attempt was made to extract their essential differences. After reviewing the

objectives assigned to PSYOP in diverse historical contingencies, the team observed that all of the PSYOP objectives enumerated in joint doctrine for both stability operations and major combat operations easily fit into four broad mission objectives for PSYOP (see table 3–1).

Table 3–1. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations

<b>Superimposed Categories</b> (with examples of subcategories)	<b>Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (without the use or threat of force)</b>	<b>MOOTW (with the use or threat of force)</b>	<b>War</b>
<p><b>Isolating an adversary from domestic and international support</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Confer legitimacy on U.S. policy and objectives and diminish adversary’s legitimacy</li> <li>• Separate combatants from popular support (critical in stability operations)</li> <li>• Encourage populace not to interfere with U.S. operations and not to offer logistic and intelligence support to combatants (stability operations)</li> <li>• Counter enemy propaganda</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Modify behavior of selected target audiences toward U.S. and multinational capabilities</li> <li>• Support peacetime elements of U.S. national policy objectives, national security strategy, and national military strategy</li> <li>• Support geographic combatant commander’s regional security strategy objectives</li> <li>• Support objectives of the country team</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mobilize popular support for U.S. and multinational military operations</li> <li>• Gain and sustain popular belief in and support for U.S. and multinational political systems (including ideology and infrastructure) and political, social, and economic programs</li> <li>• Attack legitimacy and credibility of adversary political systems</li> <li>• Publicize beneficial reforms and programs to be implemented after defeat of adversary</li> <li>• Shift loyalty of adversary forces and their supporters to friendly powers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Explain U.S. policies, aims, and objectives</li> <li>• Arouse foreign public opinion or political pressures for, or against, a military operation</li> <li>• Counter hostile foreign psychological operations efforts</li> </ul>
<p><b>Reducing effectiveness of adversary’s forces</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demoralize enemy combatants</li> <li>• Degrade adversary’s combat ability</li> <li>• Encourage surrender (war)</li> <li>• Encourage participation in amnesty programs (stability operations)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote ability of host nation to defend itself against internal and external insurgencies and terrorism by fostering reliable military forces and encouraging empathy between host nation armed forces and civilian populace</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Influence development of adversary strategy and tactics</li> <li>• Amplify economic and other nonviolent forms of sanctions against an adversary</li> <li>• Undermine confidence in adversary leadership</li> <li>• Lower morale and combat efficiency of adversary soldiers</li> <li>• Increase psychological impact of U.S. and multinational combat power</li> <li>• Support military deception and operations security</li> </ul>

<p><b>Deterring escalation by adversarial leadership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deter atrocities (stability operations)</li> <li>• Deter geographic expansion</li> <li>• Deter WMD use (war)</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deter adversary powers or groups from initiating actions detrimental to the interests of United States, its allies, or conduct of friendly military operations</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Minimizing collateral damage and interference with U.S. operations</b></p> <p>Safety instructions to populace:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Avoiding dangerous operations</li> <li>• Crowd control</li> <li>• Approaching checkpoints</li> <li>• Refugee assistance</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promote cessation of hostilities to reduce casualties on both sides, reduce collateral damage, and enhance transition to post-hostilities.</li> </ul>	

The four overarching PSYOP missions that cover both major combat operations and stability operations may be summarized as:

- isolating an adversary from domestic and international support
- reducing the effectiveness of an adversary’s forces
- deterring escalation by adversarial leadership
- minimizing collateral damage.

We believe that this short list of broad PSYOP objectives is simpler and more direct and better communicates desired effects than either the general objectives identified in Joint PSYOP doctrine or the PSYOP objectives across the range of military operations (also provided in Joint PSYOP doctrine),<sup>32</sup> which use more nebulous verbs such as “support, explain, promote, influence, and publicize.” The more specific exemplary list of sub-objectives or tasks for each of these four missions in table 3–1 illustrates that some sub-objectives will be more likely and important in stability operations than in major combat operations.<sup>33</sup> Even though Army doctrine seems to play down differences between PSYOP objectives in stability operations and major combat operations, its examples of more specific, exemplary PSYOP objectives also emphasize that the specific target audience behavior desired in stability operations often differs from that sought in major combat operations.

For example, under the broad category of “detering enemy leadership from escalation,” deterring WMD use is a more common PSYOP mission in major combat operations than in stability operations, whereas deterring atrocities by undisciplined forces is a more common objective in stability operations. Similarly, under the broad category of reducing the effectiveness of adversary forces, advertising the virtue of an amnesty offer is a more likely PSYOP mission in a stability operation, and explaining surrender procedures is a more likely

PSYOP mission in major combat operations.

Another difference between PSYOP objectives in stability operations and major combat operations is their criticality, which is not reflected in either Joint or Army doctrine but is mentioned in a recent CJCS instruction.<sup>34</sup> Experts in stability operations argue that the center of gravity in stability operations is political relationships rather than terrain and armed forces. Therefore, influencing popular political and social perspectives, commitments, and behavior is an indispensable prerequisite for success in stability operations, and PSYOP missions are usually critical in that regard.<sup>35</sup> Taking an example from table 3–1, we can acknowledge that the broad objective of “isolating an adversary from domestic and international support” is important in any contest between combatants. However, successfully separating combatants from popular support, and especially from logistic and intelligence support from the population, will make a direct and critical impact in stability operations. In contrast, convincing enemy combatants that their fellow citizens do not support them will have at best an indirect effect in deciding the outcome of major combat operations (and perhaps only a small effect when fighting authoritarian regimes).

These differences between PSYOP submissions and the relative importance of their contribution to the overall military effort can drive major differences in tactics, techniques, and procedures. For example, since the focus in stability operations is on the mission of divorcing irregular forces from popular support, PSYOP must do more to reach the general populace, whereas it can afford to concentrate more on combatants in major combat operations. This often means that PSYOP forces must do more to control the information available to the local populace. When, in some cases, it will not be possible to restrict popular access to information or control its content, it will be especially important that U.S. forces make a positive impression on the local populace to belie the adversary’s disinformation. PSYOP can work with regular infantry forces to improve their ability to communicate messages to a local population more effectively than many other media products and sources.<sup>36</sup> Allied PSYOP experts noted that in some cases, U.S. PSYOP forces were slow to transition from the TTP appropriate for major combat operations to those appropriate for stability operations.<sup>37</sup> This is not surprising, since service and Joint doctrine and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures do not clearly identify the difference between major combat operations and stability operations and PSYOP objectives in each.

In summary, at the broader operational level, the four major categories of PSYOP missions are not noticeably different for stability and major combat operations. However, at the tactical level, there are indeed differences in specific PSYOP missions. Moreover, the contribution of PSYOP is more critical to the success of stability operations than it is to the success of major combat operations. The question of whether these different PSYOP missions can be executed with capabilities required for major combat operations, or whether they generate different requirements for PSYOP capabilities and resources, will be addressed later in the report.

*Operation Iraqi Freedom 2.* With this background on PSYOP in stability operations, the study team examined PSYOP performance in Iraq after major combat operations ended and stability operations began to determine whether PSYOP forces were assigned new missions and whether they were similar or different from those identified from historical experience. For purposes of this study, OIF combat operations concluded on May 1, 2003. May 1 also marks the beginning

of the next phase of Iraqi operations known as OIF Stability Operations, or OIF 2.

PSYOP efforts in OIF, which at the time were credited with the desertion of Iraqi soldiers, the deterrence of WMD use, and the prevention of the destruction of Iraqi oil fields, changed in focus in OIF 2. Soon after major combat operations ended, it became apparent that U.S. forces not only would have to facilitate civil order, they also would have to defeat resistance from insurgents opposed to the new Iraqi government.

*PSYOP guidance on objectives.* As it became evident that U.S. forces were engaged in a different and increasingly difficult stability operation, PSYOP forces were assigned new missions. On July 17, 2003, the Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) and the JPOTF received additional guidance on the mission in the form of an amendment to the existing operations plan. The task force was to:<sup>38</sup>

Conduct PSYOP in Iraq to provide a secure and stable environment and facilitate development of a functioning civil administration, which adheres to the rule of law, promotes regional stability, and eliminates threats from terrorism and WMD. On order, transition responsibility to the Coalition Provisional Authority enabling the Coalition Forces Command forces to withdraw.

The guidance further identified six major PSYOP objectives to accomplish the newly articulated mission, with numerous supporting objectives.<sup>39</sup> The objectives were directed to ensure that:

- Iraqis involved in the production, storage, transportation, and employment of WMD would not support the use or trafficking of WMD
- Iraqis would cooperate with coalition and civil military operations, Coalition Provisional Authority, and the Iraq Survey Group
- the regional and international communities would cooperate with coalition forces
- Iraqis would support both interim and future Iraqi governments
- Iraqis would not interfere with coalition military operations
- terrorists would cease activities in Iraq.

Notably, these objectives all fit into the first category from table 3-1: isolating an adversary from domestic and international support. This reflects and supports the conclusion above that this PSYOP mission is vital to success in stability operations.

*PSYOP guidance on themes.* During OIF 2, PSYOP themes adapted to support the missions that were carried out in Iraq's post-conflict environment. PSYOP messages emphasized the need to maintain order and to obey new laws set forth following the fall of the former regime. Messages also communicated the need to be aware of mines and unexploded ordnance, both to safeguard innocent civilians and to help eliminate them as threats to coalition forces.

A second set of themes common in OIF 2 PSYOP messages centered on information intelligence. Specifically, the message was to influence the civilian populace to come forward

and provide coalition forces with information and intelligence regarding WMD locations and whereabouts of insurgents, key members of Saddam's Baath Party, and paramilitary forces. These themes guided PSYOP missions throughout the stability support phase of OIF 2.

*PSYOP activities in support of OIF 2.* PSYOP teams communicated their themes and messages through two principal means of communication: face-to-face interactions and loudspeaker operations. PSYOP teams used face-to-face exchanges for disseminating handbills, leaflets, and posters. This method also was the sole means for distributing newspapers that had been printed by PSYOP print companies and radios that conveyed coalition messages.

Loudspeaker operations were the second means of conveyance. Curfews were imposed in some Iraqi cities shortly after the conclusion of major combat operations. Loudspeaker teams disseminated announcements regarding the curfew throughout Iraqi neighborhoods. The teams also accompanied Army infantry units in support of search operations. Through an interpreter, PSYOP teams read messages to individuals who occupied buildings being searched. These teams explained the purpose of the search operation, the intention of the search teams, and what was to be expected of the occupants once they vacated the buildings.

*PSYOP challenges in OIF 2.* The new guidance and themes provided to PSYOP reflect a realization that effectively accomplishing the assigned objectives would require use of resources well beyond those normally available to PSYOP forces. The guidance seems to acknowledge the difficulty of conducting a sophisticated PSYOP campaign in an environment in which multiple competing sources of information are available to target audiences. During combat, the focus is usually on enemy forces that have limited sources of information. In stability operations, the target audiences are among the general population, where the competition for public influence can be ferocious. To effectively compete in such an environment requires multiple media, quality products, and significant production capacity. Where existing media already have well-entrenched audiences, working through indigenous media to amplify the PSYOP message may be required. In this regard, the PSYOP experience in OIF 2 was consistent with key lessons learned in Bosnia by the 4<sup>th</sup> POG.

Where infrastructure is less developed and thus offers fewer sources of competition, PSYOP may be able to compete directly with indigenous sources, as appeared to be the case in Somalia and, to some extent, in Afghanistan. Radio and print media competition in Somalia was vibrant and a critical factor in the struggle for popular understanding and support as usual, but the relatively small numbers of radio stations and media sources and the importance attached to the American presence permitted PSYOP to compete directly and successfully. In the immediate aftermath of OIF, the Iraqi people had relatively few media choices. However, this quickly changed, greatly compounding the complexity of the PSYOP mission.

Even when domination of or effective competition with the majority of information sources available to a target audience in a stability operation is not possible, the behavior of U.S. forces in general can send powerful messages to the local population. To the extent PSYOP is used to coach other U.S. forces on messages, it can help raise popular opinion about the U.S. presence and purposes in a stability operation. This lesson from past stability operations is being relearned by some U.S. commanders in OIF 2, as the following excerpt from an internal Army report on the operation indicates:



Current Iraqi sentiment has evolved from personal relationships between coalition soldiers and Iraqi citizens. Because these relationships differ from location to location and person to person, it is hard to correlate events and actions with relationship successes or failures. An armor[ed] task force commander in Baghdad described his methodology as that of plotting and measuring everything: “After a positive or negative event, he would have his staff evaluate all actions they had conducted before, during, and after the event. This would allow him to correlate activities with outcomes and develop TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures] for future success.” While not all actions provided equal measures or correlating events, this methodological approach helped establish a base line of comparative success for his task force. It allowed him to utilize the Army approach of BDA [battle damage assessment] in regard to stabilization and support operations. This task force was very in tune with the local Iraqi populace in their area of operation. A bond was built and cultivated over many months resulting in a trust between the military and civilian population. As a result of this established relationship, a new anxiety has developed due to the impending transfer of authority. The local leaders inquired about the replacement force and their capability to “be as good” as the current command.<sup>40</sup>

This anecdote about the armored task force commander’s attention to Iraqi attitudes demonstrates that ground force commanders in stability operations can support the critical and ongoing target audience analysis that PSYOP should conduct. Unfortunately, as the Army report notes, this commander’s experience was not the norm:

Some U.S. units understand and use the concepts of setting objectives, developing themes, and setting measures of effectiveness. Others do not understand the process and therefore are just conducting operations without any measure of

success or failure. Some commanders use tactical psychological operations teams as a reactive measure when negative second or third order effects occur. Most IO [information operations] battle drills are reactionary in nature.<sup>41</sup>

### **Assessment of Effects**

Based on an assessment of PSYOP efforts conducted during OEF, OIF, and OIF 2, specific PSYOP effects were difficult to ascertain. In general, it is easier to assess effects where specific behavior is requested. Efforts to change general target audience attitudes through radio broadcasts and other products were not much remarked upon by enemy sources, and allied efforts to assess these effects through surveys are not sufficient to provide reliable indications.<sup>42</sup> A thorough assessment requires both manpower and funding to pay for interpreters to conduct systematic surveys so that effects can be more reliably measured. At present, PSYOP has neither the manpower nor the funds to conduct such research.<sup>43</sup>

Therefore, attempts to assess general effects are mostly the result of informal focus groups, anecdotal evidence, and other media input.

The best and most expensive alternative, as a Coalition Provision Authority public affairs official responsible for information activities in OIF 2 noted, is polling. In operations such as OIF 2, the environment may be stable enough to permit outsourcing of polling, but the costs are considerable. PSYOP forces lack the training to do polling systematically and professionally themselves, as well as the money to pay others to do so. That said, a careful examination of the available evidence from prisoner interviews and other intelligence sources permits some comment on correlations between PSYOP activities and target audience behaviors and attitudes.

*Strong correlation.* In several instances, a strong correlation between PSYOP objectives and activities on the one hand, and observable enemy behavior on the other, was apparent. Typically this occurred when tactical PSYOP products asked for a specific behavior, which was then observed, and for which no other explanations seem as plausible. These cases include:

- **Surrenders:** During OEF, PSYOP leaflets and broadcasts directed at enemy forces in Konduz appeared to result in the surrender of 1,000 Taliban fighters. Unlike surrender and desertion of enemy forces in OIF, the Taliban forces were not facing a sizable U.S. ground force, and therefore the correlation between the value of the PSYOP effort per se and enemy behavior seems stronger. In other words, one might argue that large-scale enemy desertion or dereliction of duty by Iraqi soldiers was more a function of their immediate experience with and perception of overwhelming U.S. military force than it was a function of PSYOP effectively communicating the futility of their resistance.<sup>44</sup> Even so, there were cases in OIF where tactical PSYOP teams appeared to have successfully induced armed Iraqis to surrender, and in those cases a strong correlation between the surrender and the PSYOP effort is evident.
- **Weapons buy-back:** After major combat operations concluded in Iraq, PSYOP forces advertised a program encouraging Iraqis to turn in their weapons for rewards. This effort appeared to directly result in the collection of a substantial number of man-portable air defense systems and other arms.

*Loose correlation.* It is also plausible to attribute other effects to PSYOP efforts, albeit with a lesser degree of confidence because other independent variables could explain the adversary behavior in whole or in part. Typically this occurred when tactical PSYOP products asked for a specific behavior, which was then observed, and for which there are no other explanations that seem as strong.

- **Other surrender, capitulation, and desertion cases:** Numerous Iraqi troops deserted and, in some cases, surrendered their equipment directly in accordance with PSYOP instructions in OIF. The extent to which this was a function of PSYOP efforts is less clear, however, because it was done in the face of a fearsome and well-demonstrated U.S. combat power. In other words, it is conceivable that the desertions or surrenders might have taken place with lesser (or even without any) supporting PSYOP efforts.<sup>45</sup>

- Mining: During OIF, PSYOP leaflets conveyed messages to prevent mining of Iraqi waterways. After the fact, it became apparent that the enemy had mines but only deployed them in a few cases. There is no other explanation as likely as the combination of PSYOP and demonstrated U.S. military might.
- Civilian noninterference: By broadcasting messages of noninterference to civilians, coalition forces were able to minimize collateral damage during combat operations in both OEF and OIF. The motivations for the compliance were probably varied, but it seemed to be directly correlated with PSYOP activities.

*Unsubstantiated correlation.* General Tommy Franks notes that one of his major concerns in planning and executing OIF was to prevent the Iraqis from using WMD preemptively on U.S. forces staging in theater. He assigned PSYOP forces the task of convincing Iraqis not to do so and also not to sabotage oil wells, which would have precipitated both an economic and ecological disaster.<sup>46</sup> PSYOP worked hard at both of these objectives, and the fact that Iraqis did neither of these things was initially taken as evidence that the PSYOP campaign was effective in this regard. However, subsequent prisoner interviews suggest that alternative explanations are at least as valid as potential explanations for Iraqi behavior.<sup>47</sup>

*Secondary and serendipitous effects.* In addition to primary effects that correlated strongly or loosely with PSYOP actions, PSYOP activities were responsible for some secondary and even serendipitous effects. For example, General Franks records a second reason for his decision to approve the aforementioned leaflets. He hoped that some Iraqis would directly comply with their messages, but he also believed they would remind Iraqi soldiers that their air defenses were useless and that U.S. forces could bomb them with iron as easily as with paper.

Interviews with Iraqi prisoners of war suggest many were, indeed, more impressed by General Franks' secondary motivation for dropping the leaflets than by their primary message. They believed that their cover, concealment, and deception activities were working until the leaflets essentially notified them that U.S. forces were well aware of their precise locations. Thus, PSYOP was able to leverage the hugely coercive value of U.S. military power through the implied message that a kinetic strike could be delivered just as easily as a leaflet bomb. Similarly, but with no evidence of malice aforethought, U.S. leaflets on Taliban forces in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan convinced them not to lay down arms, but rather to flee to what they assumed was a more secure position in a mountain tunnel and cave network. Unhappily for them, this simply presented a more concentrated target for U.S. airpower.

*Other PSYOP value.* Although PSYOP forces are most often graded on their effects, they do make other contributions in support of combat and stability operations. During OEF, OIF, and OIF 2, PSYOP repeatedly was credited with providing valuable intelligence to coalition forces. In the process of conducting extensive face-to-face communications and assessing effects, PSYOP tactical forces obtained a great deal of rich and current information on local sentiments and the activities of irregular enemy forces. For example, in Afghanistan, TPTs were able to identify and approach tribal or influential leaders in villages throughout the region, who then provided specific information of intelligence value.

#### 4. PSYOP Lessons Learned: Operations

The purpose of this section is to identify officially sanctioned PSYOP lessons learned and to determine whether modifications to these lessons learned (or altogether different and/or additional lessons) merited investigation. Essentially, the only officially sanctioned<sup>48</sup> joint lessons learned were those completed by the Joint Staff (primarily national or *strategic*-level lessons on information operations, but relevant to psychological operations), the Joint Forces Command (self-described as focused on the *operational* level of war), and the 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (most of which focused on *tactical* issues.) From these three documents, lessons were captured at all levels of war and provide a solid illustration of the critical issues in psychological operations.

To determine whether alternative lessons are sufficiently plausible to warrant further investigation, interviews with informed PSYOP leaders and a thorough review of numerous after-action reports and informal lessons learned produced by participants in the operations, but not formally approved by a commander, were conducted.<sup>49</sup> This process yielded a comprehensive list of lessons learned that was then pared down and organized around 10 macro-level issues:

- the extent to which national-level authorities integrated the information element of national security policy, providing guidance on themes and messages for PSYOP
- the extent to which authorities in the Pentagon and CENTCOM accorded high priority to PSYOP
- the extent to which PSYOP leaders and soldiers clearly understood their mission
- whether PSYOP integration with IO was a positive or negative development
- whether there was a dearth of PSYOP personnel to fulfill planning requirements
- why and where the approval process failed to provide rapid approval of PSYOP products
- whether a cooperation and communications gap between theater- and tactical-level PSYOP forces and efforts reduced possible effectiveness
- whether the quality of PSYOP products could have been higher and created greater effects
- whether historic underfunding of PSYOP forces reduced effectiveness in recent operations
- whether and how specific resources shortfalls and equipment performance issues reduced the effectiveness of PSYOP forces in recent operations.

These 10 macro issues and summary observations from various lessons learned efforts were then shared with members of the PSYOP community for comment, the results of which are reflected in the conclusions about the issues in this section.

### **Operations *Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom*: Summary of Official Lessons Learned**

The Joint Staff lessons learned<sup>50</sup> concerning broader information operations are equally relevant to PSYOP lessons learned. Essentially, the Joint Staff made two broad observations that, if acted upon, would permit more effective PSYOP campaigns. First, it noted that better integration of all aspects of national information efforts would facilitate PSYOP by providing timely, authoritative guidance on themes and messages. This would ensure that PSYOP efforts were consistent with larger, national themes and messages about U.S. national security and defense policies. Second, it pointed out that a more robust public affairs effort in the Pentagon that allowed rapid, effective official responses to enemy disinformation on a global basis would make PSYOP resources more readily available to concentrate on producing desired effects instead of responding to enemy efforts to do the same. More specifically, the Joint Staff effort:

- recommended fixing interagency coordination to harmonize all national “perceptual assets”
- recommended coordinating operational-level IO (and thus PSYOP) with national efforts
- implies, but does not actually state, that consolidating IO policy oversight in OSD would facilitate such coordination
- argues that public affairs must counter adversary disinformation around the clock in overseas as well as domestic audiences.

The United States Joint Forces Command lessons learned<sup>51</sup> focused on the operational level of war. Although JFCOM also concentrated on lessons learned from information operations, the document nevertheless included specific recommendations on PSYOP. Specifically, two major observations were made:

- Theater-level PSYOP must be integrated with national efforts (similar to the point made in the Joint Staff lessons learned, but with a slightly greater emphasis on the role of the Combatant Commander in accomplishing this objective).
- PSYOP must build a competitive, responsive live theater-radio-television capability. More specifically, the JFCOM lessons learned noted that PSYOP execution was marked by friction, assessment difficulties, and, at times, a lack of sophistication in spite of its contribution to strategic and operational objectives.

In addition, JFCOM provided the following PSYOP-relevant recommendations.

- The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) should publish guidance that effectively provides interagency coordination and national-level guidance for PSYOP themes.

- The Joint PSYOP Support Element, a PSYOP cell supported by commercial sector contractors as recommended in the *IO Roadmap*, should be accelerated to improve integration with national themes and messages.
- The quality and quantity of PSYOP broadcasting capabilities and platforms should be improved from the strategic to the tactical level.

The 4<sup>th</sup> POG lessons learned<sup>52</sup> focused on tactical-level issues. One exception was the response to the maneuver commanders' criticism that they were not well supported by PSYOP units. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG characterized this concern as a misperception and recommended an improved understanding of PSYOP capabilities. To the extent that PSYOP support to maneuver commanders was less than it should have been, the 4<sup>th</sup> POG considered it largely due to delays caused by the USD(P) in PSYOP product approvals. Most of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG lessons learned addressed inadequate resources, both in overall force structure and personnel, and in specific equipment and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding categories. They include:

- Personnel/force structure: Generally, the 4<sup>th</sup> POG notes that more trained PSYOP personnel are needed and that the issue should be included in their current Force Design Update process.
  - More specifically, the unit supports an increase in active regional companies and in active and reserve tactical companies.
  - It recognizes the need to reverse projected recruiting shortfalls for PSYOP personnel and force structure to support the Army's transformation to units of action and employment.
  - It notes the need for more PSYOP personnel to be placed in higher command staff elements for improving appreciation and attention to PSYOP-specific equipment requirements.
- Training is needed for PSYOP personnel for Internet/Web site development.
- Equipment needs should be aligned with increases in force structure and addressed in the Force Design Update process. More specifically, the 4<sup>th</sup> POG agrees that it needs:
  - long-range television-radio broadcasting systems for denied airspace
  - organic communication support at the company level to distribute information to and from the JPOTF
  - communication links and print capability for product development detachments
  - a reserve of loudspeakers to replace damaged ones

- satellite communication capability for electronic news gathering kits
- ruggedized laptops with communications capabilities
- up-armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), body armor, M4s, and M9 pistols for force protection.
- Contracting funds are needed for:
  - satellite connections to facilitate reachback capabilities
  - PSEs assigned at short notice to Embassies
  - linguists to translate products and to produce and conduct surveys on PSYOP effects
  - copyrighted products that are otherwise not available for use.

The lessons learned from the Joint Staff, JFCOM, and 4<sup>th</sup> POG are consistent with those found in previous PSYOP lessons learned, which often lament the absence of national guidance on themes, the flawed approval process that renders PSYOP products less timely and effective, the lack of sufficiently high-quality PSYOP products, and the limited resources to address all PSYOP requirements. They also offer new insights and deeper, more detailed lessons. However, in the process of consolidating diverse issues and reaching a consensus, they necessarily obscure some contentious issues that are worth investigation.

*Issues of contention.* The lessons learned from the Joint Staff, JFCOM, and 4<sup>th</sup> POG do not reveal all the contentious issues associated with PSYOP performance. Informal lessons learned documents and interviews indicate a wider and deeper set of issues for exploration. As noted above, we bundled these issues of contention in the list of 10 macro issues, the first 8 of which are operational or non-materiel issues.

Of the eight operational PSYOP issue areas investigated, the two least controversial are the need for national-level authorities to integrate the information element of national security policy and the guidance on themes and messages for PSYOP. The question is why a concept that all support in theory is seldom exercised in practice. The extent to which authorities in the Pentagon and at CENTCOM accord high priority to PSYOP is more controversial and depends greatly upon the operation and the leadership element in question. The same might be said of the approval process. While the confusion surrounding the approval of products at the beginning of OEF left many of the participants embittered about Pentagon–combatant commander cooperation in this area, a cursory review suggests that the problems with the approval process were more widespread, possibly affecting the entire chain of command down to the tactical level.

An additional issue to consider is the level of clarity and understanding in PSYOP missions, particularly in the area of strategic PSYOP. This is a point of strong contention within the Pentagon and among civilian and uniformed PSYOP leaders. The *IO Roadmap* conclusion that PSYOP forces do not practice any form of “strategic PSYOP” and that the expression should be

expunged from the Pentagon's lexicon remains a point of irritation for many in PSYOP circles. In a separate but related issue, the question of whether PSYOP integration with IO was a positive or negative development is also controversial within and outside of the PSYOP community. Many observers favored dividing information operations into a "soft" set of capabilities that focuses on human decisionmaking (for example, PSYOP and military deception) and a "hard" set that concentrates on automated or materiel systems (for example, electronic warfare and computer network operations). The *Information Operations Roadmap* conclusion that PSYOP and the other four core capabilities of IO (electronic warfare, operations security, computer network operations, and military deception) are closely interrelated, largely because they all must increasingly exploit the electromagnetic spectrum to be effective, is still not widely accepted. In recent military operations, this disagreement manifested itself in irritation among PSYOP personnel who were suddenly assigned to IO staff officers who had little background in or knowledge of PSYOP.

The assertion that there were insufficient PSYOP planners is noncontroversial in the sense that it indicates an appreciation for PSYOP and a desire for its expertise in the joint planning process. The controversy stems from the issue of whether the personnel available to the PSYOP community were properly utilized to support joint planning. The perception that a cooperation and communications gap existed between theater- and tactical-level PSYOP forces is a point of contention within the PSYOP community. It reflects, in part, differences of opinion between active and reserve PSYOP officers and between the enlisted and officer ranks with respect to which PSYOP activities will generate the greatest effects. The reserve PSYOP forces own the majority of the tactical PSYOP capability, and the Active Component is organized mostly to support theater planning and dissemination of PSYOP products. Not surprisingly, the inclinations of the reserve and active personnel generally reflect their orientation toward the tactical and theater missions, respectively.

PSYOP materiel resource issues are not controversial per se. Most would acknowledge that additional resources would benefit PSYOP. Resource issues become controversial when assertions are made that additional investments in PSYOP would be cost-effective; that is, that they would produce proportionately advantageous effects compared to the cost of the investments. Cost benefit analysis is always difficult when the output is battlefield effects, but this challenge is particularly pronounced in gauging PSYOP effects (as explained in section 2 of this report). Since it is difficult to ascertain and quantify PSYOP effects, it is equally difficult to address the observation that PSYOP products were unsophisticated or of low quality. To address this controversial issue, measures of merit for quality in PSYOP products were developed in conjunction with this report.<sup>53</sup>

### **Stability Operations: Historic Lessons Learned**

During the interim review of this project in June 2004, Pentagon leadership directed that a more general overview of PSYOP performance and lessons learned in stability operations be included in the scope of the research. Therefore, in addition to PSYOP in support of OEF and OIF combat operations, this section of the report also addresses PSYOP in stability operations over the past few decades.



PSYOP forces are employed more frequently in support of stability operations than in major combat operations because stability operations are more common. For this reason, PSYOP lessons learned from stability operations are more readily available than those gathered from major combat. It is important to understand whether PSYOP lessons learned are specific to either type of operation so that the lessons are not misapplied, and to facilitate informed decisions about correcting any shortfalls revealed in the lessons learned analysis. Decisionmakers may opt to accept the risk of not fully correcting a shortfall if the costs are too great. For this reason, understanding whether the shortfall applies only to major combat operations or stability operations, or both, may be an important factor in such decisions.

The ready availability of PSYOP lessons learned from stability operations and the limited time for this research effort precluded a reexamination of primary sources on PSYOP lessons learned in stability operations. For this study, a comprehensive review of secondary sources was conducted, consisting mainly of official and unofficial PSYOP lessons learned for stability operations over the past 20 years.<sup>54</sup> The operations examined in this review included *Urgent Fury* (Grenada, 1983); *Just Cause* (Panama, 1989); *Provide Comfort* (Iraq/Turkey, 1991–1994); *Restore Hope* (Somalia, 1992–1993); *Uphold/Restore Democracy* (Haiti, 1993–1994); *Joint Guard* (Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995–1998); *Assured Response* (Liberia, 1996); and *Noble Anvil* and *Allied Force* (Kosovo, 1999).

Based on the list of all PSYOP lessons learned for these operations, nine functional areas emerged. A complete review of the specific lessons learned for each category is available in the classified annex to the report. A brief summary of each of the nine functional areas provides elucidation.<sup>55</sup>

- *Coalition cooperation and interagency coordination (critical to success)*: Time and again, reviews of PSYOP performance in stability operations underscore the need to share information between agencies and with coalition partners to ensure that PSYOP is part of a well-orchestrated information effort that generates consistent messages across multiple media outlets.
- *Understanding of PSYOP (limited and irregular, depending on commander)*: Appreciation for the importance of PSYOP varies among individual U.S. commanders, with some using PSYOP well, and others, not at all. In some instances, other Governmental agencies will not properly understand or utilize PSYOP. Either the ability of PSYOP to produce positive effects is not fully understood or appreciated or the fear that PSYOP will hurt U.S. information efforts precludes certain agencies from employing PSYOP missions. Lack of proper appreciation for PSYOP's role in supporting contingency operations has been a common complaint in operations from Grenada to Kosovo.
- *Planning (early and continuous is best)*: Every lesson learned highlighted the importance of involving PSYOP early in the planning stage of operations in order to maximize its effects. PSYOP is frequently late-to-need and is forced into a catch-up mode when authorities finally realize its importance to the overall military mission. Similarly,

because political and diplomatic circumstances can change quickly during a contingency operation, PSYOP planning must continue throughout all stages. This truism is frequently recognized with respect to public affairs, but less often in the case of PSYOP.

- *Operations (integrated efforts magnify effects)*: PSYOP effects can be greatly enhanced when they are carefully integrated with conventional forces. Benefits are amplified when PSYOP forces use their knowledge of local mores and attitudes to prepare regular forces for the cultural context of their operations, and when those forces behave so as to reinforce PSYOP messages and themes.<sup>56</sup> This is particularly true in prolonged stability operations where PSYOP is given sufficient time to generate observable effects.
  - A related observation is that PSYOP is not well supported by conventional sources of intelligence. In contrast, in the course of conducting their missions, PSYOP forces are able to gather a wealth of intelligence that is highly useful to conventional forces.
- *Products (timeliness and quality need improvement)*: Securing product approvals in a timely manner is an ever-present liability. Prepared and preapproved products offer an easy solution to this problem, since many themes and messages are consistent across the range of military operations and can easily be anticipated. The products can then be tailored to meet the immediate needs of forces on the ground.<sup>57</sup> In addition, a higher volume of superior quality products from radio and television is needed to fill airtime, especially in more sophisticated media markets where target audiences have multiple choices for news sources and prefer these media venues.<sup>58</sup>
  - Another unanimous lesson learned is that the quality of products could be improved if better intelligence support was available. Most military intelligence is focused on the enemy order of battle and intentions, and the other intelligence organizations tend to focus on the political machinations of elite decisionmakers. PSYOP needs an in-depth understanding of its target audiences on a continuing basis, since it rarely receives help from the Intelligence Community in this regard. In fact, the repeated observation is that PSYOP is a better source of intelligence than a valued consumer of intelligence. While PSYOP forces can develop some knowledge of the target audiences through their own exertions once deployed, this does not help them prepare products in advance of deployment.
- *Training (needed to improve PSYOP capabilities)*: Insufficient numbers of well-trained PSYOP specialists are a common weakness in many stability operations. The main deficiencies have been the lack of PSYOP campaign planning,<sup>59</sup> insufficient levels of trained senior PSYOP Reserve Component officers,<sup>60</sup> lack of knowledge concerning combined operation functions,<sup>61</sup> and the need for training PSYOP soldiers in marketing and advertising.<sup>62</sup>

- *Force structure (insufficient Active Component forces)*: The high operations tempo of the Active Component PSYOP forces over the past two decades has led to frequent observations that there are insufficient numbers of Active Component PSYOP forces to meet the demands of operational requirements.
- *PSYOP equipment (insufficient quantity and quality)*: Units are chronically short of the quantity and quality of equipment needed to effectively accomplish their tasks.
- *Other resource issues*: PSYOP lacks both strategic and tactical organic mobility. Forces frequently arrive late to theater because they are accorded a low priority for movement. In addition, PSYOP has insufficient fungible resources to purchase short-notice support elements, particularly in the area of translator support.

All nine of the general PSYOP lessons learned from stability operations apply equally well to major combat operations and indeed are reflected in lessons learned from Operation *Desert Storm*<sup>63</sup> and from more recent major combat operations. Similar to the analysis of doctrine, however, a more detailed review of these issue areas illuminates key differences between PSYOP lessons in stability operations and major combat operations.

For example, integrating PSYOP with other military operations magnifies its effect by lending credibility to PSYOP messages. This is true in both stability operations and major combat operations, but since the operational objectives are different, the way in which conventional forces magnify PSYOP effects is different in each type of operation.

In major combat operations, conventional forces lend credibility to PSYOP messages that proclaim a stark choice between surrender and death by demonstrating their ability to destroy adversary forces as advertised. This type of integration of PSYOP and conventional force operations is largely a tactical enterprise directed at specific enemy units. Theater-level PSYOP supporting major combat operations generally cannot produce effects fast enough to affect combat operations. They are aimed at the general population, and popular perceptions of U.S. forces are not directly relevant to the conduct of major combat operations against large, organized enemy forces.

In contrast, conventional forces magnify PSYOP effects in stability operations by acting in a manner that carries favor with the local population and demonstrates that those resisting U.S. forces will be selectively punished with every attempt to minimize collateral damage, for which there will be compensation when it does occur. Unlike major combat operations, the synchronization of PSYOP and conventional forces in stability operations applies at both the tactical and theater levels. Tactically, face-to-face PSYOP takes on greater importance in stability operations, where soldiers leave an emotional impact through their interactions with the population. Hence, lessons learned emphasize the importance of every soldier knowing PSYOP themes and messages on a current basis in stability operations. A good example is Haiti, where lessons learned documented the impact of simple greetings and gestures by American forces, which went a long way toward transforming Haitians' views of American forces and their mission.<sup>64</sup> At the theater level, PSYOP (radio, TV, and other media that broadly communicate with the general populace) is important as well to advertise the legitimacy of U.S. objectives.

Other differences arise with respect to the criticality of a lesson learned. PSYOP coordination with other agencies is important during major combat operations but is essential to the success of stability operations; hence emphasis is placed on close coordination with in-country teams. The same is true of attempts to confer legitimacy on U.S. objectives. As an example, great emphasis is placed on taking the information offensive early in stability operations and doing so with full coordination across all government agencies (including PSYOP and its themes and messages).

Both the differences in the nature of tactical integration of PSYOP and conventional forces and the criticality of particular PSYOP lessons learned stem from the essential difference between stability operations and major combat operations. At the strategic level, the country always wants to confer legitimacy on its use of military force and build that legitimacy over time—even in the adversary’s population. At the operational and tactical level, however, the importance of doing so and the means of doing so are vastly different. In major combat operations, the adversary’s forces consider U.S. objectives illegitimate because they are fighting to prevent their imposition, and the public is largely neutral or indifferent. In stability operations, the public directly enables and supplies the combatants depending on its perception of the legitimacy of U.S. forces and objectives. It is difficult to obtain success in any stability operation without securing popular support or without at least neutralizing active support to insurgents and terrorists from the populace. For this reason, the PSYOP mission of conferring legitimacy on U.S. forces and objectives is a critical one in stability operations and an ever-present focus of U.S. tactics.

In summary, the PSYOP lessons learned for stability operations that deserve to be highlighted as distinct either in application or criticality from PSYOP lessons for major combat operations include the following:

- The center of gravity in stability operations is popular support, so PSYOP must focus on the general population as well as on enemy combatants and leaders.
- Early and continuous theater-level PSYOP integration with other agencies to ensure consistent themes and messages is essential.
- Face-to-face PSYOP with the host population is critical, and PSYOP forces must use conventional forces to support this objective.

An overarching observation is that the entire role of PSYOP is more critical for success in stability operations than in major combat operations where the struggle will largely be determined by a clash of arms rather than changes in popular support for contending agendas. The significance of this observation will be taken up in the conclusion of the report.

## **5. Findings on Critical Issues**

This section of the report examines the set of 10 hypotheses that emerged from a review of formal and informal lessons learned from OEF, OIF, and, to a lesser extent, from OIF 2. As noted in the preceding section, the official lessons learned did not cover all the contentious issues

associated with PSYOP performance. The following 10 key issues were extracted from informal lessons learned documents and interviews.

### **National Integration of Themes and Messages**

*Issue.* The Joint Staff information operations lessons learned on OIF include the observation that the United States Government is not sufficiently organized to coordinate the full spectrum of national “perceptual assets” and activities. Little debate exists on this point. There is, however, broad opinion regarding the extent of the problem caused by the lack of organization, particularly with respect to PSYOP. Most hold that the absence of national-level guidance on themes reduces the effectiveness of PSYOP plans. A related point is that the lack of coordinated activities can undermine the overall effectiveness of an information campaign. Others assert that national themes are nice to have but are not essential for PSYOP.

*Evidence.* The office of the USD(P) coordinated and obtained interagency approval for strategic information campaign objectives and themes for OEF. The Joint Staff transmitted these themes to CENTCOM on October 7, 2001, the day OEF operations began, and approximately a month after the attacks of September 11.<sup>65</sup> Shortly thereafter, the Department of State produced a revised list of themes that were less pointed than those developed by DOD. The differences of opinion were not resolved. Thus, other than periodic public affairs guidance on issues of the day, no other national guidance on a strategic information campaign was released from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to help guide the development of PSYOP themes and objectives.

The national OEF themes enabled CENTCOM to prepare for its PSYOP campaign for Afghanistan and elsewhere.<sup>66</sup> The content of the OEF PSYOP plan, its objectives, and its themes reflect, and are consistent with, national themes. In this regard, they contain guidance on political and religious positions, as well as military objectives, such as the need to undermine enemy combatant morale. Absent national-level guidance for OIF and OIF 2, CENTCOM continued to produce PSYOP plans that were approved by authorities in the Pentagon.<sup>67</sup> The plan prepared for OIF focused largely on objectives that would facilitate combat operations. The amendment to the OIF plans that accounted for post-conflict stability operations stressed political themes, especially those that would help secure popular support for coalition efforts.

By way of comparison, the most specific themes in any of the three plans are found in the OEF plan, and they reflect national themes provided to CENTCOM. For example, the OEF plan ventures to comment on religion and terrorism and on the moral and political justification for the war on terrorism. In contrast, the PSYOP themes outlined in the plans of OIF and OIF 2 were generally, but not dramatically, less specific. PSYOP professionals who responded to inquiries on this subject were unanimous in their observation that national-level guidance on themes is helpful from their point of view. However, some expressed an appreciation for why it is difficult to obtain such guidance and noted that a PSYOP plan may be developed without it. In this regard they held varying opinions on how critical such guidance was to the development of a PSYOP plan in support of an operation. In short, there appears to be some correlation between the presence of national guidance on themes and more specific PSYOP campaign themes, which better support a more aggressive PSYOP campaign. However, the absence of such national-level

guidance did not prevent CENTCOM planners from developing PSYOP themes for all of their operations.

*Discussion.* Not surprisingly, PSYOP professionals appreciate national-level guidance on information themes. It provides important context for developing their more specific objectives. At a minimum, it saves planners the trouble of trying to divine policy objectives from the public statements of senior officials. At best, it allows PSYOP professionals to produce plans and respond rapidly to evolving events with a high level of confidence that they were acting consistently with national objectives.<sup>68</sup> Consistency is desirable, since the most effective persuasive communications campaigns repeat a small number of themes constantly, albeit in different ways.<sup>69</sup>

It also is not surprising that PSYOP themes in OEF, which benefited from national information themes, were somewhat more specific than in OIF and OIF 2. The tendency of planners working without explicit guidance is to err on the side of more general formulations of information themes to ensure that they do not exceed established policy. This is especially true since senior officials sometimes differ in how they explain policy objectives publicly. And PSYOP planners must reconcile the differences as they see fit. From the planners' point of view, broad formulations of information themes probably carry less risk of backfiring. However, they may suffer from a corresponding diminution in effectiveness if the themes are so general or ambiguous that they do not help target audiences better appreciate U.S. policy and operations.

Developments at the beginning of OEF may demonstrate both the importance and the limitations of national-level guidance. Initial PSYOP operations in Afghanistan were handicapped by a lack of coordination between the policy and PSYOP communities and by the exclusion of the IO policy community from the Afghan war plan. The planning for this operation was done quickly and in narrowly confined circles. The Secretary of Defense was under the impression that PSYOP products would accompany the first publicly announced combat operations in Afghanistan. However, lower ranking policy officials overseeing the information campaign were not aware of the date of the operations and the products under development by PSYOP forces.

When it became clear that the Secretary was incorrect in announcing the dissemination of PSYOP leaflets the first time that he explained OEF operations to the public, the highest levels of the Pentagon were suddenly interested in seeing PSYOP products as quickly as possible. The initial PSYOP product was deemed inconsistent with policy objectives and was disapproved, and all subsequent PSYOP products were subjected to particularly intense scrutiny by senior officials in the Pentagon. The leaflet, similar to ones used in the first Gulf War, pictured B-52 bombers dropping bombs on a green valley. Policy officials were concerned that it would erroneously communicate U.S. objectives as revenge against the Afghan people for September 11.

The national-level guidance that was approved and disseminated the day that operations began made clear that the U.S. response in Afghanistan would protect, not target, innocent people and that there was no cause that would justify purposeful targeting of the civilian population. These themes make the B-52 bomber leaflet appear particularly inappropriate in hindsight. One can

only speculate as to whether those charged with developing PSYOP products would have created something different had such guidance been available. Interviews conducted in support of this study reveal that PSYOP officers who developed the products felt it communicated seriousness of purpose and national commitment. Moreover, they intended it for limited distribution in support of one tactical operation, something policy officials did not understand. The tension surrounding the review process contributed to a significant delay in getting subsequent approved PSYOP products into the field. The incident demonstrates both the importance of guidance and the reality that opinions can differ as to which products are consistent with such guidance. Additionally, it demonstrates the importance of rapid communication between policy officials and PSYOP planners, a point that will be examined in discussions on the approval process.

The incident also raises an important distinction concerning the relative importance of national themes for theater, as opposed to tactical, PSYOP, at least in major combat operations. Pentagon decisionmakers assumed the B-52 bomber leaflet would receive broad dissemination, whereas PSYOP leaders later indicated it was designed for a tactical application. A recent Army report on OIF reached this conclusion:

The one clear point in IO doctrine, at least as it applies to psychological operations, is that top-down development of themes and messages often inhibits opportunity for tactical success. In OIF, as in the Balkans, centralized themes and messages sometimes proved irrelevant to local populations and situations, and centralized control of active IO was not responsive to rapidly changing situations. For example, Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) were provided capitulation leaflets for the first 48 hours of the conflict. After that, the centralized message approval process proved unable to provide leaflet texts appropriate to the situation V Corps confronted. TPTs were reduced to using their loudspeaker capability. The Army and the joint team should revisit PSYOP doctrine and organization to find ways to provide commanders PSYOP support that is as agile as their combat units.<sup>70</sup>

The excerpt was taken from a report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned investigating information operations during the combat phase of OIF. That same Army institution later concluded in a report reviewing stability operations in OIF 2 that PSYOP measures of effectiveness and criteria for success needed to be aligned to strategic and operational goals and that soldiers' interaction with the populace (including PSYOP) can have tactical, operational, and sometimes strategic implications.<sup>71</sup> These apparently contradictory conclusions about the importance of national themes to PSYOP efforts may be explained by the important differences between major combat operations and stability operations.

Many tactical PSYOP products in support of major combat operations are straightforward appeals for surrender, safety, compliance with procedures, and the like. They do not contain much, if any, political content. Subjecting these products to a national approval process often takes so long that they lose their value. In contrast, since the focus in stability operations is on the objective of severing enemy combatants' support from the local population, PSYOP tactical messages have a significant amount of political content designed to reinforce the legitimacy of U.S. policy, actions, and forces, and those of local allies. Such products need a timely, but

nonetheless thorough, review from policy experts. As recent experience in OIF 2 demonstrates, it is important to keep everyone “on message,”<sup>72</sup> all the way down the chain of command. In short, national themes are always helpful to PYSOP at the theater level and at the tactical level in stability operations. However, while welcome, they are much less important to tactical PSYOP in support of major combat operations.

Another incident that raises the importance of coordinated information activities was the decision to try to bomb the Iraqi minister of information (Mohammed Saeed al Sahaf, otherwise known as “Baghdad Bob”) off the air. One goal of the OIF PSYOP plan was to avoid destruction of PSYOP-relevant facilities. This goal had to be balanced against the value of preventing the regime from communicating with its supporters (inside and outside of Iraq) during the war. Initially, concerns about collateral damage apparently kept the Ministry of Information off the targeting list. However, as the minister of information’s disinformation campaigns became more problematic, pressure grew to destroy his broadcast facilities. The audience he was able to reach was largely foreign because few Iraqis had access to satellite television.<sup>73</sup> Some experts in the information operations community assert that they knew the minister had mobile broadcasting options and had successfully used them after the ministry was bombed. Moreover, this information was made known to senior officials in Washington, but their preoccupation with getting al Sahaf off the air prevailed, and the decision to bomb was ultimately made. The bombs failed to prevent the minister from broadcasting, but they did succeed in denying communication assets that PSYOP could have used in OIF 2.<sup>74</sup>

*Conclusion.* National guidance on information themes improves the likelihood of an aggressive PSYOP campaign. Without such guidance, PSYOP products conveyed to general audiences at the theater level are likely to be a less specific formulation of broad U.S. public policy positions. Theater-level PSYOP products may still counter adversary disinformation and provide news generally supportive of U.S. policies and operations, but they are less likely to provide aggressive argumentation in defense of U.S. policies for fear of getting ahead of policy. At the tactical level of major combat operations, the lack of national guidance on themes is less significant. Many tactical PSYOP products are designed to elicit specific behaviors (noninterference, surrender, safety compliance) that have little political content. As such, they would benefit less from national-level guidance on themes. Two caveats need to be addressed, however. First, as the B-52 leaflet example illustrates, what may be intended as a tactical product can be perceived as having broader unintended political effects. Second, in stability operations, even tactical products that aggressively solicit popular support require political reasoning and appeal. Therefore, the general conclusion holds true for tactical PSYOP products as well, with the exception that national themes are much less important to tactical PSYOP in support of major combat operations.

Coordinated national guidance on information themes does not necessarily lead to themes that powerfully justify U.S. policies and operations. It is possible that such an interagency process would resolve inevitable differences over information themes by promulgating the least objectionable themes rather than riskier, but potentially more powerful and effective, themes. Therefore, it is possible that even with national-level guidance, PSYOP planners might only obtain the most general direction on information themes. A process for performing target



audience analysis, “market testing” themes, and obtaining rapid feedback on information effects throughout the interagency would likely mitigate this problem.

In summary, producing and routinely updating national-level guidance on themes would facilitate an aggressive, effective PSYOP campaign. The British have a system for coordinating their information themes at the national level, and they are widely perceived to benefit as a result. Their task is made easier by their relatively small bureaucracy and forces.<sup>75</sup> A U.S. national-level effort to coordinate themes would require a robust interagency coordination process, preferably with analytic support to help resolve issues of contention. The absence of national-level guidance does not preclude the possibility of an effective PSYOP campaign at the tactical level, especially in major combat operations, but it greatly diminishes the likelihood of an effective campaign at the theater level. In short, the lack of such guidance would be an argument in favor of concentrating PSYOP resources on producing specific behavioral effects at the tactical level where PSYOP has a comparative advantage. Trying to indirectly affect adversary or popular behavior through attitude adjustments when PSYOP is limited to parroting broad public diplomacy themes is probably not a wise investment, particularly given the scarce resources available to PSYOP.

*Coordinating information activities.* This study cannot conclude with confidence whether a more integrated approach to managing national perceptual assets might have improved decisionmaking on whether to knock Baghdad Bob off the air. Based on evidence collected for this study, this decision was made with all of the relevant facts available. In retrospect, it appears that a decision might have been made without benefit of all of the facts involved, since little formal documentation exists regarding this decision. The real issue to note, however, is whether an interagency body dedicated to weighing the advantages and disadvantages of courses of action on information activities might have produced a better outcome. This study concludes that it might have helped and that it could not have hurt.

Therefore, the broader point about the value of better coordinating information activities seems like a logical conclusion, particularly with respect to theater-level information activities aimed at broad audiences that have access to multiple information sources. In such instances, uncoordinated activities run a higher risk of working at cross-purposes and producing conflicting messages.

### **Leadership Priority Accorded to PSYOP**

*Issue.* The Joint Forces Command lessons learned on OIF note that top-level advocacy for integration contributed to the success of information operations. At issue is whether this advocacy translated into support for PSYOP, whether the support led to an improved PSYOP effort, and whether that support was uniform or intermittent, depending on personalities and circumstances.

*Evidence.* Both senior civilian and military DOD leaders are increasingly vocal in their support for information operations and its component parts, including PSYOP. The Secretary of Defense’s personal interest in information operations is well known and documented in major

Department of Defense strategy and guidance documents, beginning with the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* and including the *Information Operations Roadmap*, signed out in 2003. Daily briefing books for both the Chairman and the Secretary on PSYOP activities were prepared during OIF, including examples of the products, radio wheels, scripts, and schedules. General Franks also indicated his interest and support for PSYOP in his account of OIF.<sup>76</sup> Other than the opening weeks of OEF during which confusion and a lethargic approval process delayed the delivery of PSYOP products to the field, interviews with senior PSYOP officers indicate that General Franks and other senior CENTCOM leaders supported IO in general, and PSYOP specifically, as key components of their OEF and OIF plans.

At the component commander level, however, a more complex picture emerges. The Air Force lessons learned indicate that some component commanders “inadvertently” assigned low priority to PSYOP missions. Other lessons learned also indicate<sup>77</sup> that once PSYOP approval was delegated to the land forces component commander in OIF, a delay occurred while a good working relationship between that commander and the JPOTF was established. Some PSYOP officers who worked directly with component commanders describe Special Operations Command Central, Air Force Command Central, and Navy Command Central as most supportive of PSYOP, while Army Command Central (ARCENT) and Marine Corps Command Central (MARCENT) were less supportive, both in OEF and OIF. There is some irony in this observation, because the maneuver commanders working for ARCENT and MARCENT were the most vocal in their after-action reviews about the value of tactical PSYOP and the need to improve it. In other words, these component commanders may have been out of touch with their subordinate commander’s appreciation of and need for PSYOP.

According to PSYOP officers involved with the JPOTF, neither V Corps nor I MEF ever complained about a shortage of PSYOP support during OIF planning. At that time, PSYOP was not necessarily a high priority during planning and deployment. But after operations commenced, the division commanders operating under V Corps and I MEF needed direct and immediate PSYOP support for their fast-moving forces, and they complained that they were inadequately supported by PSYOP tactical efforts. The JPOTF, both before and during operations, seemed to many observers to be more focused on theater-wide activities. This suited the perspective and needs of the other component commanders, who generally wanted theater-wide effects from PSYOP. In short, and not surprisingly, the Marines and Army appreciated tactical PSYOP more than the Air Force and Navy, which tended to look for PSYOP support at the theater level.

These differing attitudes about the value of theater versus tactical PSYOP may also help explain, at least in part, the apparent divergence in appreciation for PSYOP among different service component commanders. The Navy and Air Force, which tend to look at PSYOP from a theater perspective, worked better with the JPOTF, which had the same outlook. However, the Army and Marines, who appreciate tactical PSYOP more, were perceived by the JPOTF as less cooperative.

Below the component commander level, appreciation for PSYOP was, again, mixed at best. Some wing, corps, and division commanders apparently had reservations about the relevance<sup>78</sup> or

ability of PSYOP products to create effects.<sup>79</sup> Many senior officers have more confidence in their ability to produce effects with kinetic weapons than with PSYOP products. As a result, PSYOP has trouble getting priority attention for air assets to deliver its products to theater and tactical targets.<sup>80</sup> Similarly, depending on the commander in question, PSYOP officers occasionally had difficulty getting senior officer priority attention for approval of PSYOP products. As a result, products and their delivery were sometimes delayed, greatly reducing their effectiveness. In contrast, public affairs officers reportedly enjoyed better access to commanders.<sup>81</sup>

Concerning OIF 2, the results again were mixed. Initially, PSYOP leaders were under the impression that the duties would quickly transition to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the Pentagon organization assigned responsibility for planning and executing relief and humanitarian assistance operations following the combat phase of OIF. By June, when it became evident that ORHA would not be overseeing information activities and that there would be organized resistance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, PSYOP forces realized they would need to mount a substantial PSYOP effort in support of OIF 2. By most accounts, the civilian leadership in the Coalition Provisional Authority was not attuned to the importance of PSYOP and essentially concentrated on keeping ahead of the public affairs agenda to the best of its ability. However, some division commanders fighting the insurgency and terrorists show marked appreciation for PSYOP, devoting substantial fiscal resources, time, and attention to PSYOP commanders and activities.

*Discussion.* PSYOP professionals over the years have often felt underappreciated and underutilized. The lack of proper appreciation for PSYOP is a common complaint in PSYOP lessons learned from contingency operations during the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, senior civilian and military leader appreciation for PSYOP is generally acknowledged to have grown after the demonstrable effects attributed to it in the first Gulf War and later in Somalia. Presumably, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's personal interest in PSYOP products from the earliest days of OEF and reportedly through OIF could only have further stimulated senior leader interest in PSYOP.

The extent to which senior military officer appreciation for PSYOP received a boost in 2000 from the Secretary's more general interest in information operations is less clear. It cannot simply be assumed from the publication of the *IO Roadmap* that senior military leader attitudes toward PSYOP in OEF and OIF were directly influenced by the new Bush administration's promotion of information operations as a critical and increasingly important component of modern war. It must be remembered that the *Information Operations Roadmap* was not completed until late 2003. During its development, there was much debate on whether PSYOP was a core capability of information operations. Some asserted that information operations should be limited to exploiting cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, the features of information operations stressed in the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review*. Hence, it was not until after OEF and OIF ended that DOD settled on an agreed definition of information operations that included PSYOP.

That said, it was clear well before the start of OIF that PSYOP was likely to be included in the definition of information operations and was certainly made to respond to those responsible for

information operations in CENTCOM headquarters. In this regard, the Secretary's personal support for information operations and the changes made in Secretary-level DOD guidance documents to reflect that support at least ensured that CENTCOM would organize for information operations in its planning and execution of contingency operations.

*Conclusion.* The good news for PSYOP professionals is that their discipline has never before enjoyed such support and interest among high-ranking civilian and military leaders, in large part because of the rising interest in information operations. Secretary Rumsfeld's intense interest in information operations certainly gave PSYOP a higher profile in recent operations. The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was also a major supporter of information operations and intervened to help win approval of the *Information Operations Roadmap* from service leaders. Thus, PSYOP appears to be benefiting from senior leader support to the extent that its integration into information operations is beneficial. Whether the attention from newly assigned IO leaders in the chain of command was always welcome by PSYOP professionals, the Pentagon's emphasis on information operations ensured that PSYOP activities would at least receive high-level attention and the benefits of better coordination with other information operation core capabilities. PSYOP integration with other IO disciplines was a net plus.

This is not to argue that PSYOP received all the necessary resources, materiel and otherwise, that it needs to be most effective. Below the level of combatant commander, flag officer attitudes about the ability of PSYOP to create effects remain mixed. It is not surprising that in combat, many commanders will place greater confidence in kinetic weapons with which they are more familiar and that have more easily demonstrated effects. For many, replacing kinetic options with PSYOP products amounts to targeting on faith, since their actual effects are so difficult to observe and quantify.

The problem of limited support for PSYOP from combat commanders is not unique to the U.S. military. Inquiries to U.S. allies indicate that they also believe that their combat commanders do not fully appreciate the importance of PSYOP or how best to utilize its capabilities. In response, they intend to undertake a series of presentations to relevant commands to explain what PSYOP and information operations are and what they are not. They also are revising their training and education requirements for commanders and staff officers and are producing a PSYOP video to be shown regularly to all troops for general awareness and prior to deployment.

Some such measures are under way for U.S. forces as well, which would seem advisable. Yet as one PSYOP officer observed, it is still the case that the first exposure many officers (at least in the Army) have to PSYOP is at one of the combat training centers, where PSYOP performance is typically lackluster. This anecdote helps underscore the point that education and training alone will not make PSYOP believers out of commanders who must appropriate scarce resources to greatest effect on the battlefield. It is incumbent upon PSYOP leaders to improve their ability to create and demonstrate effects.

The means of improving the quality of PSYOP plans and products are examined in a subsequent section of this report. As for measuring effects, the impact of PSYOP activities will always be more obscure than that of kinetic weapons, but much more could be done to systematically

assess PSYOP effects through dedicated intelligence support and interrogation of target audiences. Only then is PSYOP likely to receive more support from commanders.

### **PSYOP Mission Definition**

*Issue.* Among the many informal and formal lessons learned about PSYOP, the question is sometimes raised of whether PSYOP is properly focused on its priority mission. In general, PSYOP missions are alleged to have been construed too broadly with negative effects. This allegation occurs at several levels. At the national level, PSYOP authorities in the Pentagon are accused of trying to conduct strategic PSYOP—that is, PSYOP directed across wide swaths of the world’s population base in a manner that inevitably results in PSYOP messages being received by the American public as well or being perceived as undermining the credibility of other U.S. persuasive communication tools such as public affairs and public diplomacy.

In addition, some PSYOP personnel involved in JPOTF operations complained that a relatively ineffective theater public affairs effort resulted in time and attention being pulled away from offensive PSYOP to conduct “defensive” counter-propaganda missions. The JFCOM recommendation to invigorate theater public affairs capability seems to support this concern. One level of command down, maneuver commanders in OIF complained that the JPOTF focused too much attention on theater missions (including support to public diplomacy) at the expense of supporting their tactical needs. Finally, some tactical PSYOP forces observed that the commanders of the units they supported wasted their skills on commander information activities or what really amounted to public affairs activities. All these complaints raise questions about the proper boundary between PSYOP, public affairs, and public diplomacy.

*Evidence.* Historically, PSYOP has been defined broadly by command sources and doctrine and remains so now (see section 1 of this report). In fact, it is defined so broadly that it could not be distinguished from public diplomacy and perhaps not from public affairs. The following set of excerpts from joint doctrine illustrates that PSYOP is not clearly distinguished from public affairs or public diplomacy.<sup>82</sup>

- advise the supported commander through the targeting process regarding targeting restrictions, psychological actions, and psychological enabling actions to be executed by the military force
- *influence foreign populations* by expressing information through selected conduits to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or noninterference with friendly military operations
- *provide public information to foreign populations* to support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order
- *serve as the supported commander’s voice to foreign populations* by conveying the joint force commander’s intent

- counter adversary propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and opposing information to correctly portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others the ability to polarize public opinion and affect the political will of the United States and its multinational partners within an operational area.

As the italicized passages indicate, the doctrine does little to clearly demarcate PSYOP from public affairs and public diplomacy. With the exception of the emphasis on foreign audiences and advice on psychological operations, the description of PSYOP in joint doctrine could apply equally well to public diplomacy and, in some cases, to public affairs. Moreover, if the SOCOM vision statement is any indication, PSYOP has set upon a course to further broaden its scope and confuse its boundaries with public diplomacy and public information. The SOCOM vision for Joint Psychological Operations Force 2020 articulates a goal for PSYOP that includes “conducting effective global influence operations . . . at all levels of operations, tactical to strategic,” apparently irrespective of audience and circumstances.<sup>83</sup>

Many PSYOP professionals and Pentagon officials responsible for oversight of PSYOP still support the concept of strategic PSYOP, by which they mean that products should be broadly disseminated across theaters in support of diverse national objectives and directed at friendly, neutral, and hostile target audiences. SOCOM’s vision statement for PSYOP also supports the concept of strategic PSYOP. Informally, many senior officials responsible for policy and public affairs reject such a broad definition. The *IO Roadmap* signed by the Secretary explicitly rejects such a broad scope for PSYOP and instead constrains objectives, audiences, and operational application as follows:

- Objective: aggressive behavior modification (as opposed to mere influence)
- Audience: adversaries (implicitly combatants, regular and irregular, and those who provide them with intelligence, logistics, and other assets in the operational milieu identified below)
- Operational level and milieu: the operational and tactical level of war in support of military endeavors in nonpermissive and semipermissive environments (operating environments where American military personnel are at risk from hostile fire in varying degrees, which would include major combat operations and all but the most benign stability operations).

As a collateral mission, the *IO Roadmap* assigns PSYOP responsibility for supporting public diplomacy as part of the approved security cooperation guidelines.<sup>84</sup> The impact of the *IO Roadmap* redefinition of PSYOP boundaries is twofold. First, it helps deconflict PSYOP with other government information activities such as public affairs and public diplomacy, since it is limited to support to military endeavors in conflict zones (nonpermissive and semipermissive environments). Second, it sets a high standard of “aggressive behavior modification,” not the more nebulous objective of “influence.”

Responses to the survey conducted for this study suggest that PSYOP leadership and soldiers have mixed opinions about the importance of mission distinctions. Most respondents indicated that they understood the differences between PSYOP, public diplomacy, and public affairs but expressed varied opinions about the importance of the distinctions. Further, JPOTF personnel tended to dismiss the concerns of tactical commanders about their overemphasis on theater PSYOP (much of which constitutes support to public diplomacy). The JPOTF personnel claimed that they also conducted tactical PSYOP with theater production and dissemination assets. Maneuver commanders felt, however, that the JPOTF tactical products were not tailored and delivered on the timelines needed in the fast-paced OIF operations.

One possible explanation for the detrimental effects of the focus on theater-level PSYOP is that PSYOP leader interest in addressing broader audiences at that level undermines attention to the more stringent standards that might be reasonable at the tactical level. Public affairs and public diplomacy provide only a small portion of the information available to foreign audiences, making their effects especially difficult to assess. Public affairs and public diplomacy professionals can refer to polling for a general indication of how they are doing, but the correlation between their efforts and favorable attitudes toward U.S. policies and actions is, at best, obscure. There is insufficient evidence to assert whether PSYOP tactical products are less than state-of-the-art because of limited resources, entrenched attitudes about the higher importance of theater PSYOP, or other factors. Many PSYOP professionals interviewed for this study had a relatively sanguine attitude about the lack of timely, tailored, tactical, iterative products based on a rapid assessment, feedback, and modification process. Others, especially in the reserves, thought this was a major problem and said it was a byproduct of insufficient resources. In any case, as indicated in the following discussions on the theater-tactical gap within PSYOP forces and on resource shortfalls, PSYOP does not have the capacity to support tactical forces in the manner they expect and require.

At the tactical level, PSYOP practitioners had some concerns that they were asked to conduct public affairs to the detriment of their PSYOP duties. However, most respondents to the study survey commented that the public affairs and command information functions they performed did not detract from their overall mission. They seemed willing and able to get the commander's word out however he wanted. In fact, some cited the advantage of taking on commander information tasks because doing so increases PSYOP's face-to-face interactions with the populace, which is advantageous for building knowledge of the target audiences.

*Discussion.* Clearly, the PSYOP community and much of its leadership are wedded to a broad definition of goals and mission that is at odds with current policy. At issue is whether PSYOP is best executed under such a broad mandate or whether a more constrained and focused definition of the mission (as dictated in the *IO Roadmap* or some other way) would improve PSYOP performance.

Those who support the broader, looser definition of PSYOP argue that it is no longer possible to make distinctions between PSYOP, public diplomacy, and public affairs. In the new global information environment, all information is qualitatively the same and must be orchestrated in one giant effort that will “meld the activities of military PSYOP (international military

information), public diplomacy, and public affairs.”<sup>85</sup> All informational communication disciplines share some common attributes, particularly the objective of influencing target audiences in a manner favorable to the communicator’s interests. And it is becoming increasingly easy for individuals to access multiple sources of communication regardless of location through the Internet, satellite television, and cellular communications devices. These facts do not argue, however, for the necessity of eliminating distinctions between communication sources and methods. As a matter of policy and perhaps law, there are distinctions in the United States between communication disciplines. To date, the U.S. Government has insisted that these differences be respected, which explains why there is not one large government organization handling all types of information dissemination to both domestic and foreign audiences. Such an organization would be political and legally unacceptable on many grounds.<sup>86</sup>

It seems reasonable that PSYOP professionals should accept the distinctions among public affairs, public diplomacy, and PSYOP, and some do.<sup>87</sup> Many definitions of public affairs and public diplomacy exist, but just two will help demonstrate where they diverge as activity sets. Public affairs practiced in support of the Department of Defense are said to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of U.S. joint forces to the public and internal audiences.<sup>88</sup> This definition suggests a more passive, “on-demand” posture for public affairs, carried out mostly in dialogue with audiences (generally recognized as mostly domestic) to ensure they have the facts about U.S. military operations. Public diplomacy “seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign audiences.”<sup>89</sup> *Understanding* refers to visitor programs and other plans designed to acquaint foreigners with U.S. society, and *influencing* means providing a defense and promotion of U.S. policies and actions.

Where do these definitions of public affairs and public diplomacy leave PSYOP? In other words, why does the U.S. military have people in the profession of arms dedicated to persuasive communication? The answer could be because public affairs and public diplomacy must occasionally be exercised in hostile environments where only armed forces dare operate. But then they would still be public affairs and public diplomacy—only practiced by PSYOP forces as collateral missions necessitated by operational considerations. The best argument for why the U.S. military has uniformed personnel practicing persuasive communications is that it directly benefits the larger military enterprise, which is inextricably focused on the employment of organized and lethal force. In this context, the *Information Operations Roadmap*’s objective, audience, and operational scope seem appropriate for PSYOP: aggressive behavior modification of individuals and groups directly opposing U.S. military forces and their designated missions in conflict environments.

However, one plausible argument in favor of a broad depiction of the PSYOP mission is that a commander would have much more flexibility in how PSYOP is employed. There are two objections to this assertion. First, it is not clear that a more restricted definition of PSYOP would prevent combatant commanders from doing anything that they needed to do in order to accomplish their missions. The tasks required under the broader definition of PSYOP are able to be fulfilled either as PSYOP per se or as part of their collateral duty of support to public diplomacy.<sup>90</sup>



Second, it can be argued that the broad definition actually inhibits the flexibility of a commander by imposing more onerous coordination requirements upon him. Confusing PSYOP boundaries alienates and reduces cooperation with other information arms of the U.S. Government, namely public affairs and public diplomacy officials. Those responsible for these activities believe that the close association of PSYOP with military deception and lethal force would undermine its credibility with domestic and foreign audiences if PSYOP boundaries could not be distinguished from their spheres of activities. Precisely these concerns led to the demise of the Office of Strategic Information, which was established early in OEF to conduct some badly needed strategic planning and analysis of the Pentagon's contribution to the overall U.S. information campaign in support of the war on terror. The Secretary dissolved the office reluctantly after a public brouhaha over its purported mission. In short, confusing PSYOP with public diplomacy and public affairs encourages those responsible for these activities to avoid cooperation with PSYOP and, whenever possible, to impose stringent coordination requirements on PSYOP activities, which they fear will exceed proper bounds and negatively impact their missions.

*Conclusion.* PSYOP needs to be coordinated with public diplomacy and public affairs efforts to avoid conflicting and dissipated effects. Ideally, it should be able to cooperate with these other persuasive communication disciplines—for example, by sharing combat camera footage. This level of cooperation is unlikely, however, as long as the practitioners of public diplomacy and public affairs feel obliged to distance themselves from PSYOP leaders who do not understand or cannot abide by more restrictive PSYOP boundaries. PSYOP's broad and amorphous mission definitions help alienate practitioners of public diplomacy and public affairs, thereby making cooperation and even coordination more difficult. This is much more the case at the national and theater levels. But as the combat camera example illustrates, it affects cooperation at the tactical level as well.

An overly broad and vague definition of the PSYOP mission may have other negative consequences. It inclines both PSYOP professionals and senior leaders to expect levels of activity that PSYOP simply cannot generate with its current resource base. Thus, PSYOP is criticized when it cannot compete—in short order—with established government and private sector news outlets that operate around the clock with the benefit of established audiences (for example, Baghdad Bob and al Jazeera). In trying to meet the demand for support to public diplomacy, in particular, PSYOP expends resources in an area in which it has difficulty producing and measuring effects. In doing so, attention is drawn away from the tactical mission it can perform to higher standards. Finally, as discussed in the evidence, some PSYOP officers appear willing to accept lower standards for tactical PSYOP operations because they are focused on theater-level PSYOP in support of public diplomacy.

In summary, PSYOP vision, doctrine, and mission statements that could easily be confused with mandates to conduct public diplomacy and public affairs are not helpful. The broader Special Operations community clearly defines its primary missions and distinguishes between primary and collateral missions. The study concludes that PSYOP would be well advised to do the same. First, doing so would allow PSYOP to cooperate better with other U.S. Government informational communication efforts, and second, it might contribute to more attention and higher standards for the tactical missions in which PSYOP has a comparative advantage

(especially prudent, given PSYOP's meager resources). Unless PSYOP benefits from a major expansion of resources, collateral missions ought to remain decidedly less important than the primary mission of changing adversary behavior to immediately benefit U.S. forces in the field.

## **PSYOP Integration with Information Operations**

*Issue.* Joint doctrine and the *Information Operations Roadmap* direct that PSYOP be integrated with broader IO efforts.<sup>91</sup> At issue is whether this integration actually benefits or weakens PSYOP and its effects. Specifically, a major problem documented in OEF, OIF, and OIF 2 lessons learned is that IO planners did not sufficiently appreciate PSYOP capabilities or employ them appropriately and effectively because they did not adequately understand PSYOP. Secondary evidence of this problem cited the lack of guidance material to formally integrate IO. It was asserted that joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for information operations do not exist and that this contributed to the problem of PSYOP integration.

*Evidence.* Some evidence indicates that integration with IO benefited PSYOP. Specifically, PSYOP profited from close collaboration with EW,<sup>92</sup> military deception (MILDEC),<sup>93</sup> and CNO. In some cases, PSYOP professionals did a great deal of staff work to elicit the desired level of cooperation, but ultimately that cooperation was obtained. Perhaps the cooperation between PSYOP and EW was most telling. PSYOP broadcast over Iraqi radio nets with the assistance of EW assets apparently was highly demoralizing to the enemy.

Unclassified accounts of PSYOP cooperation with MILDEC and CNO are mentioned in the public domain but are not discussed in this review. However, it can be said that cooperation with computer network operations generally produced less satisfying results than cooperation with EW and MILDEC. In his autobiography, General Tommy Franks provided an example of PSYOP support for military deception during Operation *Desert Storm*:

Every night, psychological operations units drove trucks fitted with gigantic loudspeakers slowly back and forth along the border, playing recordings of clanking tanks and Bradleys. And this ruse complemented another of our PSYOP efforts, which broadcast bogus radio transmissions mimicking several heavy divisions moving forward to their final pre-attack tactical assembly areas.<sup>94</sup>

Overall, since PSYOP seemed to produce uneven levels of effects,<sup>95</sup> it is not possible to attribute any great success to its integration with IO. On the other hand, there certainly is more evidence of the benefits of integration as opposed to the costs.

Many PSYOP officers were irritated by suddenly having to work closely with and through newly designated IO officers. In one case, an IO officer reportedly distributed a product without PSYOP expert input and outside the bounds of the normal PSYOP product approval process, with disastrous effects.<sup>96</sup> However, the incident seems to be the exception that proves the rule: exceptional in that the IO officer was able to produce a PSYOP product without getting PSYOP input or going through the product approval process, but common in that the officer apparently

was poorly informed on PSYOP principles and practices. The many complaints from PSYOP generally reflected frustration with having to educate untrained IO officers (for example, on the capabilities and limitations of PSYOP).<sup>97</sup> Despite the irritation of working with poorly informed superiors, there is little evidence that doing so actually undermined PSYOP performance. Nor does that irritation seem to outweigh the benefits of working closely with the other IO core capabilities.

*Discussion.* Work on the *Information Operations Roadmap* began in January 2003, a few months before the start of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, and was completed in October 2003. Even though OIF major combat operations were concluded before the *Roadmap* was finished, the Joint Staff, services, and CENTCOM knew early on that the document would require the integration of the five core IO areas. They also knew that the Secretary of Defense strongly supported information operations. Thus, it is fair to assume that information operations and, by extension, PSYOP, received more attention than previously would have been the case. In this regard, the work on the *Roadmap* may have contributed to a higher level of integration between PSYOP and other IO core capabilities. However, it is also evident that the *Roadmap* recommendations on a career force of planners and specialists, and commensurate training and education initiatives, had not yet taken effect. Unsurprisingly, then, officers in charge of IO were not well informed on PSYOP or how to integrate the core IO capabilities.

Allied PSYOP experts commenting on their own performance made observations similar to the conclusions reached in this report. They noted that integration of PSYOP with IO helped PSYOP perform better by making it a more direct part of operational planning and attention but that IO officers needed to better understand PSYOP and on occasion retarded the ability of PSYOP to perform well.<sup>98</sup>

*Conclusion.* Based on the evidence collected, PSYOP integration with IO produced historically unprecedented levels of cooperation between PSYOP, EW, and CNO. PSYOP also contributed to military deception to a lesser degree. Overall this integration was not to great effect, but it does bode well for the future if one believes in the vision of information operations as a core military capability. There is no evidence that the integration hurt PSYOP performance other than wasting some staff time, which admittedly was a precious commodity.

The *IO Roadmap* recommends the establishment of a career force, designated billets, and joint doctrine, education, and training to support the integration of IO components. In the absence of these supporting elements, it is not surprising that PSYOP officers and soldiers were dismayed by the lack of respect and understanding—real or perceived—on the part of IO. PSYOP integration into IO can be expected to improve when the *Roadmap* recommendations are fully implemented and IO leaders are better educated and trained on IO, including PSYOP.

Army assessments of performance in OIF and OIF 2 recommend that the service take IO as a whole—including PSYOP—more seriously.<sup>99</sup> PSYOP professionals should also take IO seriously; they have little to lose and much to gain by doing so. For years PSYOP lessons learned (and PSYOP leaders) noted that senior commander understanding was limited and that PSYOP often was excluded from planning until it was too late to make a major impact. PSYOP

integration within IO does not mean that PSYOP professionals will be more isolated from senior commanders. On the contrary, inclusion in IO, which is gaining prominence in planning and operations (and by extension, in Army and Joint doctrine, education, and training),<sup>100</sup> will permit PSYOP to overcome a historic tendency to undervalue its contributions. Instead of insisting that PSYOP must operate independently in support of the combatant commander, PSYOP leaders should seize the opportunity to make it more effective by first integrating their efforts with the larger IO community and then using a dominant position to help ensure that information operations are well represented in all planning and operations conducted by combatant commanders.

PSYOP personnel should have a prominent place in IO command slots and planning staffs for three reasons. First, they are more numerous and more senior in rank than personnel in many of the other IO core capabilities. Second, arguably with the exception of military deception, the PSYOP discipline benefits most from integration with other IO core competencies since PSYOP increasingly needs EW and CNO to disseminate products. PSYOP already needs the other core elements of IO to reach target audiences, and that will be increasingly true as more people get their information from networks and electronic media. Loudspeakers and leaflets will always have their place, but PSYOP will not be effective in the future unless it can utilize assets that permit U.S. forces to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, which will only be possible through robust IO capabilities. Third, and unlike some other IO core capabilities, PSYOP officers are accustomed to command of personnel expert in both the hard and soft IO disciplines (human and electronic or automated decisionmaking) and to their integration in planning. Thus, PSYOP officers appreciate how important it is to integrated technical and human decisionmaking competencies in order to create effects, which is true of IO as a whole.

Yet PSYOP personnel generally prefer isolation from IO, largely in the unlikely hope that commanders will someday accord them a status similar to that held by public affairs. The increasing emphasis on standing joint headquarters and effects-based planning is more likely to force PSYOP to integrate into IO and IO into operations planning. Attention to IO overall will depend on demonstrated ability to affect adversary human and automated decisionmaking processes. PSYOP could use a prominent position within IO to ensure access to commanders, who in turn would be likely to pay attention to PSYOP when its effects are magnified by cooperation with other elements of IO. However, if the response of PSYOP leaders to this report is any indication, finding personnel in the field who agree with this vision will be difficult.

An impediment that tends to subordinate PSYOP to other concerns and obscure its importance within IO is its rank structure. This is especially true since the Army still defines IO too broadly (and inconsistently with the *IO Roadmap*), including civil affairs and other disciplines as part of IO. In comparison with intelligence, foreign area experts, public affairs, civil affairs, or other military occupational specialties, PSYOP officers are usually junior to their counterparts at every level of command.<sup>101</sup> Refusing to participate in IO will only aggravate the problem. It would be better for PSYOP personnel to report to trained IO commanders, many of whom would be PSYOP specialists or have background in PSYOP, than to report to officers from other military disciplines with no training in IO and with a narrower focus such as civil affairs or intelligence.

## Quantity of PSYOP Planners

*Issue.* A widely recognized problem in OIF was the insufficient number of PSYOP planners available to support component commanders. The lack of PSYOP planners was alleged to have contributed to poor planning and execution of PSYOP missions.

*Evidence.* Specifically, the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) and the Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander had insufficient PSYOP planning support within their respective commands. In the case of the CFACC, the absence of a PSYOP planner with the requisite wind model to assist targeting analysis for leaflet drops reportedly was a particular problem. Personnel eventually were found and the shortfalls were addressed, but not before component commanders felt their mission planning and execution had suffered.

Only two to four planners were required in each component commander's headquarters. Given the small number of slots that had to be filled and the hundreds of PSYOP personnel ostensibly under the command of the JPOTF (albeit spread among Fort Bragg, Tampa, and forward operating locations), it is surprising that the requests were not filled sooner.

Interviews with PSYOP officers revealed different possible explanations, all of which may have an element of validity. Some felt that Fort Bragg, where the largest number of PSYOP staff officers were working on a broad range of global operations, was not sufficiently attuned to the demands of Iraq and had other contingency requirements to meet in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and other locations. Others assert that PSYOP commanders, all Army officers, were less concerned with the needs of other services. After all, some argued, none of the other services provide any trained PSYOP personnel of their own.<sup>102</sup> Some believe that the JPOTF, intent on theater-level operations, was content to work as directly as possible with the combatant commander's operations staff and later with the coalition forces land component commander (CFLCC), once PSYOP product approval was delegated to him. Most believe, however, that there were simply too few PSYOP planners available, and especially too few with experience serving at component command headquarters.

*Discussion.* None of the proffered explanations are necessarily contradictory, and all may have contributed to decisions on how PSYOP planners were allocated. Given the generally acknowledged limitations on PSYOP force structure and numbers and the multiple demands placed upon the JPOTF, simply concluding that there were not enough bodies to go around would be easy. Although that would certainly seem true at one level, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the delayed allocation of planners was also a simple matter of priorities. There were only a handful of component commander planning jobs for which to account. All or most of the positions were eventually filled, and, unlike the rushed planning for OEF, there had been substantial lead-time in planning for OIF. The fact that PSYOP planning initially was delayed suggests that greater priority had been placed on theater-level than tactical-level missions in meeting component commander requirements. This assessment is consistent with Fort Bragg's emphasis on product development and dissemination to theater via improved communication links, rather than forward-deploying actual planners in theater. Reportedly the JPOTF commander had only a handful of planning staff forward with him in

theater, so meeting the component commander needs would have required deploying personnel from Fort Bragg.

**Conclusion.** The good news for PSYOP personnel is that other service component commanders hold them in high esteem and complained forthrightly about not having sufficient numbers of planners. The fact that commanders believed this shortage had a significant negative impact on their operations means that the PSYOP contribution to the total mission is gaining greater recognition and appreciation and that PSYOP must be prepared to meet this demand in the future. The creation of a Standing Joint Force Headquarters and standard operating procedures for integrating information operations in all combat operations would go a long way toward rendering this issue moot. In such circumstances, PSYOP presumably would be integrated through a joint IO operations cell rather than through individual component commanders. Until then, either the other services must offer up personnel for training in joint PSYOP or PSYOP must provide for them by forward-deploying more personnel from Fort Bragg to the theater.

### **Approval Process**

*Issue.* A dilatory PSYOP product approval process is detrimental to the execution of an effective campaign. A delayed process inhibits PSYOP planning and rehearsal time before operations begin, while slow approval during an actual campaign can render some military and political products useless, since they may be late to need or overcome by events (especially at the tactical level).

*Evidence.* During OEF, OIF, and OIF 2, the product approval process was a continual issue of contention at multiple levels of command. At the front end of OEF, poor communications between OSD Policy and the JPOTF led to several PSYOP products, particularly leaflets, being disapproved, and other products being delayed. The JPOTF commander was surprised that his products would require Policy approval, and Policy was surprised that it could not get an early look at the products and their rationale. Because senior officials were disappointed in the initial products, they insisted on reviewing all PSYOP themes and products before finally delegating authority to CENTCOM in November 2001.<sup>103</sup>

From that point on, the combatant commander could approve his products as he saw fit, referring only those with substantial political content to OSD Policy for preview and approval. This shifted the initiative to the combatant commander, who personally granted ready access to the JPOTF commander to facilitate faster product review and approval. Later, for OIF, the combatant commander delegated approval authority to the CFLCC. Initially, this decision had the result of slowing product approval again. Then, after a period during which personal relationships and access between the JPOTF and the CFLCC were ironed out, the pace of the approval process accelerated. However, it never was fast enough for the tactical commanders, who complained that getting products approved still took too long. They wanted product approval delegated to the division level, the lowest level consistent with the Chairman's instruction on the subject.<sup>104</sup>

No one was pleased with the approval process. Numerous interviews at all levels of command underscore the difficulty in obtaining timely approval of products. Some of the evident

frustrations concerning tardy product approval stem from the natural desire on the part of those responsible for product development to have nearly instantaneous approval of their creative efforts. However, interviews revealed specific cases where a significant delay in approval rendered the product useless. Reportedly, many tactical PSYOP units simply decided to “seek forgiveness rather than permission” for products they were confident would not run any significant risk of blowback. In some cases, commanders who valued PSYOP simply relabeled it “command information” in order to circumvent the approval process.<sup>105</sup> Close allies working with U.S. PSYOP forces in the field also concluded in lessons learned that the U.S. approval process needed to be substantially improved.

Joint doctrine notes the importance of rapid approval and recently was modified to provide guidance on the PSYOP approval process, including approval of objectives and themes as well as products. Joint doctrine states that the Office of the Secretary of Defense must approve PSYOP objectives and themes but that normally the Secretary of Defense will delegate product approval to the supported combatant commander. It adds the caveat that “in some cases, PSYOP products may be politically sensitive and may require separate approval for dissemination.” The combatant commander may delegate product approval authority to the Commander, Joint Task Force, but service or functional component commanders will not have product approval authority.<sup>106</sup>

*Discussion.* Product approval is a longstanding issue with PSYOP that has surfaced repeatedly in lessons learned from contingency operations since the 1980s. The trend over time has been to require ever-higher levels of approval. Problems in Vietnam reportedly led to the decision to require PSYOP products being approved at no lower than the division level.<sup>107</sup> The requirement for Pentagon approval of PSYOP programs came about in the 1980s as the result of “peacetime PSYOP” programs when it was necessary to ensure that PSYOP was consistent with policy and other public diplomacy efforts.<sup>108</sup> But more recently, increasing calls have been made to delegate PSYOP approval to the lowest levels possible, a point made in several of the informal lessons learned sources reviewed for this study.

Approval of PSYOP products can be held up at almost any point in the chain of command. However, there are two junctures in recent operations at which most difficulties seem to reside: between Pentagon and the JPOTF, which represented the combatant commander and had immediate access to products, and between the JPOTF (representing the combatant commander’s theater perspective) and tactical maneuver commanders who could define their immediate tactical PSYOP needs.

*The Pentagon and the JPOTF.* All concerned agree that PSYOP products with political content (those that represent U.S. positions on either foreign or international political issues) ought to be consistent with U.S. policy. The question is, who makes that determination? If U.S. policy is static, and the combatant commander has a firm understanding of it regarding the use of military forces, why not delegate all PSYOP product approval to the combatant commander and allow him to decide which ones require a judgment call by officials in the Pentagon? This approach makes sense if several conditions apply. First, the policy ought to be stable, if not static, as might be true in short-duration major combat operations. In such cases, one might argue that the major policy positions have been worked out well in advance of the conflict and are readily understood by the combatant commander and his staff. In such circumstances, the value of

keeping busy Pentagon officials out of the approval process might be judged to outweigh the risks involved in miscommunicating U.S. policy. The risk would be especially tolerable if the preferred approach is to keep the theater PSYOP products supporting U.S. policy at a relatively high level of abstraction (that is, devoid of nuance or many supporting arguments).

Some would argue that the lack of sophistication in PSYOP products overseen by military commanders instead of Policy officials would undermine their effectiveness. Another view would be that it depends on the conflict and how controversial U.S. policy is. Clearly, the theater-level PSYOP products in OEF benefited from national-level policy oversight, and they had more nuance; however, the goals of OEF were more complicated than those of OIF. A third position would be that justifying war is always a complex enterprise, and that in a global communications environment, a more sophisticated understanding and defense of U.S. decisions to use force will always pay dividends.

For those who want theater PSYOP products to be as timely, detailed, and consistent with U.S. policy as possible, the preferred solution is not to cut Policy officials out of the approval process, but rather to elevate the profile of PSYOP and military information more generally in the Pentagon and make sure the approval process is executed with alacrity. This approach has the advantage of ensuring that justifications for U.S. policies and actions are completely current and well coordinated with other information efforts of the U.S. Government—especially valuable in situations where policy can change rapidly or where the proper expression of policy positions requires an up-to-date understanding of the risks that the Government is willing to accept. For example, in the case of OEF, the original PSYOP products were disapproved because they seemed to emphasize that U.S. bombings were punitive and directed against Afghans in general rather than al Qaeda in particular. Moreover, the products had to evolve as U.S. policy swung in favor of eliminating the Taliban regime once it became apparent they would not cooperate in the fight against al Qaeda.

*The JPOTF and maneuver commanders.* Just as there is general agreement that PSYOP products should be consistent with U.S. policy, there is also a consensus that products with low political or noncontroversial content should be delegated. The questions are, what products fit that description, and how far down the command chain should they be delegated? Recently, agreement has been reached on a list of preapproved programs with low or no political content that seem to be staples in the PSYOP repertoire: safety and public service messages, for example. Wherever possible, expanding this list of programs or, in some cases, specific products is advisable.

The question of how far down the chain the approval process should be delegated is more problematic. Some former JPOTF personnel interviewed raised serious objections to delegation to division commanders. They argued that consistency in products needed to be assured across the theater.<sup>109</sup> For example, if procedures for approaching a checkpoint are conducted differently by each division in OIF, Iraqis traveling across divisional boundaries might apply the wrong set of rules and inadvertently cause an incident. On the other hand, maneuver commanders and some PSYOP personnel who supported them directly in recent operations argue that some PSYOP products must be tailored to the division commander's immediate needs.<sup>110</sup> For



example, in OIF 2, if insurgents were operating out of cemeteries, a local commander would need a message challenging that practice. Alternatively, local commanders trying to control border infiltration would need messages tailored to that problem. In short, good arguments can and are made for both consistency and diversity of products, depending on circumstances.

*Conclusion.* The two basic approval issues are quality and policy consistency. High-quality products that could produce desired effects must nonetheless be consistent with policy, and products that are consistent with policy need to be reviewed by expert opinion to increase the likelihood that they will produce desired effects.

Unless the approval process is reformed at both the theater and tactical levels, PSYOP effectiveness will be seriously compromised. First, the risk of an occasional poor product must be accepted and mitigated with a rapid effects assessment and product revision process that limits the damage by quickly modifying and reissuing a better product. Also, the norm concerning decisions about quality should be to leave them to those most expert in the subject. Commanders and Pentagon officials should review products to determine whether they are consistent with policy and the general campaign plan, not to rule on whether the quality of the product is high enough. At the same time, PSYOP personnel should be ready to explain in detail to commanders and policy officials precisely why they believe their product will achieve the desired effect. This approach should be codified in policy and doctrine and resourced accordingly.

Second, a general scheme for preapproval of tactical products should be adopted. Building on recent experience and the success of recent efforts<sup>111</sup> to preapprove products for some small contingency operations such as noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian, counterdrug, and maritime interdiction operations, a more discrete set of product categories with designated approval levels should be developed. Table 5–1 gives one example of how this might be done.

Third, at the theater level, the preferred solution is to make the Policy approval process more responsive. The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) should delegate the approval process to someone with day-to-day access to contingency policy who can review products in an expeditious manner. PSYOP products that are not preapproved for delegation or that the JPOTF believes need review should be forwarded directly to the Pentagon with product control sheets, logged in with an expiration time after which their approval is assumed, and handled accordingly. The sole responsibility of the Policy official charged with approval should be to check for policy consistency, not quality, which would be the duty of the combatant commander. For this approach to work, the JPOTF would require direct liaison authority with the Policy official responsible for product approvals to resolve outstanding issues quickly.

This preferred solution presumes that the Pentagon can generate national-level themes and messages, as well as develop a process that allows for expeditious, interagency review of themes and messages on a recurring basis. In the case of the war on terror, the national themes and messages need to differentiate between those broad themes that apply on a global basis and those that are region- or country-specific. If, for political reasons, it is not possible to produce and regularly review national themes, then the value added by the Pentagon would not be high enough to justify its participation in product review. The Policy guidance would be relatively

static and at a high level of abstraction, and no better than whatever was approved originally in the combatant commander’s plan. Instead, the combatant commander should have the JPOTF (or whatever staff element he puts in charge of PSYOP) review and approve theater-level products intended for general audiences simply on the basis of guidelines approved in the contingency plan and updated periodically as necessary.

As for tactical products, the same general process should apply. PSYOP products that are not preapproved for dissemination by tactical commanders or that the PSYOP company commander believes need JPOTF review should be forwarded directly to the JPOTF with product control sheets and logged in with an expiration time after which their approval is assumed by the local commander. In the case of tactical products, however, the JPOTF responsibility should be to check for policy consistency as well as minimum quality standards, since he presumably will have more resources for that purpose than individual PSYOP company commanders. Obviously, the JPOTF should be attentive to tactical PSYOP insights on what is effective and share these insights across the theater.

Table 5–1. Designated Approval Levels for PSYOP Mission Categories

<b>PSYOP Mission Categories</b> (with subcategory examples)	<b>Major Combat Operations</b>	<b>Stability Operations</b>
<p><b>Isolating adversary from domestic and international support</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Confer legitimacy on U.S. policy, objectives, and actions</li> <li>- Diminish the adversary’s legitimacy</li> <li>- Separate combatants from popular support</li> <li>- Encourage populace not to offer logistic and intelligence support to combatants (stability operations)</li> <li>- Support local and national authorities (stability operations); for example, recruiting posters for security forces</li> <li>- Public health and safety messages for goodwill</li> <li>- Counter enemy propaganda</li> </ul>	JPOTF with Pentagon approval	JPOTF with Pentagon approval
<p><b>Reducing effectiveness of adversary forces</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Demoralize enemy combatants</li> <li>- Degrade adversary’s combat ability</li> <li>- Sow discord and distrust among enemy</li> <li>- Rewards programs</li> <li>- Encourage desertion and surrender (combat operations)</li> <li>- Encourage desertion, cooperation, and participation in amnesty programs (stability operations)</li> <li>- “Wanted” posters</li> </ul>	Division-level commanders with JPOTF approval	JPOTF with Pentagon approval

<p><b>Deterring escalation by adversary’s leadership</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deter atrocities (stability operations)</li> <li>- Deter geographic expansion</li> <li>- Deter WMD use (combat operations)</li> </ul>	JPOTF with Pentagon approval	JPOTF with Pentagon approval
<p><b>Minimizing collateral damage and interference with U.S. operations</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Dissemination of safety messages to populace</li> <li>- How to avoid danger in proximity to operations</li> <li>- How to approach checkpoints</li> <li>- How to obtain refugee assistance</li> <li>- Mine and unexploded ordnance awareness</li> <li>- Public health and sanitation</li> </ul>	Division-level commanders with JPOTF approval	Division-level commanders with JPOTF approval

**Theater- and Tactical-Level PSYOP Forces Divide**

*Issue.* A gap exists between the missions and capabilities of theater-level and tactical-level PSYOP forces that undermines the effectiveness of the overall effort. Tactical PSYOP forces, located predominantly in the reserves, are not as well equipped or trained as the Active Component, which is organized primarily to support theater-level PSYOP. Tactical PSYOP, once on the move, cannot communicate readily with the JPOTF, which is overseeing the theater-level effort, and they have scant resources to actually produce and disseminate products to meet local requirements. The JPOTF can deliver tactical products on behalf of tactical commanders, on a prioritized basis, but the commanders complain that products frequently are not timely enough or tailored to their needs. Because of the communications gap, the JPOTF is not well informed by the tactical forces on the effects their products have on target audiences. The gap between the mission focus, capabilities, and, ultimately, cooperative intent of theater and tactical PSYOP degrades the overall performance.

*Evidence.* The JPOTF ostensibly is responsible for all PSYOP efforts, but its focus is on the theater PSYOP campaign. It prepares theater products for general audiences (mainly radio messages, but also printed products) and tactical products that are produced and delivered to specific target audience segments by theater-level resources (primarily, but not exclusively, printed materials delivered by air). The products for general audiences tend to be support to public diplomacy (that is, conveying the legitimacy of U.S. policy and objectives to the general population) and preplanned tactical operations that have longer planning timelines (for example, desertion and surrender of enemy forces).

In contrast, the mission of tactical PSYOP forces, especially in major combat operations, concentrates more on the provision of time-sensitive, tailored messages of persuasion and support to emerging tactical operations. The tactical forces work directly in support of individual tactical commanders, who often desire products that are tailored to their specific exigencies delivered on a very rapid timeline. There are exceptions. For example, tactical

PSYOP forces can deliver products for general audiences that do not ask for specific behaviors, but rather attempt to change general attitudes or beliefs. An example would be showing videos village by village that make a broad case in support of U.S. policy or handing out printed tracts that do the same. This is more often the case in stability operations. The norm, however, is for tactical PSYOP forces to use loudspeakers and limited quantities of printed materials to request specific behavior from target audiences to help the tactical commander produce the effects needed accomplish his mission more efficiently. Tactical PSYOP products typically require more precise intelligence about enemy commanders and the morale of local adversaries.

The theater and tactical PSYOP missions should be mutually reinforcing. However, the fact that the theater forces control the majority of PSYOP product development and dissemination capabilities, are geographically removed from the tactical fight, and are responsible for theater-wide missions (which some PSYOP officers believe are inherently more important) has contributed to lack of attention to tactical PSYOP priorities.<sup>112</sup> As a result, some maneuver commanders in recent operations complained that the JPOTF was too focused on theater PSYOP and not sufficiently supportive of their tactical requirements.

*Capabilities.* The tactical force can produce simple messages for dissemination by loudspeaker, assuming the availability of linguists. They can also produce limited quantities of printed material that can be delivered to the target audience by air assets that they do not control, or by personnel in the case of stability operations. All other radio, television, and printed production and dissemination capability is controlled by the JPOTF at the theater level or is resident at Fort Bragg, far removed from the front lines. The problem is particularly acute in fast-paced combat operations such as OIF, where embedded tactical reserve PSYOP battalions were ill prepared and equipped to meet the demands of the operation. The same is true of the rapid, short-term combat phases of stability contingency operations such as Panama and Kosovo, where securing adversary compliance was a fast-paced affair.

In Operation *Desert Storm*, however, where the lead time prior to ground operations was longer and PSYOP planning and product dissemination were conducted at a less hectic pace, the problem was less acute. The same is true of many stability operations, where the situation evolves more slowly. Yet even in slower-paced stability operations where timeliness is less of an issue, maneuver commanders have still complained about lack of products tailored to their needs.<sup>113</sup> The PSYOP forces supporting tactical units have difficulty obtaining JPOTF-approved products that they could modify within approved limits. Even when they succeed in doing so, they currently have no organic means of distribution other than hand delivery of such products (although they can appeal to the tactical units they support for helicopters or C-130s to accomplish leaflet dissemination). When one considers that PSYOP effects are more readily observed at the tactical level and that the comparative advantage of uniformed persuasive communicators is the leverage they get from the highly effective and coercive U.S. combat arms, the gap between the theater and tactical capabilities is particularly glaring.

*Cooperation.* The differing mission focus, reinforced by the discrepancies in capabilities, is further highlighted by geographic distance, disparate training regimes, and some natural tension between active and reserve forces. The result is a commensurate decline in ability and

willingness to cooperate. For many of the tactical reserve units, the JPOTF did not provide any value added for their efforts. The JPOTF was not able to maintain a secret Internet protocol routing network (SIPRNET) connection for tactical forces to transmit with approved products that could be modified and for relaying news of PSYOP efforts and effects elsewhere in the theater. (As mentioned already, the JPOTF is a higher authority that controlled product approval and dissemination assets, which required periodic situation reports.) Nor was it able to provide much assistance to the tactical units once operations were under way. From the JPOTF point of view, the overall structure and intent of the campaign was largely a theater effort. Since tactical PSYOP units have few assets with which to measure product effects and no communication devices to rapidly transmit images or files, they were not particularly important to watch closely, other than to report to higher authorities the disposition of forces on a daily basis. Tactical-level PSYOP units receive high marks for their contribution to tactical intelligence. They use their interaction with the local populace to facilitate collection of critical information that is especially valued during stability operations. However, this information is fed directly to tactical commanders rather than through the JPOTF.

*Discussion.* The gap that separates theater and tactical PSYOP forces, coupled with PSYOP-specific factors that contribute to this problem, hinders overall PSYOP effectiveness. Maneuver commanders do not feel well supported with timely and tailored products that evolve based on discernible effects, and the JPOTF cannot take advantage of feedback that should be available from tactical PSYOP forces more directly in contact with target audiences. The significance of the theater-tactical gap depends somewhat upon the type of military operation under way. For example, with respect to timeliness, combat operations generally may require more time-sensitive support. However, in all operations, including stability operations, it is advantageous to move quickly when countering disinformation from the adversary, and it is always important to tailor products rapidly based on tactical needs and feedback about product effects. In this regard, it would be correct to say that the theater-tactical gap remains significant regardless of the type of operation.<sup>114</sup>

In addition to mission and capability differences, several factors that deepen the theater-tactical gap also need to be underscored. PSYOP force structure is one such factor. Active duty forces are primarily assigned to theater-level operations and serve as the first tier of in-theater PSYOP specialists. Four of the six active duty battalions are oriented to specific regions and designed to focus on product development. Depending on where the contingency occurs, the relevant active duty battalion is tapped and supported by active duty dissemination and tactical battalions, both of which are chronically in short supply. The reserve units are called upon to round out support to tactical-level operations and to reinforce the small amount of active duty tactical and dissemination capabilities. Education, training, and force alignment of the Active Components are all oriented toward theater-level missions, while reserve forces are limited in the amount of training that they receive (typically, one week per month) and are thus directed toward tactical PSYOP missions, which require less training and preparation than functional and regional expertise. Reserve PSYOP forces are more likely to experience equipment shortages and receive inadequate training, which further exacerbates the tension between those working theater and tactical PSYOP missions.

Some of the imbalance in theater and tactical capability reflects force structure adjustments made in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The PSYOP force structure of the Vietnam era was based on multipurpose battalions designed to operate at province level in a mature theater. Each battalion had its own product development cell, tactical cell, intelligence and interrogation cells, and support capabilities such as motor pools and cooks. Following the war, PSYOP units maintained the old organizational structure. The Active Component 4<sup>th</sup> POG was given worldwide responsibilities, while the three Reserve Component groups were given regional orientations. The reserve groups were assigned much later deployment dates than the 4<sup>th</sup> POG and reported up through the reserve structure. Their internal organization and roles were not deemed appropriate to meet the emerging threats of the 1990s or to execute sensitive peacetime missions. This caused great concern among multiple agencies in Washington and was confusing to the theater commanders, as there were two different PSYOP commanders under two different commands operating in each theater. This roles and missions issue was solved when all PSYOP forces were placed under SOCOM. During the process, one reserve group was deleted from the force structure for readiness and mission reasons, and the other two were placed under the 4<sup>th</sup> POG for peacetime operational control, which included coordinating authority.<sup>115</sup>

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, just as PSYOP was being integrated into SOCOM and lessons from the first Gulf War were being absorbed, PSYOP force structure was revised. At that time, lessons learned indicated that excess forces were assigned to the theater level and dissemination missions but that there was a dramatic shortage of tactical forces, especially if there were multiple contingencies or requirements for troop rotations over long periods of time. Tactical operations are people-intensive, whereas planning and product development functions are not. As a result, the tactical cells in the 4<sup>th</sup> POG were combined to form one tactical PSYOP battalion in order to have an on-call force capable of early deployment and initial support of key units. Regionally oriented cells in theater-specific battalions accomplished theater planning and product development. Finally, the regionally oriented battalions were placed under a single group commander. Dissemination functions (print, radio, television) were consolidated into a single battalion in the 4<sup>th</sup> POG, which maintained a close relationship with its sister Reserve Component battalion. The reserve forces were converted to tactical units except for the dissemination battalion and an enemy prisoner of war battalion. In addition to the force structure changes, a single product development center was established at Fort Bragg, and product development capabilities for the field were reduced on theory that the products could be electronically disseminated from this center to forward locations.

The goal of these changes was to improve the training and readiness of the active group. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG commander could task-organize his forces depending on the contingency and combatant commander needs, and each battalion commander was able to focus on a narrowly defined set of skills instead of having to try to master divergent skill sets of small, habitually undermanned cells. The reserves could focus on tactical skills, which are easier to master in the short amount of training time available to them than are product development and regional orientation skills. According to a former 4<sup>th</sup> POG commander who help institute force structure changes in the early 1990s, they improved efficiency in part by leveraging reachback capability and improving the readiness of limited force structure:

The concept developed in the late '80s /early '90s was for the 4<sup>th</sup> Group to provide theater-level planning, execute operational programs, meet theater joint coordination requirements, and develop and execute dissemination operations. There was a very limited capability to provide the initial tactical loudspeaker assets. All but the loudspeaker functions could be accomplished by three or four cells in each area, and force structure was sufficient to do this. This concept would permit rotations of highly trained cells capable of executing theater-level missions. The early and sustaining follow-on tactical level forces would come from the reserve component in battalion level and lower size units. . . . It was also part of the concept that dissemination and production requirements would be met primarily by contracting in theater or in CONUS [continental United States], thus reducing the number of deployed personnel requirements. In addition, technology would be exploited to leverage creative programs and products that could be developed anywhere in the world.<sup>116</sup>

The force structure reforms of the 1990s were focused on theater operations and had the advantage of allowing the PSYOP commander to task-organize, which is routinely done. PSYOP personnel are often pulled from wherever they are and sent to support various missions regardless of regional orientation. Similarly, a large amount of product development or dissemination capability to fit the contingency at hand can be dispatched as needed.<sup>117</sup> The changes also ensured more tactical capability in the reserves. However, active duty tactical PSYOP is still in short supply and remains less capable than it needs to be of supporting maneuver forces. Some minor adjustments to permit more leaflet printing capability by tactical units were made after maneuver commanders in Bosnia complained about the lack of tactical capability, but the major adjustments of the late 1980s and 1990s remain in place. As a result of the *Information Operations Roadmap* effort, SOCOM added an active PSYOP company in fiscal year (FY) 2004 and plans to add one active and four reserve regional PSYOP companies in FY05.<sup>118</sup> These additions will not correct the shortfalls in tactical PSYOP, but they will increase manpower available for theater-level product development.

Some argue that total PSYOP forces have an abundance of tactical capability, enough to support seven Army corps equivalents (at the ratio of one PSYOP tactical battalion per corps equivalent).<sup>119</sup> However, six of the seven tactical battalions are in the reserves and cannot be called up repeatedly for extended deployments without affecting retention. Moreover, as demand for PSYOP rises in the war on terrorism, the standing assumption that a tactical PSYOP company can support a division and a battalion can support a corps may need to be reconsidered. This could be particularly true as the Army transitions to a transformed force structure that is based on roughly brigade-sized units. Finally, those who argue that there is more than enough tactical PSYOP are only looking at overall force structure, not demand for capability and actual PSYOP tactical capabilities. There may be enough tactical PSYOP companies if the reserves are available for repeated and extended deployments, but demand for their services is growing, and their capability is meager.

The scarcity of tactical PSYOP capability is reflected in part by recent decisions by the Marines to build their own resources. After operations in Iraq demonstrated the need for more tactical PSYOP capability, the Marines requested additional support from the Army, which had to deny

the request because the PSYOP force was overextended. Therefore, to compensate for this limited tactical capability, the Marines took a series of initiatives designed to provide organic PSYOP capability for their forward-deployed forces. In addition to officer training, the following steps have been taken recently or are under way:<sup>120</sup>

- The Marine Corps established the 9955 PSYOP Officer Additional Military Occupational Specialty to identify and track PSYOP-trained personnel. Marine PSYOP officers will be sent to the U.S. Army PSYOP Officer Course at Fort Bragg. U.S. Army PSYOP doctrinal publications have been dual-designated as USMC publications to ensure that Marines operate under existing TTPs in the joint arena.
- Billets and force structure have been allocated to create a TPD of three TPTs at both I and II MEFs to provide sequential TPTs to deploy with the three Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) on each coast. III MEF will get a single TPT to support its single MEU.
- A memorandum of understanding between the USMC and SOCOM is being developed to facilitate an ongoing relationship for training and operational support as TPTs are trained and deployed.
- 24 MEU purchased a tactical loudspeaker system (SoundCommander 1000) for its current deployment to Iraq.
- 26 MEU purchased four SoundCommanders and designated tactical broadcast teams to deploy each system. These four teams were to be trained in November 2004 at Fort Bragg by U.S. Army PSYOP personnel to become proficient in basic PSYOP broadcast procedures and coordination of reachback support.

If the product development center at Fort Bragg could be made responsive to tactical forces and quickly turn products for them that could then be disseminated rapidly, the lack of tailored, timely products for maneuver commanders would be solved in part. However, the product development center has proven less than responsive to requests from the field, and the tactical PSYOP forces have no organic means of disseminating products. What is sometimes referred to as the *CNN central* concept, wherein Fort Bragg is the hub that feeds the tactical PSYOP units on the fly, remains an unfulfilled promise.

Inadequate means of communication between the JPOTF and tactical PSYOP forces contribute substantially to the inability to exercise a Fort Bragg-central concept and to the theater-tactical gap more generally. An absence of organic communication equipment within tactical PSYOP teams hampers their ability to share real-time information with theater-level assets. The result is that they are largely cut off from the JPOTF when moving with tactical units. Once the tactical maneuver unit stops and sets up communications, it can attempt to connect with the JPOTF. Transferring large files is difficult, however, and major products (especially video) must be hand-carried to the JPOTF. The lack of rapid, high-bandwidth communications makes it difficult for tactical and theater PSYOP forces to cooperate, thereby degrading the situational awareness of each. This issue can lead to uncoordinated or duplicated efforts and reduces the overall effectiveness of PSYOP campaigns.<sup>121</sup>



*Conclusion.* The gap between theater- and tactical-level PSYOP must be closed to improve its effectiveness for the combatant commander. Many of the nonmateriel recommendations in this report, such as reforming the product approval process and minimizing the confusion over PSYOP mission boundaries, could help narrow the chasm. In other cases, additional resources will be required, particularly in the area of mobile, tactical high-bandwidth communications. Organic communications equipment for tactical PSYOP that would enable reachback to the theater level would allow theater PSYOP efforts to benefit from tactical feedback on effects and would permit tactical forces to leverage theater-level situational awareness and products and secure rapid product approval. Perhaps as important, tactical PSYOP must have its own deployable product development and dissemination capabilities if it is to keep pace with fast-moving maneuver forces.

The question arises whether theater-level PSYOP to general audiences (often executed through resource-intensive radio, television, and newspapers) is as cost-effective as tactical PSYOP conducted primarily through sound systems and small, simple paper products. The theater general audience missions are conducted for supporting public diplomacy and minimizing collateral damage, along with encouraging noninterference with U.S. operations, which are among the generic PSYOP objectives for both major combat operations and stability operations:

- isolating an adversary from domestic and international support
- reducing the effectiveness of an adversary's forces
- deterring escalation by adversarial leadership
- minimizing collateral damage and encouraging noninterference with U.S. operations.

The first objective is much more critical to the success of stability operations where irregular forces depend upon support from the population. This objective is executed at both the theater and tactical levels. In fact, direct PSYOP appeals to target audiences at the tactical level are a critical contribution to success in stability operations, which is why excessive focus on the theater level hurts PSYOP performance in both major combat and stability operations.<sup>122</sup> However, theater-level PSYOP in support of stability operations is also necessary to reach the civilian population, and it is most resource-intensive at the theater level, where PSYOP must compete with better-established information enterprises via newspapers, radio, and television.<sup>123</sup> Unless PSYOP is operating in the immediate aftermath of a major combat operation when major media outlets are temporarily out of commission, or the political will exists to curb competition from competing information sources, PSYOP may have difficulty competing and being effective at the theater level when engaging broad audiences. "Fixing" theater PSYOP products for general audiences will be expensive, but it is critical for success in stability operations.

By contrast, tactical PSYOP products can make direct and powerful contributions to the second and third objectives, which pay much higher dividends in major combat operations where adversary forces have more combat power and escalation options. These objectives are best pursued at the tactical level where PSYOP can attempt to affect the enemy decisionmaker directly as opposed to eroding his support base.<sup>124</sup>





Tactical PSYOP in support of major combat operations is more cost-effective and easier to fix but less critical for the success of the overall combat operation. In contrast, theater PSYOP to general audiences is harder and more expensive to fix but more critical for the success of stability operations. Given the other reforms necessary to make PSYOP effective at the theater level, senior leaders might want to consider focusing PSYOP on the tactical mission whether executed by forces controlled by the JPOTF or by tactical maneuver units. Doing so would help reduce the variance in theater-tactical missions and lay the groundwork for greater cooperation between the JPOTF and tactical forces. If senior leaders consider the theater PSYOP mission that targets a broader and more general audience worth the required expenditure of political and fiscal capital, it still may be advisable to have the theater product and content development capabilities moved to another entity so that the JPOTF could concentrate on supporting the tactical mission.

The need to provide robust tactical capability should also influence the current force redesign effort. PSYOP reorganization in the late 1980s allowed better task organization by contingency or training event, but it diminished tactical capability once engaged. Force structure redesign needs to safeguard the advantages of flexibility in a more modular design while increasing the strength of tactical PSYOP where the greatest effects can be achieved at the least cost. PSYOP force redesign also needs to account for the transformation of Army units that PSYOP tactical forces will support. Previously, a tactical PSYOP company (TPC), made up of 60–70 personnel, was tasked to provide PSYOP support to a division-strength combat force.

According to some accounts, U.S. Army transformation is leading to ground forces based on units of approximately brigade size but nonetheless covering areas of operation previously requiring division-size forces. These new Army units will have a more robust information operations capability that includes PSYOP. A TPC that supports a transformed brigade-size unit would need more robust capabilities than currently reside in a TPC, including:

- organic communications with the JPOTF while moving
- organic intelligence support, to include HUMINT collection and intelligence analysis
- contract linguist support
- organic tactical dissemination capabilities.

Figure 5–1. Fault Lines and Options

	Major Combat Operations	Stability Operations
Theater PSYOP	Less critical Harder to fix Resource-intensive Effects more obscure 	More critical Harder to fix Resource-intensive Effects more obscure 
Tactical PSYOP	Less critical Easier to fix PSYOP comparative advantage (leveraging coercion) 	More critical Fixing requires adjustments to concept and doctrine as well as resources 

Beefing up TPCs with these capabilities would solve several problems. The PSYOP teams attached to future Army units must have organic communications common to those units, including the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below program, tactical FM radios to work with the unit’s IO cell, and the Army’s Maneuver Control System Light to enable battalion-level PSYOP to communicate with higher headquarters. Tactical PSYOP companies will not be under the operational control of the JPOTF, but they still must be able to communicate with the JPOTF for products to be quickly transferred, modified, and approved. Such additional communications would also allow both the TPC and the JPOTF to have better situation awareness. The JPOTF will maintain a clear tactical picture of the battlefield as events unfold and will benefit from insights on product effects obtained at the tactical level. The TPC will be well informed of successes and failures elsewhere and can remain current on themes and messages as plans change.

Readily available, direct intelligence support to TPC operations will improve target audience analysis and product assessment. Whether in the form of intelligence cells attached to the TPCs or through intelligence liaison officers who respond to their requests for intelligence, TPCs need dedicated intelligence support. Both a HUMINT officer to exploit human sources and an intelligence analyst to liaison with diverse intelligence sources and build a composite picture of local enemy leaders, enemy morale, and public attitudes in his area of operations are critical to good, timely target audience analysis.

TPCs should be funded so that they can contract for local linguists. Proficient linguists are an absolute necessity for the proper translation of radio broadcast scripts and leaflet messages, for conducting loudspeaker operations in support of infantry units, and for distributing surveys to target audiences to assess PSYOP product effectiveness. In the words of one PSYOP professional, “Without linguist support, either assigned or available on request—PSYOP cannot function.”<sup>125</sup>


Finally, TPCs must be equipped with limited organic production (for example, Risographs) and dissemination capability. Tactical PSYOP teams often will not have the luxury of contracting out printing jobs, and the ability to print small materials greatly facilitates timely delivery of messages. As for dissemination, the need to coordinate efforts with print production teams, broadcast teams (both SOMS–B and Commando Solo aircraft), and leaflet bomb deliveries from aircraft operating within their AOR to disseminate products increases the time required to deliver a PSYOP product to a target and thereby reduces its effectiveness. TPCs need some form of organic, rapid local product delivery other than hand distribution—for example, the Wind Supported Aerial Delivery System. In addition, tactical PSYOP needs the ability to broadcast video directly to audiences, either to increase effects or to directly reach illiterates who otherwise would have to rely on third-party interpretations of printed materials.<sup>126</sup>

PSYOP should be willing to restructure to provide more of this kind of capability to future ground forces. The Army intends to reorganize its fighting force into a structure consisting of 48 brigades. If PSYOP planned on providing one TPC per brigade, it would require 48 TPCs in the active and reserve PSYOP battalions. If each TPC is assigned 60–70 personnel, PSYOP would need between 2,880 and 3,360 personnel. Currently, active and reserve PSYOP personnel total 3,935, so the reorganization is within the realm of the possible. However, it might have to come at the expense of some theater product development capability, which is where most of the active duty force resides. This may be acceptable for two reasons.

First, organizing most of PSYOP active duty structure around regions may be inefficient. A general regional orientation may be less relevant than a general cultural or functional orientation for two reasons. PSYOP force structure is so limited that personnel often are asked to perform in contingencies outside of their region. In addition, the level of knowledge of target audiences provided by regional orientation is insufficient to produce high-quality products. It provides a small running start at target audience analysis, but rapid in-depth study of local culture from open and classified sources prior to deployment (as is the habit of the Marines) is needed in any case. Once on the scene, this must be augmented with detailed, persistent, and ongoing target audience analysis and assessment at both the theater and tactical level. Second, other recommendations in this report would help compensate for this diminution of regional expertise—for example, the redesign of the SDD, and the amalgamation of the JPSE in Tampa, Florida, with the Media Production Center (MPC) at Fort Bragg.

Figure 5–2. PSYOP Tactical Force Structure

## PSYOP Tactical Force Structure



**Observation:** PSYOP force structure redesign should consider personnel and equipment to provide organic “on-the-move” communications, and intelligence support at the company level; add more target audience analysis personnel with contract linguist support and limited print capability to the product development detachment; add another tactical team to handle organic dissemination assets.

### Quality of PSYOP Products

*Issue.* A recurrent complaint throughout the operations reviewed by this study concerns the quality of psychological operations products. Specifically, according to both the JFCOM and 4<sup>th</sup> POG lessons learned, CENTCOM leaders were unhappy with the quality, timeliness, and sophistication of PSYOP products.<sup>127</sup> In discussions on this issue in interviews, emails, and the informal survey distributed for this study, many PSYOP professionals responded to these complaints about quality by noting that what matters is what the target audience thinks and whether the product works. They often use the analogy that “the bait smells good to the fish and not necessarily to the fisherman,” implying that PSYOP products may still be effective even if senior officers do not find them appealing for one reason or another. The question at hand is whether PSYOP products are not appreciated by those without the requisite training to evaluate them, or whether there is a need for improvement.

*Evidence and discussion.* Assuming that the most important determinant of quality is effects, PSYOP products present a mixed picture for two reasons. First, as noted earlier, the correlation between PSYOP efforts and adversary behavior is spotty, ranging from a strong correlation to

none at all. We conclude that PSYOP demonstrated some ability to generate effects, especially at the tactical level, where the audience is limited, a specific behavior is requested, and coercion or appeals to emotion are heavily leveraged. Loudspeaker operations and surrender leaflets show a closer correlation between product and effect, for example, than did leaflets warning against the use of WMD or destruction of oil wells. As is usually the case, convincing evidence of PSYOP effects could not be found at the theater level, where the audience is more general and amorphous and the message less distinct. One might argue that the muted reaction of the Afghan population to the coalition presence suggested an effective PSYOP campaign, but this conclusion would be speculative.

Second, PSYOP effects are inherently difficult to measure. Therefore, other criteria that can reasonably be considered indicators of quality must be examined, such as product sophistication (including timing, credibility, and cultural sensitivity) and quality of inputs (including education and training of personnel, intelligence, and analytic support). These criteria can be considered as they apply to the overall PSYOP campaign and process and with respect to the quality of specific, individual products.

*Campaign quality.* Effects can be assessed, and any good PSYOP campaign will go to extraordinary lengths to do so. Enemy prisoner of war interviews and PSYOP face-to-face contacts provide information. Physical evidence of effectiveness is also possible, such as leaflets found near abandoned equipment, evidence of attempts to follow PSYOP instructions, or immediate reaction to loudspeaker operations. Generally, however, PSYOP does not have resources like those in the commercial sector to conduct extensive product testing, focus groups, and market surveys; nor does it have freedom of movement in nonpermissive or semipermissive environments. Operational circumstances often will permit such product testing and feedback, however, and conducting it is simply a question of resources, training, and initiative.

An example of how such market surveying can be used to good advantage was provided during OIF 2. A division in southern Iraq was commended for using an operational analysis cell to develop and analyze measures of effectiveness covering the full spectrum of operations but emphasizing information activities. The unit used weekly surveys to query population samples throughout the area of operations and to analyze the trends over time. This continuous Iraqi attitude survey was conducted by an independent civilian scientific research organization. This model had two advantages: the research organization provides trained, dedicated personnel to perform the task, and since they are not in the unit's chain of command, the organization can be an honest broker.<sup>128</sup>

The general lack of feedback on the effectiveness of past campaigns and products, combined with limited resources, undermines the quality of the overall PSYOP effort, as do other process shortcomings. For example, the most straightforward complaint received about the larger PSYOP campaign was that the tactical units never really understood the campaign plan—that is, the information that breaks down objectives into supporting objectives with different target audiences, appropriate themes and messages, and the necessary development and timing of products. According to one PSYOP officer:

Every operation must be nested to support a higher intent. When you have no higher intent, you are left on your own to do what seems best for your area. This probably causes a lot of unnecessary redundancy in products and I cannot imagine how a POTF [psychological operations task force] can ensure it is meeting the commander's intent or progressing to the desired end state when there is no coherent idea what the different sectors are trying to accomplish. There is no single Web site you can go to and find all the products for the region. Ideally, these would be linked to the various programs and series if there were any.<sup>129</sup>

Complaints such as this come from senior PSYOP officers, including battalion commanders, and are not just a prejudice resident in tactical PSYOP detachments. Evidence of the weak planning is found in the lack of specificity in the product control sheets that chart the logic from product dissemination to anticipated effect. In order to create an effective campaign, each product should be compared to the overall campaign objectives to determine whether the product supports the objective, has properly conveyed the core message, and is likely to result in the desired outcome. This should be an ongoing process, with revisions to both the campaigns and products as information and intelligence dictate.

The PSYOP product control sheet should serve the purpose of linking products to overarching objectives, but the study's review of numerous samples indicates that it typically does not. The sheets are not structured to ensure anticipated effects are clearly described and linked to knowledge of the target audience and the specific product attributes. A review of products in the specified operations showed generally loose correlations between combatant commanders' and PSYOP objectives, and between PSYOP objectives and the specific product attributes. They do not generally indicate the best means of dissemination to reach the target audience, nor do they address the issue of timing the message delivery. In a 1999 article, Major Stephen C. Larsen suggested using product worksheets based on graphic design principles and specific to media dissemination means. He noted, "Without specificity, the doctrinal [Product/Action Worksheet] leaves too much for interpretation and does not support specific product development."<sup>130</sup>

Another key element of the campaign, intelligence support, is lacking, especially to the degree necessary to fully inform target audience analysis. One respondent to this study's survey complained about the lack of cultural awareness in the field and the need to have intelligence support forward. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG's Strategic Studies Detachment provides a high volume of general utility reports that help orient PSYOP personnel to the general cultural milieu in which they will be operating and that are generally useful for broad audience products. However, as a result, the Strategic Studies Detachment is not able to devote as much time to specific target group analysis in support of tactical products, including product testing.<sup>131</sup> When its personnel have deployed to support operations, their expertise has been found to be invaluable.<sup>132</sup>

In general, the historic pattern of PSYOP's relationship with intelligence—that PSYOP provides more intelligence than it receives—was replicated in recent operations. Tactical units were able to collect critical intelligence to pass on to their commanders, which was considered quite valuable. In the past, this information often failed to make it to higher headquarters.<sup>133</sup> This seemed likely to be the case in recent operations as well, given the communication gaps between

tactical and theater PSYOP forces. However, interviews with PSYOP personnel and a recent Army report indicated that PSYOP tactical intelligence was received and highly valued all the way up the chain of command and even in the Pentagon.<sup>134</sup>

More detrimental, though, has been the limited amount of intelligence support received by PSYOP units. This is most likely a consequence of the fact that there is no dedicated PSYOP intelligence section in theater to support the PSYOP mission, which seriously impairs its ability to function most effectively. Again, this lesson reflects past experience as well.<sup>135</sup> The rationale behind having dedicated intelligence support in theater is that the PSYOP mission needs and intelligence requirements are not well understood by intelligence units, which means that PSYOP is given a low priority. For example, PSYOP forces received little intelligence about specific enemy commanders, their predilections, and their decisionmaking environment, and no dedicated intelligence on the effects of products. PSYOP battalions have intelligence officers, but they may not deploy if their battalions are simultaneously supporting multiple units deployed to different regions on different missions.<sup>136</sup>

Another characteristic of a good PSYOP campaign is effective timing, especially for tactical products or counter-disinformation products for general audiences. Messages that either solicit capitulation from enemy commanders or warn them against escalation must be carefully timed to hit the target when it is most vulnerable to such appeals. This requires a good understanding of the extant morale of adversary forces and the means to deliver PSYOP products at precisely the right moment. In OIF, capitulation messages were poorly timed, having been delivered too late to be effective in some instances and too early in others.<sup>137</sup> Evidence indicates that the factors that led to a failure in timing were the approval process and the limited means of product delivery. The priority of kinetic over nonkinetic bombs and the lack of organic delivery means limited the commander's ability to get the message out when it was most needed.

Finally, PSYOP often lacks an organized red-teaming effort to improve product quality<sup>138</sup> and assist with damage limitation when effects go awry. PSYOP products can produce untoward effects among the target audiences but also may produce unintended blowback from domestic or international audiences. Operation *Urgent Fury* in Grenada provides a classic example of a product that was effective in a local target audience but had unintended blowback elsewhere. In this operation, a photograph of a black New Jewel leader seated naked on a chair with only a towel draped across his lap and a white PSYOP soldier standing over him was disseminated as a poster across Grenada to demonstrate to the populace that they should no longer fear their former leaders. Although the photograph generated little negative reaction from the Grenada populace, a subsequent feature of the photo in the *Washington Post* resulted in accusations of racism perpetrated by the U.S. military.

In general, PSYOP products tend toward the safe side to avoid potential blowback in the international media. As noted above, the Pentagon and PSYOP leadership should recognize that some element of political risk is always associated with PSYOP products. After taking reasonable steps to ensure consistency with national themes, the best PSYOP can do is be prepared to react quickly to failed messages and products. Systematic red-teaming of products, with the requisite cultural and linguistic expertise, can improve products on the front end by



eliminating obvious errors. On the back end, red-teaming improves the overall quality of the effort by better preparing the PSYOP team to react quickly to unfortunate effects or enemy countermessages.

*Product quality.* The overall process can be assessed for the presence of all requisite steps generally required for product success, but the question of individual product quality remains. The examination of all PSYOP products in OEF and OIF, and some of those used in OIF 2, indicates that the majority of them are exceedingly straightforward and demonstrate little guile or cultural specificity. While some may attempt to manipulate emotions with appeals to “think of your family,” most make a simple, direct appeal to self-interest: surrender or die. Many PSYOP products are, in effect, public service messages—how to make potable water, avoid mines, ensure sanitation, obtain vaccines, and so forth.

Many PSYOP products lacked target audience specificity and could be used anywhere with minor modifications. In OIF, for example, only about half of the surrender products were targeted to specific units, and the majority of products were not culturally specific. Printed products made little effort to persuade Iraqi soldiers or civilians that the U.S. mission and presence were legitimate. Radio scripts conveyed messages justifying U.S. military presence but may not have used arguments that would most impress the Iraqi population, which had been suffering under UN sanctions. The messages generally argued that the United States had a legal right to enforce the sanctions or informed the population that Saddam Hussein was a dictator and bad leader.

How did PSYOP’s simple and straightforward products actually work? Anecdotal evidence, combined with a review of OEF, OIF and OIF 2 products, reveals both successful and failed products and illustrates the importance of following PSYOP procedures and industry best practices. Successful products can be defined as those with messages that correlated with subsequent adversary behavior (reviewed in section 3 in this report). We learn more about quality issues by examining products that obviously failed to achieve their intended effects.

Examples of miscues in OEF products show low quality of translation and lack of message verification. The initial PSYOP capitulation messages were widely cited as a product that failed to adequately assess its target audience. Some argue that the capitulation concept was forced on PSYOP planners by Pentagon authorities who wanted to avoid the legal obligations involved with prisoners of war. Others note that regardless of origin, the leaflets tried to communicate instructions that were nearly impossible to comply with (although there is some photographic evidence that a small number of Iraqi units did form up in squares, adopting the non-hostile posture requested of them). The upshot, however, is that in many cases, “The target audience did not easily understand [capitulation] messages that were delivered,”<sup>139</sup> a failure that must be attributed to an inadequate understanding of the target audience.

Some product problems can be linked to uncertainty over U.S. policy and unanticipated political ramifications from messages that are not precisely crafted. An example of questionable message development in some leaflets was the linking of humanitarian assistance to information on terrorists and insurgents. This would be a legitimate message for some, especially if it portrayed

the difficulty of providing aid as an unintentional byproduct of a poor security environment rather than a punitive tactic. In any case, the message in question inadvertently linked information about insurgents directly to the receipt of aid from nongovernmental organizations, which elicited a negative response from aid donors, the press, and allied observers.<sup>140</sup>

Other product failures were due to inadequate translation. A handbill designed to close down illegal checkpoints ended up closing all checkpoints because of a translation error. In OIF 2, one example of product failure was a poor—and unchecked—Arabic translation of a handbill that had intended to warn the populace to stay clear of the area where a U.S. unit was registering mortars. Instead, the handbill told the audience that the troops were shooting mortars because they could and that the people should stay in their homes.<sup>141</sup> The level of Arabic language used in OIF translations was criticized as “juvenile and patronizing to the local population.”<sup>142</sup> These examples are from recent operations, but there is evidence that poor translation is an enduring problem for PSYOP.<sup>143</sup>

The problem of inadequate linguists is a resource issue, not a personnel management issue. In other words, PSYOP forces must be able to contract for fluent native speakers; they cannot compensate by improving their own limited linguistic skills. A 1996 RAND research project highlighted the difficulty of providing qualified linguists from organic sources. In 1995, PSYOP and Civil Affairs could meet less than 10 percent of their requirements for qualified linguists. However, the problem was due not to recruiting or retention but rather to inappropriate use of those linguists in the force (with less than half serving in positions requiring foreign language proficiency, and less than 10 percent occupying positions requiring their specific language) and to dramatic shifts in requirements:

Shifting requirements appear to cause the shortages and poor utilization. Substantial changes in language requirements, both in number and in mix, were a major factor in the discrepancy between requirements and capability. The number of linguist requirements for civil affairs units grew from 457 in fiscal year 1993 to 1,347 in fiscal year 1995. The mix was also turbulent. For example, the requirements for Arabic speakers in psychological operations units went from zero in fiscal year 1993 to 157 in fiscal year 1995, while those for Russian speakers fell from 225 to 61 during the same period. Changes of this magnitude are difficult for any unit to accommodate and virtually impossible for reserve component units.<sup>144</sup>

The RAND report was concerned with language skills resident within the PSYOP force, since personnel need minimum levels of foreign language proficiency to work effectively in a cross-cultural milieu and with the native populace. But the report, now almost 10 years old, also highlights some enduring facts about the PSYOP enterprise: namely, that it is hard to predict requirements in advance and hard to align language-qualified personnel with appropriate assignments within the PSYOP force. These limitations remain in effect and underscore the need for flexible contract support.<sup>145</sup>

In addition to fundamental translation problems, a general comment across Afghanistan and Iraq was that PSYOP products used an abundance of photos and clip art, which suited Western culture more than the local culture. Using such prepared graphics often is easier than developing a good illustrated product that will be easily discernible to the local population. Some allied observers, in particular, noted that PSYOP lacks the flexibility to produce simple illustrations and drawings, relying too heavily on computer graphics and clip art.<sup>146</sup>

Copyright restrictions are another factor severely limiting the quality (and quantity) of PSYOP products. Were PSYOP forces free to use copyrighted products such as wire service photos, political cartoons, news stories, and commercial radio and television broadcasts without the usual legal and financial restrictions, their burden in creating timely products of high quality would be eased. With PSYOP properly delimited to support for military operations in conflict environments, it should be possible to obtain voluntary or legal relief from copyright laws.

*Overall quality factors.* Another means of assessing quality is to look at the inputs, particularly the training and functional expertise of PSYOP forces. Assuming all other factors are equal, high-quality inputs should lead to higher quality output. In the case of PSYOP products, the quality input is the creativity and skill of the individual PSYOP product developer. PSYOP soldiers, whether active or reserve, do not typically join the PSYOP career track with a background in communications or graphic design. The average age of a PSYOP enlisted soldier is about 30 years old, and more than 90 percent are limited to a high school education.<sup>147</sup> They generally have about 10 years of training in infantry or some other combat-related field before they enter the PSYOP field and are given a short introductory course in PSYOP.

PSYOP training covers a lot in a short period. PSYOPS Officer Basic Course is 9 weeks long and teaches basic soldiering skills, including tactics, maintenance, and operational aspects of processes, systems, and equipment used in a PSYOPS platoon. Advanced Individual Training is 9 to 24 weeks long. It includes loudspeaker training, a short tactical field training exercise, land navigation, and a few days of target audience analysis as well as other subjects. Perhaps the most glaring deficiencies in the training regimen are functional expertise in general and target audience analysis in particular. Teaching persuasive communication skills principles and techniques for developing and assessing product effectiveness simply requires more time. In fact, many would argue that dedicated civilian support is required for this reason.<sup>148</sup>

The Army's cooperative master's degree program with Troy State University was a positive source of functional expertise in the PSYOP training regimen, but it is no longer available. The study was unable to determine what percentage of PSYOP officers had actually earned advanced degrees in either persuasive communication or international relations, but it was noted that many chose not to continue in the PSYOP career field in spite of the investment in their formal training. Also, the members of the Strategic Studies Detachment lack functional communications expertise to complement their knowledge in regional and cultural areas, so they do not provide PSYOP with an authoritative source of functional expertise. Finally, based on surveys administered for this study, it appears that only a small number of PSYOP reserve forces have civilian jobs in the communications industry. To compensate, PSYOP soldiers seek out hands-on training, which in the past has included printing at the Document Automation and

Production Service, broadcasting training at the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, 2-week courses at Industrial Light and Magic in Hollywood, and internships at CNN and National Public Radio.

One important qualitative indicator of PSYOP campaign and product quality is the personal assessment of PSYOP officers themselves. While noting that PSYOP can contribute a lot for the relatively low cost of these forces, PSYOP soldiers noted candidly in interviews that there is room for improvement in quality. This sentiment is not a recent development. Citing after-action reviews from Bosnia, a PSYOP officer writes, “PSYOP messages were bland, ineffective, and not properly targeted to the local population.”<sup>149</sup> Those with private sector marketing skills and those leaving after many years of service are the most critical of current capabilities and practices. These individuals also cite the need for additional resources that would enrich individual products and contribute to an improved campaign process overall.

*Conclusions.* PSYOP produces some effects for a small resource investment. Even so, there is unquestionably room for improvement in the quality of the overall PSYOP campaign, standard PSYOP processes, and individual products. To summarize the priority areas for improvement, we refer to the conclusions in section 2 of this report on industry standards for best practices.

- Integrated and sophisticated campaign. Generally, PSYOP campaign planning:
  - only vaguely links products and assessments of their effects to an overarching strategy
  - poorly balances theater and tactical PSYOP and does not provide for constant communication between the two to allow sharing of updated objectives and assessments of effects
  - cannot fully benefit from coordination with public diplomacy and public affairs efforts, both because it alienates these disciplines by insisting on references to strategic PSYOP and because there is no coordination vehicle for national strategic communications
  - does encourage *relationship-building* promotional activities where target audiences are particularly resistant to PSYOP messages, both through face-to-face PSYOP and in support of civil affairs (where local commanders are receptive to such initiatives)
  - generally receives high marks for tactical PSYOP efforts to establish contacts within local communities, although these efforts are more for the purpose of obtaining intelligence than exploiting alternative advocacy channels.
- Quality process: PSYOP processes emphasize a timely, repetitive planning process that includes intelligence gathering, target audience analysis, product development, media selection, media production, dissemination, and assessment of results to inform the next

cycle of product development. However, PSYOP does not have the resources and talent to execute these processes robustly. More specifically, PSYOP processes:

- do not emphasize the logical connection between objectives, products, and intended effects, both because the product control sheets lack specificity and because they lack the resources to assess product effects
  - do not have access to deep functional expertise in persuasive communications
  - do not maintain long-term historical knowledge of PSYOP efforts and effects with civilian staff or contractors to inform its practices
  - do not emphasize the importance of careful attention to timing of product delivery (even though PSYOP cannot control timing in many cases anyway)
  - do not have access to simple, field-ready templates that summarize knowledge of effective techniques in a comprehensible, user-friendly format
  - do not undertake extraordinary efforts to compensate for lack of predeployment access to target audiences and do not have the resources to develop deep understanding of the target audiences' culture and subcultures after deployment
  - do not conduct ongoing qualitative assessments of effects, backed by quantitative measures wherever possible.
- Quality products and inputs: PSYOP TTPs provide good general guidelines in their manual to ensure product quality. However, a key component of quality—highly trained, seasoned, and expert personnel—is not available to PSYOP forces.

The quality of the overall campaign would improve greatly if PSYOP could benefit from national themes and rapid approval processes. Barring these difficult-to-achieve goals, the most immediate means of improving product quality are better tactical target audience analysis (and supporting intelligence) and access to high-quality translation capabilities. Beyond these pressing needs, the quickest way to improve PSYOP quality would be to address the following factors:

- tactical dissemination capability to improve timeliness (and audience reach and impact)
- need for graphic artists
- responsive tactical production capability
- communications linking tactical and theater PSYOP forces
- quality of theater-level, general audience radio and TV products
- training in PSYOP campaign process.

These improvements can be facilitated at less cost to the PSYOP community in several ways. For example, allied PYSOP experts commenting on U.S. performance observed that what appeared to be poor target audience analysis by PSYOP forces was, in some cases, a function of having to please general officers who imposed their own notions of quality on a product without the benefit on understanding the local audience.<sup>150</sup> Fixing the approval process as recommended elsewhere in this report would minimize this problem. Also, the Strategic Studies Detachment might provide stronger tactical support to PSYOP soldiers without additional resources and with some retooling or reorientation. Currently it is focused on broad area studies and analyses instead of tactical support, where PSYOP needs the most help.<sup>151</sup> In addition, better prioritization and utilization of current resources could contribute. Finally, legislative action allowing for the specific and narrow use of copyrighted material during combat and perhaps during stabilization operations should be explored. All these measures notwithstanding, the improvements identified above will require more resources.

In general, PSYOP doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, including the articulated six-part process (intelligence gathering, target audience analysis, product development, media selection, media production, and dissemination)<sup>152</sup> suggest that the community understands the necessary ingredients of a high-quality effort. As noted above, the process could be further improved with greater attention to red-teaming, timing of product dissemination, quality product control sheets, better target audience analysis, and easily useable product templates for field use. Putting more functional expertise at the disposal of PSYOP forces would help as well. But whether it is a question of recruitment, training, or additional funding for field analyses and translation services, PSYOP simply lacks the resources to make a significant improvement in quality. This is not to say that if PSYOP leadership is given additional resources, it would necessarily know how to best prioritize for their program needs or to invest them in improvements with the best rate of return.

### **Specific Resourcing Shortfalls and Equipment Performance Issues**

*Issue.* Numerous lessons learned, especially from the 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group, pointed out that PSYOP suffered from specific resourcing shortfalls that had a direct and deleterious impact on its ability to complete its assigned missions. At issue is how seriously these shortfalls affected performance.

*Evidence.* The perennial question is not whether networking and interoperability were realized and proved useful, but whether there was enough networking and whether it connected all the nodes of communications (or at least the right nodes at the right times). Technology allowed the JPOTF to operate in Fort Bragg, Tampa, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Diego Garcia, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. The JPOTF had many assets at its disposal: satellite connectivity via PSYOP Product Distribution System (PDS) and Joint In-Theater Injection System–Receive Only (JITI–RO) associated with SOMS–B and Commando Solo aircraft, secure phones, and SIPRNET. These elements could receive audio only, audio/visual, and print products electronically via satellite from Fort Bragg, where they were produced. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG’s formal lesson learned report states: “No longer does a JPOTF have to deploy in total. This ultimately conserves the resources and personnel. The PSYOP ‘reachback’ doctrine has been fully realized.”

On the other hand, the case can easily be made that this conclusion is overstated. Army Special Operations Forces lessons learned indicated that the Fort Bragg-to-JPOTF connections lacked dedicated, large-bandwidth, secure satellite access that in turn constrained the JPOTF ability to transmit timely, high-quality audio-visual products. (This problem was exacerbated by the lack of consistent funding for satellite contracts to facilitate reachback, but the problem was resolved late in the process.) In addition, the informal comments of the SOCOM conference documents indicate that collocation with CENTCOM Headquarters and Operations Directorate was essential to the JPOTF in order to have access to the communications backbone linking the theater command to CONUS. This conclusion suggests that organic PSYOP reachback capability was not sufficient and that the JPOTF relied on CENTCOM's communications structure. Other shortcomings hampered reachback as well:

- 4<sup>th</sup> POG lacked a dedicated Joint Warfighting Intelligence Communications System video teleconferencing suite, which prevented the unit and the JPOTF from communicating with other government organizations quickly and securely
- SOMS-B software was not fully interoperable; during reachback, data and video could not be transferred electronically between the Product Distribution Facility and the Mobile Television Broadcast System.<sup>153</sup>

Moreover, the optimistic conclusion about reachback capability between Fort Bragg and the JPOTF does not extend to the connectivity between the JPOTF and tactical units, either directly or through the company commander. The 4<sup>th</sup> POG lessons learned indicate that connectivity was not easily available, and the results of this research found the gap between theater and tactical PSYOP forces to be a major problem.

Interoperability is a key part of networking and can only be achieved by paying close attention to system architecture and configuration management as technology and attrition make acquisition of new systems necessary or desirable. Again, it is difficult to measure how much of it is present and how much of it is necessary. From the discussion above, it is evident that many systems were indeed interoperable and information did flow between Fort Bragg and JPOTF systems but that shortcomings were identified nonetheless.

*Shortfall in ability to disseminate radio and television in denied areas.* PSYOP has a limited ability to target large areas with radio or TV broadcasts. These mass media capabilities were especially necessary during stability operations<sup>154</sup> and will be required should it be determined that PSYOP will provide theater-wide dissemination support to public diplomacy. This experience reconfirms lessons learned from previous contingencies and discussed in some detail in a 2000 Defense Science Board (DSB) report.<sup>155</sup>

The Commando Solo aircraft currently is the only stand-off, high-altitude means available to PSYOP forces to disseminate information to large denied areas. Two orbits were established during OIF, one in the northern area and one in the southern part of the country, both far enough from harm's way to keep the aircraft out of reach of potential enemy attack. At their operational altitude of 18,000 feet and assuming clear channels, these aircraft can transmit radio and TV

signals approximately 170 miles, which does not reach the objective areas near Baghdad. Straightforward physics dictate the range, given the power installed and the antenna configuration and assuming clear channels.

The enhanced altitude capability of the Commando Solo EC-130J (now funded) is increasing transmitter range. While this is an improvement over 130E capability, it is a small step, since the increase in altitude is only 7,000 feet (less than 50 percent) and the range increase is governed by a square root function (that is, a 14 percent increase in range).

The PSYOP Global Reach ACTD is addressing area dissemination concerns as a primary pursuit. It is investigating various unmanned vehicles that may meet the requirement. Initial broadcast payload and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) integration is being conducted on the WSADS UAV. This system can carry up to 575 pounds (or increase its range by reducing payload weight) into denied areas.

*Tactical PSYOP shortfalls.* A review of several unofficial and official PSYOP mission execution lessons learned studies from OEF and OIF questioned the adequacy of PSYOP tactical equipment. In particular, the following needs were identified:

- electronic news gathering kits (secure)
- up-armored HMMWVs
- forward product development equipment
- M4 assault rifles and M9 pistols
- pool of family of loudspeakers (FOLs)
- ruggedized laptops.

No military unit is ever equipped to the point that additional or better gear is not desired, but the question here is one of adequacy of equipment to meet mission needs. Notably, all items identified above are associated with the tactical arm of PSYOP, the part that interacts with the enemy in the most direct way and in the most forward battle lines. These shortfalls exacerbate and probably also reflect the theater-tactical gap discussed elsewhere in this report.

*Discussion.* PSYOP would benefit from a national capability to seize control of an adversary communication infrastructure without much, or possibly any, physical destruction. PSYOP forces could then use these production and dissemination capabilities in the aftermath of the major combat operations or for supporting stability operations. Factors involved in developing such a capability are discussed in the classified annex to this report. Clearly, this is another area where PSYOP can benefit from a close association with electronic warfare and computer network operations. The ideal situation would be for these capabilities to work together to provide early electromagnetic spectrum dominance in a manner analogous to the proven strategy of rapidly defeating enemy air defenses.



- While not a PSYOP mission per se, the objective of seizing an adversary's communications networks is a desirable capability that affects calculations of PSYOP resources and generally suggests a growing demand for PSYOP services. PSYOP forces would need to be capable of manning these assets and would have to participate in planning that identified which facilities would be most useful.
- Shortfalls in fungible resources for quality processes and products: As noted in the section of the report on quality (page 101), the quickest way to improve PSYOP quality is to provide more funding for the following:
  - native-language translators
  - tactical dissemination capability to improve timeliness, audience reach, and impact (in particular, the WSADS for all PSYOP companies and a successor to the AN/MSQ-85B for video dissemination)
  - target audience analysis on the fly, including intelligence support<sup>156</sup>
  - graphic artists
  - responsive production capability (more forward printing capability with PSYOP companies or sufficient responsiveness from the Media Operations Center at Fort Bragg, which would require around-the-clock battle staffing, expanded staff, and adequate reachback communications)
  - training in campaign processes.

None of these shortfalls individually is crippling, with the possible exception of the inadequate linguistic support and target audience analysis, which together appear responsible for more PSYOP misfires than any other factors. However, taken together, they seriously degrade the quality of the overall PSYOP effort as well as individual products.

*Conclusions and recommendations.* Several conclusions may be drawn from this review of specific shortfalls. Some of the most egregious theater shortfalls are being addressed by SOCOM's ACTD, which is a major boost in both funding and technological content. The leave-behind residuals will provide capability not now available, tools for further experimentation, and a possible avenue to an acquisition program. However, the ACTD will not deliver capability in the short term, nor will it address all the specific shortfalls. In addition, since the SOCOM requirements generation process and the analyses of concepts and system alternatives pit PSYOP systems against higher SOCOM and service priorities, it is unlikely that it will deliver adequate capability to PSYOP forces absent intervention by OSD. Shortfalls that are not covered by the ACTD should be addressed under separate initiatives such as the following.

- Shortfalls in tactical forces equipment and fungible resources for quality processes and products: Elsewhere, this report reviewed the significance of a theater-tactical gap in PSYOP missions and capabilities and the means to improve the quality of PSYOP

products. Conclusions from those reviews substantiate the need for additional resources in both areas. However, absent a detailed action plan for comprehensive reform of PSYOP from SOCOM, additional investments in this area may not be warranted. The likelihood that PSYOP can generate substantially improved battlefield effects without such a plan is small. The single exception to this general observation would be funding for linguists, which could reasonably be expected to make an immediate and positive impact on the overall quality of products.

- Expanding joint dissemination capabilities: As the military services develop concepts and requirements for new platforms, PSYOP broadcast and leaflet delivery requirements should be considered as a potential capability for each platform. While it is unlikely (and probably undesirable) that all will address this need, it should be possible to ensure that a few of the platforms have some of the requisite capability.
- Reachback, interoperability, and theater-tactical communications links: Interoperability is a key part of networking and can only be achieved fully by paying close attention to system architecture and configuration management as technology and attrition make acquisition of new systems necessary or desirable. From the discussion above, it is evident that many systems were indeed interoperable and information did flow between Fort Bragg and JPOTF systems but that communication with forward forces was broken. In particular, the inability of the maneuver commanders to communicate directly with the JPOTF contributed to the slowdown of PSYOP product approval and production. Consequently, SOCOM should take a broad architectural look at the PSYOP assets and assure that their connectivity and interoperability reflect the mission assigned to PSYOP, all nodes of the network have connectivity appropriate to the mission, and vigorous configuration management ensures interoperability among issues of equipment at all echelons.
- Temporary suppression of adversary communications: A team of national laboratories, led by Lincoln Laboratories and supported by service laboratories, should initiate an urgent examination of the technical challenges involved in this mission area. This effort should address what types of media need to be countered; identify alternative system vulnerabilities that might be exploited by differing techniques; identify potentially viable countermeasure techniques; summarize existing U.S. countermeasure capabilities for addressing each medium; and inform leadership on uncertainties or risks. The team should be guided in its efforts by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)]-chartered electronic warfare Integrated Product Team and should report out in 120 days to the electronic warfare Executive Steering Group. Upon receipt of the analysis, USD(AT&L) should identify a lead service to complete an analysis of alternatives of promising technical capabilities or systems within 120 days. Identified alternatives should be considered for implementation by a focus area Defense Acquisition Board no later than October FY05.

## General Underresourcing of PSYOP and Its Impact

*Issue.* A common observation about PSYOP is that it does not have enough resources to do its assigned missions. Specific resource shortfalls were examined in the preceding section. The issue here is whether PSYOP is so systematically underfunded that it either cannot fulfill its mission or is forced to cut corners in ways that have multiple and cross-cutting negative effects on mission execution. In short, the question is whether decisionmakers should consider a wholesale increase in resources for PSYOP or just examine individual, specific shortfalls that are particularly egregious.

*Evidence.* PSYOP is a minuscule part of the special operations major force program element managed by SOCOM and a fraction of the total DOD obligation authority. SOCOM's total obligation authority is about \$6.5 billion (not including contributions from the services), which is about 1.5 percent of the total DOD budget. The SOCOM investment budget (about \$2 billion) represents roughly the same percentage (1.5 percent) of the Department's overall investment. In turn, PSYOP acquisition funding is 1 percent of SOCOM's investment account. These figures are useful as background, but they hardly address the issue of whether PSYOP has sufficient resources to do its mission. PSYOP's small share of the SOCOM budget might simply reflect the fact that other types of special operations are much more resource-intensive. Since PSYOP is such an anomalous capability, however, it cannot be compared directly with the Special Forces mission, nor can its funding be measured against other special operations forces budgets.

A more appropriate comparison for general funding levels would be with the Armed Forces Information Service (AFIS), which oversees the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS). Both PSYOP and AFIS rely on diverse communication technology to relay their messages to directed audiences. PSYOP targets foreign audiences, whereas AFRTS broadcasts to U.S. military personnel stationed overseas. AFIS is currently budgeted to spend roughly two and a half times as much per annum as PSYOP (approximately \$125 million compared with \$50 million). AFIS spends an estimated \$23 million each year on global satellite connectivity. In comparison, PSYOP spends only \$2 million on satellite connections, primarily to the JPOTF.<sup>157</sup> Given that AFIS can leverage a well-established civilian infrastructure (overwhelmingly through contracting), whereas PSYOP must be prepared to move on short order, produce materials in foreign languages and cultures, and disseminate in austere environments and denied areas, the variance in Department funding is particularly notable. Not surprisingly, the difference in funding seems to produce differing capabilities. For example, AFRTS was able to broadcast to and from Baghdad, while PSYOP was limited in that regard. AFRTS has no trouble broadcasting around the clock.

*Capability to execute the defense strategy.* However, the broader issue of whether PSYOP is resourced to meet standard Department mission definitions can be addressed. The current DOD defense strategy requires the military to be able to swiftly defeat two regional adversaries in overlapping timeframes, as well as support ongoing stability operations, deter WMD use, and defend the homeland. Although not always officially designated as such, PSYOP was generally considered a high-demand, low-density asset for most of the 1990s. Indeed, the recent Army decision to expand its force structure acknowledges the historic stress on PSYOP. Since the new

defense strategy requires PSYOP to support even more concurrent missions, a prima facie argument may be made that it is underresourced in terms of force structure. This argument could also be extended to equipping the PSYOP force. Instead of the two Psychological Operations Broadcast Systems (POBS) needed to support operations in two different theaters, PSYOP to date only has been able to budget for one. However, the SOCOM 2006 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) reportedly will add a second POBS. In effect, this is an admission that PSYOP is not capable of supporting two overlapping conflicts. Instead, as happened when OEF and OIF overlapped, PSYOP must largely withdraw at least its major equipment items from one theater in order to engage in another.

*Capability to execute doctrinal PSYOP missions.* General Pentagon contingency planning factors and joint doctrine<sup>158</sup> require PSYOP to be able to produce and distribute the full range of products in denied space, in a timely manner, in two overlapping conflicts. PSYOP cannot execute within these doctrinal parameters. PSYOP also comes up short with respect to the need to produce and deliver timely products to broad and specific audiences in denied space. Lessons learned from multiple sources plainly indicate that PSYOP is not able to generate the radio and especially not the television content for round-the-clock operations, nor would it be capable of disseminating such content if it were able to produce it. The Media Operations Center at Fort Bragg lacked the proper equipment and personnel to broadcast from CONUS. By way of contrast, coalition forces were able to produce quality broadcasts from in-theater, and the AFIS and AFRTS were able to reach military forces stationed overseas. Finally, as the previous discussion of lessons learned indicates, PSYOP cannot disseminate tactical products in a timely fashion, especially not in support of fast-moving ground operations.

*Dissemination of products in denied areas.* PSYOP has limited ability to target large areas with radio or TV broadcasts.<sup>159</sup> Commando Solo aircraft are the currently available PSYOP capability for standoff, high-altitude dissemination to large denied areas. The two operational SOMS-Bs possess a broadcast range of 400 kilometers (km) AM, 64 km FM, and 1,600 km short wave. They would not be able to effectively transmit messages over 1,090,542 square km of the operational terrain in Iraq and Afghanistan (applying the two-conflict metric to recent contingencies).

JFCOM and CENTCOM reports also noted that the JPOTF has limited capability to produce TV programming. No live broadcasting in Arabic meant delays in time-sensitive messages. There appeared to have been some expectation that the Joint Staff or other organizations of the U.S. Government would provide 6 hours of world news television programming per day, although this was not provided. By comparison, the United Kingdom provided world news programming within 2 weeks of request submission through its liaison office. The British Broadcasting Company and Sky News produced a 1-hour program in Arabic, costing the United Kingdom \$15,000 per day.

A thoughtful and candid reply on this subject from one PSYOP officer is worth quoting at length, since it amply demonstrates the type of resources required to produce around-the-clock radio and television broadcasting and reaches appropriate conclusions about their absence and how to rectify the shortfall:

It takes an immense amount of resources to produce TV programming, both in people, time, and creativity. . . . any local [TV] channel normally has a few hundred people running their studio. A good example is WRAL, a CBS affiliate out of Raleigh, North Carolina. They have 38 on-air and 206 behind-the-scenes personnel. It takes all of these people to produce the live news, weather, and sports for the station which . . . produces 4.5 hours of live news per day and 3 hours of community service programming per week. Additionally, the station produces commercials for clients, their own promotional videos, and public service announcements. By comparison, the entire third PSYOP Battalion B Co[mpany] (the Company that does the TV and radio production) only has 70-something soldiers. And all of these soldiers are not dedicated to producing TV. . . . If we expect PSYOP task forces to produce 24-hour coverage, we need to have the commensurate resources dedicated to that. I am not convinced DOD has that commitment.

On the creativity portion of the producing TV challenge: our soldiers are very well trained in the actual operation of the TV production equipment. We have state-of-the-art equipment equal to what they have in Hollywood as far as non-linear editing, etc. Our cameras are a little behind but suitable for the mission. The greatest challenge is creativity. The film industry pays huge salaries to get that creativity. While we in the military can train the soldiers on how to operate the equipment, I have not broken the code on ensuring we have enough people that really have experience in developing films and producing state of the art programming. Contracting this portion of the mission may be the solution. . . . These employees of commercial stations are trained professionals with on the average of 10–14 years of experience in local broadcasting. The youngest employees are usually college educated and start at the most basic level of television to gain experience. The difference in the level of training of PSYOP soldiers and of civilians is not in training on equipment but the experience gained by producing TV every day for a number of years. . . . SOCOM has invested in world-class equipment and the skills of the soldiers need to keep pace with the advances in technology that have taken place. Serious consideration should be given to commercializing . . . production requirements. Through contracting, producers, directors, and other technicians can be hired on an as-needed basis to produce world-class products in support of the war on terrorism.<sup>160</sup>

*Capability to keep pace with emerging information sources.* Another indication of whether PSYOP is adequately resourced on a macro level is whether it is modernizing to keep up with adversary and general technology trends. In May 2000, the Defense Science Board issued an excellent report<sup>161</sup> that indicates PSYOP is not staying abreast of emerging technologies increasingly available to target audiences. The DSB task force reviewed the various technological trends for mass media dissemination and then specifically addressed the dissemination of radio and TV from aircraft. According to the task force, technology is moving toward systems and means of dissemination that are not favorable to the PSYOP equipment inventory in general and Commando Solo in particular. (See section 6 on technology and equipment for additional details.)

*Catastrophic failures or systematic unsatisfactory performance.* The failure of PSYOP forces or equipment to perform well across the board could be taken as evidence of systemic underresourcing. This was not the case in terms of quality of product or effects generated. However, the study also reviewed whether equipment failed at an alarming rate. Equipment failed in OEF and OIF due to the climate and operating environment in both Afghanistan and Iraq (see appendices C and D). A significant amount of the current inventories of tactical PSYOP equipment is purchased as commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and is not ruggedized to meet the requirements of combat and extreme weather conditions. Some specific examples include compact disc players and power generators that were rendered useless with the penetration of dust and sand. Damaged equipment could not readily be replaced due to lack of funding. For example, the modular print systems (MPS) located in-theater broke down repeatedly due to sand clogging the hoses inside the gas generator.<sup>162</sup>

In some cases, insufficient training in the use of PSYOP equipment apparently compounded equipment problems. Although PSYOP specialists are required to complete a 16-week course, the training focus is more on PSYOP education, skills, and procedures than on equipment maintenance and operation. The only pieces of equipment that soldiers are trained on initially are loudspeaker systems and leaflet bombs.<sup>163</sup> Maintenance and usage training for PSYOP equipment is taught at most for 2 weeks. After that training, soldiers do not see or review that piece of equipment until they reach theater. There is no complete review to test soldiers' comprehension on all PSYOP equipment.<sup>164</sup> Because of insufficient time to train and familiarize themselves with equipment, operators sometimes misused the limited quantity of PSYOP resources that were available, thereby adding to the failure rate of PSYOP equipment. The problem is further exacerbated by training of reserve forces on outdated or cannibalized equipment and by the short mobilization time for reserve forces.<sup>165</sup>

The reported performance profile of individual equipment systems indicates that the equipment was used more intensively than envisioned and in an environment that exceeded the design specifications. This raises the question of whether reliance on COTS equipment is appropriate in all cases of PSYOP equipment acquisition. COTS is a quick solution and a very effective way to keep introducing new technology at the rate delivered by industry. However, comparing the total life cycle cost of a series of COTS systems to meet a mission to the cost of a (presumably) smaller number of custom-made, more serviceable equipment could be revealing. One would then also have to balance the cost of configuration management required for logistics and for ensuring interoperability against the benefit of new technology introduction. PSYOP typically lacks the necessary funding to conduct these types of studies. In fact, interviews and funding figures indicate that PSYOP's research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding is so small and irregular that COTS equipment is used to compensate.

*Discussion.* Some SOCOM leaders and past leaders of the PSYOP community caution against a blanket observation that PSYOP is systemically underresourced. They argue that PSYOP receives adequate resources and that the community often fails to put those resources to good use.<sup>166</sup> They observe that in the early 1990s, PSYOP budgets were elevated and all O&M requirements were met. The study team was unable to verify this because it could not obtain copies of past PSYOP budgets. However, two observations seem pertinent.

First, the additional resources allegedly provided to PSYOP in the early 1990s may well have produced commensurate improvements in performance. This might explain why appreciation for the effects PSYOP could produce grew over the same period. It also is possible that the spate of stability operations that the United States conducted in the 1990s simply underscored the importance of PSYOP for success in those operations. And of course, both might be true: PSYOP was improved and performed better in stability operations where its contributions were considered critical to success.

Second, it may be generally true that PSYOP resource planning could be improved. Some authoritative observers with intimate experience in PSYOP planning claim that this is the case.<sup>167</sup> The situation could be remedied by having a detailed, concrete plan with funding estimates before allocating significant additional resources to PSYOP, something that this report recommends. The evidence and arguments made here suggest the need for a major increase if PSYOP is expected to meet the general planning factors outlined by the defense strategy. Marginal improvements in resource management, however necessary they may be, will not solve the problem.

Another indication that current capability is insufficient to meet demand is the decision by other services to build their own organic PSYOP capability. The services normally do not volunteer to meet requirements that a lead service already provides. However, since Army capability has proven insufficient to meet demand, the Marines<sup>168</sup> are investigating means to increase their organic capability to execute PSYOP. After recent operations in Iraq demonstrated the need for more tactical PSYOP capability, the Marines requested additional support from the Army, which could not be provided because the force was overextended. Consequently, the Marines decided to build some tactical PSYOP force structure. The Navy allowed its ships to support PSYOP in recent operations but does not yet appear inclined to institutionalize those capabilities or procedures.<sup>169</sup> Navy ships were able to broadcast short wave radio messages into southern Iraq from the Persian Gulf, and the USS *Constellation* provided leaflet production with its on-board, high-speed, multicolor printer and dissemination via F/A-18s using the newly certified Product Development Unit 5 leaflet bombs. The Air Force, like the Navy, is looking at PSYOP capability in a broader vein and proposing using the full range of air and space capabilities as psychological instruments of influence.<sup>170</sup>

*Conclusion.* PSYOP personnel interviewed typically insisted that PSYOP completed all assigned missions in recent operations but that it could benefit from significant resource increases. The two assertions are not consistent. Either PSYOP can complete all existing missions at current resource levels, or it cannot and some risk is accepted as an alternative to full mission capability. We conclude that the latter is true.

PSYOP forces have made extraordinary efforts to produce effects for combatant commanders, but over the course of the 1990s, their reputation for producing effects, and consequently the demand for their services, has grown. As was the case throughout the 1990s, PSYOP cannot currently meet the requirements of the defense strategy. It cannot fulfill its missions as laid out in doctrine, and it is falling behind competitors and general technology trends. Its general funding level does not compare favorably with that of AFIS, suggesting that DOD places more

importance on keeping its own forces well informed of world events and domestic debate than on generating information effects in adversary decisionmakers, combatants, and supporting populations.

To compensate, PSYOP has spread its capabilities thinly. Forces cannot really make theater broadcasts to general audiences, but a substantial amount of resources are poured into a marginal capability for that mission (no around-the-clock radio/TV content and limited dissemination capability). Personnel have a more comprehensive ability to conduct tactical PSYOP missions but cannot meet the demands of maneuver commanders for timely, tailored products. In both theater and tactical PSYOP areas, the community is falling behind the technological trends. The conclusion of this report is that while better PSYOP planning and resource management may be necessary and certainly would be desirable, there is simply no way to meet mission requirements and substantially improve the quality of PSYOP products and the ability to produce effects without a substantial increase in resources. A tripling of the PSYOP budget would put it on par with AFIS, which seems like a reasonable starting point assuming the PSYOP community can produce a detailed reform and implementation plan to correct identified shortfalls.

## **6. Technology and Equipment**

Part of the mandate for this report was to assess whether PSYOP sufficiently exploits technology to accomplish its mission, and whether more could be done in this regard. To make this determination, this section of the report provides an overview of current PSYOP equipment and capabilities; reviews SOCOM processes for establishing requirements and developing PSYOP programs; reviews extant opportunities to exploit technology, particularly the ACTD and Defense Science Board recommendations in this area; and draws appropriate conclusions.


### **Current PSYOP Equipment**

Figure 6–1 is a depiction of the taxonomy of the various pieces of equipment, and figure 6–2 is a graphic of their disposition in CONUS or in theater. Appendix B provides a more detailed description of the equipment with some specifications for each and, in some cases, a picture.

*Equipment stationed in CONUS.* The Media Operations Center at Fort Bragg supplies the JPOTF with a higher quality and larger quantity of PSYOP products than what can be produced with deployable PSYOP assets. For example, the deployable print production center in theater consists of a Risograph printer, which is a two-tone printer capable of printing 93,000 copies a day. In contrast, the MPC's four Heidelberg print press machines can print 1,188,000 copies an hour. The center has the capability of producing audio, video, and print products for broadcast and dissemination in combatant regions. The products are provided through satellite communications (up-linking) or by shipment to theater.



Figure 6–1. PSYOP Systems Taxonomy




*Theater-level equipment.* In-theater equipment used during OEF, OIF, and OIF 2 included:

- Modular Print Systems (MPSs), which contain heavy print press machines (HPPMs)
- Deployable Print Production Centers (DPPCs), which contain Risographs
- JITI systems
- EC–130E Commando Solo aircraft
- Special Operations Media System Bravo (SOMS–B) audio and video system
- AN/MSQ–85B, a mobile audio/visual system.

The Modular Print System is a compartmentalized, mobile print plant for in-theater production. It is generally deployed in a truck and trailer combination and uses HPPMs to print multicolor products. Some HPPMs are used on board Navy ships as well.

A DPPC is similar to but smaller than an MPS. It is deployed on HMMWVs and uses Risograph systems that produce two-color print products. Both MPSs and DPPCs have to carry a gas generator to power the equipment.

Figure 6–2. SOCOM Equipment Disposition



JITI systems located at Fort Bragg and in theater have two-way and one-way communication capability with Commando Solo aircraft and SOMS–B systems in the field. PSYOP forces sent audio and video products to and from the theater with the system. A recent addition to the inventory, the Production Distribution System (PDS), uses recently developed improved video compression techniques to transmit information between systems in theater and in CONUS while using significantly less bandwidth.

The SOMS–B consists of four HMMWVs outfitted with radio and video broadcast equipment. In this configuration, the vehicles serve as broadcasting studios that can produce audio and video for or of events in theater through the use of its Deployable Audio Production System (DAPS).

The Commando Solo EC–130E aircraft flies orbits suitable for broadcasting audio and video PSYOP products. Like the SOMS–B, the Commando Solo uses the DAPS to create and broadcast content.

For large audience broadcasts, an AN/MSQ-85B Mobile Audio-Visual Information Collection and Dissemination system is used. It is a mobile audio and video recorder and transmitter designed to gather intelligence and broadcast audiovisual products. The system, which is also outfitted with a family of loudspeakers, is antiquated and arguably no longer fit for use.<sup>171</sup>

*Tactical unit equipment.* Tactical PSYOP forces have a set of vehicle-mounted loudspeakers from the family of loudspeakers systems that are designed to broadcast messages. This speaker system is also mounted on manpacks so that individual soldiers can play prerecorded PSYOP messages wherever they go. The majority of their recordings are on mini disc players that are connected to the loudspeakers. Tactical PSYOP groups also carry news gathering kits that consist of a digital camera and camcorder to gather information.

In the future, tactical units should have more routine access to leaflet delivery systems that are able to fly over target areas and drop leaflets. These deployment systems can be bombs or remotely controlled UAVs. Currently, not enough prototypes exist to be routinely supplied to tactical PSYOP units. Similarly, the units need video dissemination capabilities to present audiovisual messages directly to local audiences.<sup>172</sup>

### **Observations about Current Equipment**

The overarching observation from this review is that PSYOP is not effectively keeping pace with a rapidly evolving communications industry. With the exception of the PDS and the WSADS, PSYOP is using increasingly dated technology. The May 2000 DSB report<sup>173</sup> on PSYOP underscores this observation. The DSB task force reviewed the various technological trends for mass media dissemination and then specifically addressed the dissemination of radio and TV from aircraft. According to the task force, technology is moving toward systems and means of dissemination that are not favorable to the PSYOP equipment inventory in general and Commando Solo in particular. The DSB report includes a table (reproduced in appendix F) of the various distribution methods made available by the new technologies and the possible associated content, but the following trends are especially noteworthy:

- Cable transmission is quickly becoming the preferred mode for (terrestrial) television in most developing countries. High-definition television seems to be the next improvement for the medium. Currently, it is transmitted in both analog and digital protocols. The task force believes that transition to the digital format is inevitable. Both cable and digital transmission are incompatible with Commando Solo equipment.
- Radio is also quickly converting to digital transmission mode, making it incompatible with Commando Solo as well.
- Space-based television and radio are becoming popular in the developing world, and their transmission method is also creating problems for PSYOP equipment. It is mostly digital, quite directional (which would require very special positioning of Commando Solo or other equipment), and uses frequencies not used by existing PSYOP equipment.

- Telephony is also expanding rapidly and is becoming adept at incorporating multimedia capabilities in its cellular structure. This may be an area that can be exploited with new equipment.<sup>174</sup>

## **SOCOM Processes**

The ability of PYSOP to exploit technology is in part a function of the requirements, acquisition, and program management processes in effect at SOCOM. These processes are described below with a view toward illuminating their impact on PSYOP programs.

*The requirements process.* SOCOM follows DOD guidelines (CJCSI 3710, DOD 5000, and the new Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Execution System). However, they have adapted the directives and regulations to reflect the fact that their budget is quite small compared to budgets of the military departments (MILDEPs). Requirements are reviewed and validated annually, and an investment plan is prepared. As CJCSI 3710 requires, a capabilities-based approach, the Capabilities Integration and Development System (CIDS), is implemented: first developing a force that meets all requirements at low risk, then applying fiscal constraints and prioritizing, recognizing assumed risk. Modeling software is used to assist in the preparation of plans, with careful review of the assumptions and results by the staff. Finally, a review by the board of directors, the most senior military and civilian leaders, occurs after the conclusion of the four major steps of the process. Thus, the warfighters are key participants in the formulation, review, and approval of the annual plan that results in the POM and budget. In summary, the requirements process follows the DOD sequence of validation with final approval for specific efforts by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-equivalent, which results in a balanced portfolio across the command.

*Analyses to support CIDS and acquisition.* The analysis of requirements and the execution of analysis of alternatives (AOAs) are supported by a very small budget—\$1.6 million for FY04 (for some specific programs, MILDEPs may support the AOAs). This permits only one or two major analyses and a few AOAs a year for the entire SOCOM; even with that limited number, the cost per AOA is very small compared to ones funded by the MILDEPs. (While making comparisons with the MILDEPs is difficult due to the annual variability of the need for AOAs, it is safe to say that the SOCOM budget is disproportionately low.) The analyses are usually carried out by external entities (some by federally funded research and development centers).

The limited budget translates to less than one study per year for PSYOP: for example, in FY01, a Long Range Broadcast System Feasibility Analysis, and in FY02, a functional analysis of IO requirements for the entire SOCOM (with ramifications for PSYOP). Therefore, given little external analytical support, assessing requirements and reviewing options must be done by SOCOM's own PSYOP staff. These circumstances force the staff to fend for themselves by gaining some knowledge of the options available through technology and acquisition alternatives. SOCOM staff must serve as technology experts—not the normal requirement for the average enlisted soldier or officer. Not surprisingly, the tendency is to buy what is available rather than to pursue technology development for specific purposes.

*Research, development, and acquisition.* Because of its small size, the processes and procedures used at SOCOM heavily influence PSYOP investment. SOCOM acquisition principles are to:

- deliver equipment to user expeditiously
- exploit proven techniques and methods
- keep warfighters involved
- take risk and manage it.

The resulting acquisition strategies for SOCOM investments are the following concepts:

- 80 percent solutions to support short timeline
- use COTS and nondevelopmental items
- spiral development
- evolutionary acquisition
- competitive prototyping
- innovative contracting
- partnering with MILDEPS, other government agencies, and domestic and foreign industry.

The emphasis on speed of acquisition and deployment of equipment is striking. The acceptance of 80 percent solutions—across the board—with the promise of a better product later (or a new 80 percent solution) makes it possible to field a well-equipped force with today’s technology that keeps pace with developments. Unless special programs provide advanced capabilities that may be needed but are not provided by industry, lack of technological sophistication in specific areas of interest to SOCOM, and PSYOP in particular, may result and be a detriment to mission performance.

Research, development, and acquisition of SOCOM systems is managed by the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL) office, one of the organizations supporting the acquisition executive (others support R&D). SOCOM distributes its approximately \$2 billion in program management and milestone decision authority (MDA) as follows:

- 52 percent managed by SOCOM, with MDA at SOCOM
- 22 percent managed by MILDEP, with MDA at SOCOM
- 26 percent managed by MILDEP, with MDA at MILDEP.

Note that about 50 percent of the program management is carried out by entities outside SOCOM, and about 25 percent of acquisition decisions are made by the service acquisition executives. This is huge leveraging and exemplifies jointness and reliance on the DOD team.

It also creates a need for vigilance by SOCOM, as the fate of their programs is in the hands of others.

*Research and development.* Since the publication of the *IO Roadmap*, PSYOP is receiving more attention within SOCOM, so there may be increasing work in supporting technologies. However, PSYOP has never had a major technology push project. SOCOM has neither the dedicated laboratory structure nor the large cadre of scientists, engineers, and program managers to execute its technology development and system acquisition responsibilities. It relies heavily on support from the services, defense agencies, national laboratories, and industry. Thus, many SOCOM programs and projects need to survive competition within the domains of other service-specific priorities, usually related to major service acquisition plans.

Technology awareness, monitoring, and exploitation are as highly leveraged as acquisition. The directorate of advanced technology, which is supported by an overarching technology integrated product team, largely performs these functions. The primary sensors for identifying needed technology are the warfighters themselves and liaison arrangements with others (military departments, DOD and other agencies, and industry). Staff is encouraged to participate in conferences and expositions to see what industry has to offer and to interact with industry representatives to impart desired characteristics for the next products industry may want to develop. SOCOM has an active program of allowing and, in fact, inviting industries to demonstrate their products. An action officer is designated as the technology industry liaison officer. He is the point of contact for industry when it has a product to offer for consideration.

Liaison with each of the services provides opportunities to exploit DOD-generated technology. For example:

- The Navy sponsors internally 10 to 15 programs annually, currently valued at \$2.8 million, that may have an impact on SOCOM.
- For interaction with the Army, SOCOM prepares a list of project proposals in an annual input to the Army's science and technology (S&T) master plan. The proposals then compete with other Army projects. This process is being institutionalized to strengthen the relationship.
- The Air Force also maintains a liaison through the Air Force Research Laboratory.
- The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) provides access to a 5- to 10-year outlook but also helps with 6- to 24-month applications. In return, SOCOM provides challenges and feedback on how products of past cooperation worked in the field. Liaison is accomplished by an on-site, full-time staff member at the senior executive service level who attends all requirements meetings and provides interface with DARPA program managers as necessary. Prototypes obtained from DARPA programs, including the language translator, water purification pens, UAVs, and ground robotics, are currently in operators' hands.

- Liaison is also close with the OSD-run DOD/Department of Energy munitions technology development program.

The annual R&D program for the entire SOCOM is documented in a book describing the organization and listing the various projects.<sup>175</sup> The number of projects is rather large, indicating high leveraging with the services and other organizations; small size of projects; or possibly both. Few of these programs are related to PSYOP.

*Investment in acquisition and technology.* Table 6–1 summarizes the comparison of DOD, SOCOM, and PSYOP funding for investment and R&D. Note the disproportionately low PSYOP funding levels.

Table 6–1. Comparison of DOD, SOCOM, and PSYOP FY05 Funding

	TOA	Investment	R&D
DOD	\$402 billion	\$144 billion (36%)	\$69 billion (17%)
SOCOM	\$6.5 billion	\$2.1 billion (31%)	\$500 million (15%)
PSYOP	\$172 million	\$29 million (17%)	\$3 million (2%)

*Acquisition investment.* PSYOP acquisition is a small part of SOCOM investment (\$18 million versus \$2 billion per year, or approximately 1 percent). Most programs are in acquisition category III and therefore are managed by the SOAL with the Program Executive Office as the milestone decision authority. The same organization is managing the Global Reach ACTD. Reflecting the general philosophy of SOCOM, PSYOP acquisition strategy has been simply to buy equipment off the shelf with minimal, if any, modification. As much as possible, staff works with industry to entice it to incorporate features needed or desirable for PSYOP use. As always, one can question the effectiveness of this approach, given the small percentage of volume or sales that such a small group represents.

The total PSYOP investment budget in FY05 is about \$29 million, broken down as follows:

RDTE	\$0.36 million
RDTE (ACTD)	\$2.94 million
Procurement	\$18.39 million
Operations and Support	\$7.45 million

Table 6-2. Actuals and POM 06 PSYOP Funding

Category	Program	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	TOTAL
RDTE \$														FY 05-11
	CSOLO	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.50
	POBS	0.31	0.42	0.00	0.24	2.16	0.36	1.46	7.33	1.35	2.37	0.66	0.67	14.19
	DPPC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	FOL	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	LDS	0.82	1.05	0.00	0.75	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	TOTAL	1.13	1.47	0.00	0.99	2.16	0.36	4.96	7.33	1.35	2.37	0.66	0.67	17.69
ACTD														
							2.94	5.86	5.85	5.85	4.88	0.00	0.00	25.38
PROC \$														
	CSOLO	0.76	0.00	0.22	6.76	47.18	0.00	15.87	28.01	11.83	0.29	0.00	0.00	56.00
	POBS	9.24	7.40	4.53	17.35	19.95	13.79	21.30	34.35	49.18	37.02	32.78	31.58	219.99
	DPPC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.05	2.06	1.43	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.54
	FOL	0.96	0.90	0.10	0.00	2.87	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.98
	LDS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.54	9.94	3.62	3.61	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.23
	TOTAL	10.96	8.30	4.84	24.65	79.93	18.39	42.83	64.41	62.43	37.31	32.78	31.58	289.73





7POG						5.75	4.02	4.09	4.25	4.36	4.52	4.70	31.69
TOTAL						21.10	18.23	16.52	17.24	17.69	18.33	19.05	128.16
TOA W/ACTD						171.83	218.52	252.14	250.41	229.82	232.31	242.08	1,597.11
TOA W/O ACTD						168.89	212.66	246.29	244.56	224.93	232.31	242.08	1,571.73
RDT&E % OF TOA													
W/ACTD						1.92%	4.95%	5.23%	2.88%	3.15%	0.28%	0.28%	2.70%
W/O ACTD						0.21%	2.33%	2.97%	0.55%	1.05%	0.28%	0.28%	1.13%
PROC % OF TOA(W/ACTD)						10.70%	19.60%	25.54%	24.93%	16.24%	14.11%	13.04%	18.14%
INVEST % OF TOA (BOTH W/ ACTD)						16.95%	31.68%	38.93%	36.42%	28.60%	27.04%	27.63%	30.25%
O&S % OF PROC						40.49%	36.37%	31.94%	34.54%	56.75%	89.61%	109.69%	51.89%

PSYOP inventory in FY05 is comprised of two parts:

- about \$735 million, supported by Major Force Program–4 (that is, by the services)
- about \$123 million, supported by Major Force Program–11 (that is, by SOCOM).

Given that the value of the total inventory of PSYOP equipment is about \$123 million, excluding the EC–130E aircraft and other major equipment supplied by the services, SOCOM appears to be recapitalizing PSYOP equipment every 5 to 10 years. This is quite a rapid replacement when compared to major equipment in the MILDEPS, and it reflects the philosophy of buying COTS equipment for rapid deployment, use in harsh environments, and quick replacement. (See appendix C for the inventory and appendix D for the recapitalization plan.)

Program Decision Memorandum II in FY02 provided \$250 million to PSYOP. By direction, the funds were distributed over 11 different accounts and over several years. In short, the funds were used to fix the potholes rather than to start a new highway system.

In contrast, the ACTD represents a significant percentage of RDT&E funding and, in fact, the overall investment budget. It will provide significant capability but only in limited quantity. The disadvantage of largely bypassing the formal acquisition process is that there often is not a transition mechanism to permit continued procurement of additional equipment pioneered by the ACTD. When the ACTD is completed, the long-term flow of funds to R&D will be much reduced.

If one excludes ACTD funds from consideration (to more properly reflect long-term steady-state funding trends), RDT&E funding in FY05 is 0.20 percent of the total obligation authority (TOA). This amount is shockingly low compared to MILDEP levels that typically hover around 15 percent. (The DOD total in FY05 is 17 percent.) As a further point of comparison, a few years ago, DOD considered setting a goal of 3 percent of TOA for S&T, which is the less expensive part of RDT&E (includes only 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 funds). The entire PSYOP RDT&E does not reach that level, let alone whatever the PSYOP S&T funding percentage might be.

If the ACTD is included in the TOA, then RDT&E is 1.92 percent of TOA, which is not much better. Even that slight improvement is a temporary infusion of R&D funding, and it includes some indirect acquisition funding since some of the equipment bought for the ACTD will become operational gear—much the same way as other equipment is bought for SOCOM. The technology infusion and the equipment bought to demonstrate it address requirements in areas that are technologically weak. Thus, this R&D infusion should raise PSYOP capabilities as it also raises the quantity of equipment available to PSYOP forces.

Prior to POM submission, the RDT&E plan budget included an increase in FY06 and FY07 with additional funds for POBS (\$3 million each for Internet broadcast and telephone broadcast). That was eliminated by the formal POM submission, reducing the budget to its usual low level.

Investment funding, in the usual definition, includes RDT&E and procurement accounts. PSYOP data provided was able to differentiate the operations and support (O&S) funds that directly support acquisition programs from the rest of the O&M account. In order to give the PSYOP process every benefit of the doubt, in the following discussion we include the O&S funds as part of the total PSYOP investment—not the usual practice.

The total procurement budget and total investment budget oscillate a lot through the years. This is normally indicative of inefficient support for research, development, and acquisition. Typically, it also signals that the program is funded with whatever remains after other programs of higher priority have been funded.

Procurement funding, as a percent of TOA, for the entire DOD (in FY05) is about 18.5 percent. For SOCOM, it is 24 percent. But for PSYOP, it is 10.7 percent, again showing a significant underemphasis (see appendix E for funding shortfalls in FY05). As usual, the plan is to increase the percentage in the out years; in fact, in FY07 and FY08, it goes as far as about 25 percent. Of course, the typical pattern is for funding to be reduced in the next year, as happened this year for POM FY06, and the program reverts to funding closer to historical trends. Similarly, investment as a percent of TOA, even including O&S costs, is 17 percent for PSYOP, compared to 36 percent for DOD and 32 percent for SOCOM.

Funding for equipment readiness (shown on the O&S line) is also unusual. Normal acquisition programs require funding for O&S that is between 90 and 120 percent of the procurement cost. PSYOP O&S funding varied from a low of 31 percent to a high of 110 percent. Most years the value is very low (in the 30s). This again may reflect the philosophy of acquisition of COTS equipment, which is considered much more disposable than major items in the MILDEPS.

Some of this episodic funding for investment can be explained by the very uneven acquisition of equipment. Note the many line items that are not funded at all through the Fiscal Year Defense Program (except for continuing O&S). This kind of programming reflects the priorities of the program within SOCOM, but also the fact that the PSYOP community has not made a case for more and better programmatic thrusts to fulfill a vision and a set of requirements.

### **Current Opportunities to Exploit Technology**

Two noteworthy efforts to identify and exploit technology for PSYOP are the Defense Science Board report of May 2000, “The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of a Psychological Operations in Time of Military Conflict,” and the PSYOP Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration sponsored by SOCOM and advocated by the *Information Operations Roadmap*. This research reviewed both of these efforts in detail (see appendix F for an overview).

The Defense Science Board recommendations on technology exploitation are being incorporated into the ACTD, which will not be completed until 2009. However, its charter appears to cover all the major shortfalls identified in this study and the DSB report, including the need for more responsible tactical PSYOP dissemination capabilities. Informally, however, the emphasis of the

ACTD appears to be on long-range dissemination in denied areas more than on new ways to quickly disseminate leaflets and videos over shorter ranges. One area not addressed by the ACTD is the inadequate communication links between theater and tactical PSYOP forces. It is not clear that this problem requires an advanced technology solution but, given the significance of the issue, SOCOM should review whether it should be covered by the ACTD. The ultimate question, as with all ACTDs, is whether the advanced technology prototypes it develops will be funded and integrated into the force.

In addition to these efforts, SOCOM is developing a PSYOP technology roadmap and a Joint PSYOP Master Plan. These efforts will benefit from a Joint PSYOP Initial Capabilities Document, which is on hold pending JROC approval. This document will provide overarching requirements for PSYOP and a mechanism for asserting the commander of SOCOM's expanded authority under the Unified Command Plan to "integrate and coordinate DOD PSYOP." This expanded authority solidifies SOCOM's leadership and responsibility for enhancing interoperability and joint warfighting of PSYOP and comes at a time when the other services are showing increasing interest in developing some organic PSYOP capability for their forces.

Beyond the modest improvements that come from numerous incremental upgrades from COTS purchases and the more substantial advances that are anticipated from the ACTD, some current PSYOP program improvements seem quite noteworthy in light of other findings in this report.

- The Product Distribution System uses recently developed video compression techniques to transmit information between systems in theater and in CONUS using significantly less bandwidth. It does so without relying exclusively on military satellites (MILSATs), a major advantage in PSYOP product distribution. Since video transmission among systems is very resource-intensive (at 6–8 megs/second), the JPOTF and higher command elements often reserve the use of bandwidth (and MILSATs) for purposes other than PSYOP. The PDS will give PSYOP some organic ability to get battlefield video back to product development centers that can then quickly turn it into PSYOP products. The current inability to move video taken by tactical units was identified elsewhere in this report as one of the communication shortfalls that tends to inhibit cooperation between theater and tactical PSYOP.
- The leaflet delivery system, using a WSADS, will enable delivery of payloads to multiple areas flying as high as 18,000 feet for distances up to 800 miles and at speeds up to 35 miles per hour (clearly, trades between these parameters will be made depending on the mission). If procured in quantity for tactical PSYOP units, this capability would contribute directly to reducing the shortfall in timely tactical dissemination of leaflets, which maneuver commanders identify as a problem.
- Commando Solo transition to the C130-J aircraft (with Congressional support) offers the option to upgrade and modularize the existing payload. The new aircraft's higher altitude does little for broadcast range, but its modular payload could support a capability to control a UAV that then could better penetrate denied airspace without endangering personnel. The value of controlling such UAVs from the air rather than the ground needs to be evaluated. However, the increased capability to target audiences in a more

responsive and persistent manner would help correct shortfalls identified elsewhere in this report—namely, insufficient theater dissemination capacity and insufficiently timed tactical dissemination.

- Reduced weight speakers, while technologically mundane, are an important improvement in PSYOP capability. Ground force maneuver commanders value immediately responsive PSYOP capabilities, a need best met by tactical PSYOP teams. Loudspeakers will remain the primary and most responsive dissemination tool for tactical teams until PSYOP is enabled by computer network attack or other innovative means of rapid dissemination. Thus, any improvements to loudspeaker capability are noteworthy.

## **Technology Conclusions**

Several observations emanate from this review of technology exploitation by SOCOM.

- First, PSYOP is significantly underresourced in its acquisition account. It has no in-house analytical capacity and only minimal resources to identify new technological directions to enhance its capability. PSYOP compensates by rapidly acquiring any new commercial off-the-shelf equipment that supports the current mode of operation.
- Second, the entire SOCOM investment process reflects all DOD directives and regulations. It exhibits many of the desiderata of jointness, capabilities-based thinking, high leveraging of others' programs with emphasis on industry, short acquisition cycles, and high warfighter involvement. The mechanics of the process are logical and provide many opportunities for leadership involvement. Therefore, the resulting investment program reflects the priorities of SOCOM, both in total investment funds distribution and in near-total reliance on technology advances pursued largely by others.
- Third, the ACTD sponsored by SOCOM is moving slowly and perhaps could benefit from some expansion, especially in the area of tactical product dissemination and perhaps with respect to communications. That said, the ACTD appears to cover all the most glaring shortfalls identified in this study and by the Defense Science Board.

If the Department feels justified in expanding PSYOP resources, it does not need to reform SOCOM processes so much as it needs to communicate that intent clearly to SOCOM leadership, among whom funding for PSYOP requirements repeatedly fails to make the cut. If DOD wants a higher priority attached to PSYOP, it must provide the additional funding to SOCOM or provide direct guidance on the subject. If additional resources are made available to the command, a better resource distribution will be needed to reflect longer time horizons and steady program execution. Improvements over the present situation would be easily achievable—including more support for analyses to better understand how technology can support requirements, more work in R&D to develop requisite technology to better adapt commercially available technology, and steady funding for acquisition supporting efficient buy profiles.

## 7. Comparison of Findings with *Information Operations Roadmap*

This section of the report compares the research on lessons learned with the recommendations made in the *IO Roadmap*, as required in this study's mandate. In general, the comparison reveals that the results of this research are broadly consistent with the findings in that document. However, in several cases, they modify and go well beyond the *Roadmap's* 10 recommendations, reviewed below, that apply directly or inclusively to PSYOP.

*National themes.* The report agrees with the *IO Roadmap* recommendation that OSD oversight should include the requirement to ensure that PSYOP messages are congruent with national themes and messages. The finding in this report is that national themes help PSYOP planning and product development, especially for theater-level products with the objective of defending U.S. policy, which are directed at general audiences. Without national themes, theater PSYOP products will be more general, less forceful, and probably less effective. National themes are not an essential prerequisite for most tactical PSYOP products.

*Delimiting PSYOP's mission.* This report supports the need to clarify the missions and tasks assigned to PSYOP, public diplomacy, and public affairs, respectively. Limiting PSYOP to support for military endeavors in nonpermissive or semipermissive environments and for public diplomacy as part of approved security cooperation guidelines will provide much-needed focus. A reasonably expected result should be sharper standards for PSYOP efforts, less interference, and more cooperation between public affairs and public diplomacy. The review also supports the *IO Roadmap* assertion that OSD Public Affairs should be more proactive and should include a broader set of select foreign media and audiences. Doing so would reduce the need for PSYOP to provide public affairs assistance to commanders.

*Joint PSYOP support element.* The findings in this report support the original intent behind the creation of the JPSE: the need for policy-consistent, commercial-quality products in support of PSYOP campaigns. Given the evolution of the JPSE and the decision to locate it outside the Washington, DC, area, where it could most effectively provide these capabilities, this report advises a modification to the *IO Roadmap* recommendation. The JPSE should be redesignated to product support for tactical PSYOP products and integrated with the Media Operations Center, either at Fort Bragg or in Tampa, whichever site provides the best advantages. Another entity, operating as a field agency under the direction of USD (Policy), should be established in the Washington, DC, area, with the sole purpose of supporting public diplomacy (not tactical PSYOP products, which would be the responsibility of the JPSE). These public diplomacy products could support theater PSYOP efforts and would be disseminated by PSYOP forces.

*Product approval.* The review supports the *IO Roadmap's* call for delegation of product approval authority for all PSYOP products that do not have "substantial political or strategic content or implication" to the combatant commander; for designation of dedicated USD(P) staff and clear procedures to approve products without costly delays; and for the delegation of approval authority for additional products and modifications of preapproved products once an operation is under way. However, the report goes further than the *IO Roadmap* and makes specific recommendations on a framework and procedures for delegation of product approval authority.

It recommends shortening the chain of approval, fixing responsibility, and publishing the established guidelines. The recommended concept of operation for PSYOP is to accept the additional risk inherent in faster product approval and to mitigate it with more rapid product assessment, revision, and redissemination capabilities.

*Force structure expansion.* The report agrees with the *IO Roadmap* that the PSYOP force structure needs to be expanded. However, the report concludes that active duty tactical forces, not regionally oriented product development battalions, should be given priority in the expansion.

*Modernize PSYOP force capabilities.* The report agrees with the *IO Roadmap* that PSYOP force capabilities should be modernized but recommends some minor additions to its three recommendations:

- PSYOP ACTD to address dissemination of PSYOP products into denied areas. This report urges an acceleration of the PSYOP Global Reach ACTD effort, which is addressing area dissemination concerns as one of its primary pursuits. Currently, it is not scheduled to reach completion until the end of the decade. The ACTD is researching various unmanned vehicles, including the WSADS UAV. This system can carry up to 575 pounds (or increase its range by reducing payload weight) into denied areas, both for theater and tactical PSYOP forces.
- PSYOP recapitalization to modernize traditional delivery systems. Tactical dissemination systems such as leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts are highly responsive to maneuver commanders, and this report supports the continued emphasis of the ACTD on tactical PSYOP dissemination. The ground-launched WSADS will provide an effective solution to leaflet distribution for tactical commanders. In addition, the ACTD is investigating scatterable media payloads for UAVs as potential solutions for maneuver commanders. These capabilities are especially useful as a means for tactical PSYOP to be more responsive to maneuver commanders.
- PSYOP Broadcast System. The POBS program is funded and is actively procuring equipment and systems against validated requirements. This report recommends that the POBS program address the immediate problem of closing the theater-tactical communication gap, perhaps in concert with the ACTD. In addition, given the pace of operations in the war on terrorism and the need to be ready to respond to other regional contingencies, POBS should be expanded to provide for a second theater capability (which reportedly is the case in SOCOM's 2006 POM submission).

*IO career force.* The PSYOP lessons learned review is in agreement with the *Roadmap* on the need for a well-trained and educated IO career force. PSYOP benefited from integration with information operations but squandered valuable staff time working with newly appointed IO officers who had little knowledge of PSYOP and its capabilities. A well-trained IO career force would minimize this inconvenience and increase the benefits of PSYOP integration into IO and of IO into the overall war plan.



*Standardized IO planning capability.* The *IO Roadmap* recommends adopting a standardized IO planning capability at the joint level. This report supports that recommendation for the same reason it supports the IO career force recommendations; it would facilitate integration of PSYOP across services and into IO, which recent operations suggest benefits PSYOP, not to mention the combatant commander's ability to degrade an adversary's decisionmaking process while preserving his own.<sup>176</sup>

*Analytic support.* This report supports the *IO Roadmap's* call for stronger analytic support, including human factors analysis provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). However, the *IO Roadmap* appears to assume that DIA could provide all human factors analysis needed by PSYOP, which is not true. PSYOP currently suffers from insufficient tactical target audience intelligence to properly tailor products for commanders. The 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group's Strategic Studies Detachment provides better support for theater-level products. The report recommends that detachment be oriented toward tactical product production and that DIA provide the more general theater-level support.<sup>177</sup>

*Transparent budgeting.* During this 6-month research effort, it was impossible to obtain an accurate accounting of PSYOP expenditures over the past decade. For this reason, the report supports the *IO Roadmap's* call for improved transparency in IO budgeting and accounting.

In summary, the PSYOP lessons learned review reinforces the conclusions of the *IO Roadmap*, including recommendations on training, career force, analytic support, standardized IO planning tools, and a virtual Major Force Program for all IO components. This review suggests, however, that the *Roadmap* did not go far enough in its recommendations. The recommendation on the JPSE in the *IO Roadmap* is not aggressive enough to make a difference at the theater level for general audiences, and it does not fully account for the need to provide more responsive, tailored product support to tactical PSYOP units. The *Roadmap's* recommendation for approval reform is also insufficient, especially at the tactical level, to ensure timely delivery of products for the best effect. Approval authority reform should be extended to the JPOTF and division levels and should be more specific on product categories. In addition, the document did not pay enough attention to the need to provide tactical, as opposed to theater or national-level, intelligence support to PSYOP. This study found that the *IO Roadmap* is not aggressive enough on reform of PSYOP doctrine, recruitment, training, force structure, and acquisition. Where the *Roadmap* generally pushed resources at PSYOP to bridge the most glaring capability gaps, the PSYOP lessons learned review provides more detailed insight into needs and longer-term solutions.

## **8. Conclusions**

The review of PSYOP lessons learned from OEF, OIF, OIF 2, and stability operations from the past two decades yields six major conclusions that merit further attention.

*Current PSYOP missions are overextended.* The rising demand for PSYOP, coupled with inadequate resourcing, has resulted in an overextension of PSYOP missions. PSYOP as it is currently configured and resourced is incapable of mounting a competitive theater-wide effort

targeted at general audiences or of meeting the demand from commanders for timely, tailored tactical PSYOP products and dissemination.

The consequences of the suboptimal capabilities at the theater and tactical levels are different depending on whether PSYOP is participating in major combat operations or stability operations. In both types of operations, PSYOP pursues the same basic mission objectives:

- isolating the adversary from domestic and international support
- reducing the effectiveness of adversary forces
- deterring escalation by adversary leadership
- minimizing collateral damage and interference with U.S. operations.

The first objective is the most important for the success of stability operations, whereas the second and third are more important contributors to success in major combat operations. Since the resources (both political and fiscal) required to improve PSYOP performance in stability operations, as opposed to major combat operations, are significantly different, senior decisionmakers may feel obliged to consider them separately.

There are different costs and benefits in improving tactical and theater PSYOP. Tactical-level PSYOP in major combat operations is the most cost-effective and generates the greatest return for the least amount of investment. Similarly, tactical-level PSYOP in stability operations is also cost-effective but more difficult to execute because it requires substantial changes in operating concepts and doctrine. In contrast, theater-level PSYOP in both major combat and stability operations demands greater resources and generates fewer visible effects. Theater-level PSYOP tends to focus on national-level themes and messages directed toward broad, diverse audiences and is more resource-intensive than tactical-level PSYOP. It also is difficult to gauge the success of PSYOP campaigns at the theater level since correlation between the conveyed message and its intended effects is less discernable. A well-coordinated national information strategy is needed for theater-level PSYOP to generate a noticeable impact. For these reasons, improvements in theater-level PSYOP are both more costly and difficult to accomplish. Pentagon decisionmakers need to first determine whether overarching priorities justify the additional costs associated with reform of theater PSYOP and then pursue a commensurate investment strategy and reform plan.

The question of whether Washington, DC, can generate national themes and help theater and tactical PSYOP stay on message with appropriate political content and product reviews is no small matter. It simply may not be possible to achieve. Many long-time Washington observers insist there is really no such thing as policy and that national leadership in a democracy is always in a reactive mode, managing public affairs responses to emerging events but incapable of producing longer-term vision for strategic communications. A senior administration official in another setting recently confessed that this is essentially the view of the current White House office of strategic communications. Even if this is true at the national level, it might still be possible to pursue a communications strategy at the theater level. However, there is evidence to indicate it is a problem at that level as well. As one PSYOP source working in the Coalition

Provisional Authority headquarters in Baghdad remarked, “The strategic communications office is focused only a week out because that is where ‘the front office’ wants them focused.”

Those concerned with public diplomacy and PSYOP often lament the lack of an organized, longer-term information strategy, but the reactive approach that relies essentially on public affairs alone is not indefensible. One might argue that if the battle over immediate public interpretation of events is lost, longer-range strategic communications are ultimately worthless. Another view would be that truth will out over the long term and that there is no point in trying to guide or shape it; or that foreign perceptions of U.S. policy and actions are ultimately a function of the policy and actions rather than efforts to dress them up to be more appealing. It is not the purpose of this research to argue this issue. Rather, the point being made here is that if national-level authorities do not deem it necessary, possible, or worthwhile to provide strategic direction for an information campaign, then the United States will not have a robust public diplomacy effort or effect. By extension, there is far less reason to build an expensive theater PSYOP capability to reach broad audiences in support of public diplomacy. In short, and contrary to the opinion of many in PSYOP as well as the recommendations in some other reports on PSYOP reform, this report emphasizes that PSYOP cannot compensate for an admittedly weak U.S. public diplomacy effort by absorbing more of that mission; it simply is not competitive in that arena, and the politics of strategic communications in the United States will not permit it in any case.

*PSYOP is critical to the success of stability operations.* PSYOP forces are increasingly employed to support stability operations because of their ability to isolate the adversary from domestic and international support. They do so in part by currying favor with the local population and neutralizing active support to insurgents and terrorists from the general populace through both theater and tactical PSYOP but especially through face-to-face interactions. As examined in the section on official lessons learned, three key lessons are unique to stability operations:

- The center of gravity in stability operations is popular support, so PSYOP must focus on the foreign populace, as well as enemy combatants and leaders.
- Early and continuous theater-level PSYOP integration with other agencies to assure consistent themes and messages is essential.
- Face-to-face PSYOP with the host population is critical, and PSYOP forces must use conventional forces to support this objective.

*PSYOP is more critical to success in stability operations than in major combat operations.* PSYOP success in stability operations requires changes to tactical-level joint doctrine (for example, Joint Concept of Operation for Stability Operations) that would enable PSYOP to leverage the larger Army and Marine infantry pool during their face-to-face interactions with the general populace. It would also require a robust ability to engage the general target audience in the face of competing information sources, which requires around-the-clock broadcasting and sophisticated print materials. PSYOP cannot currently produce this content and has difficulty disseminating it. In short, significantly improving PSYOP for stability operations will be an arduous and expensive undertaking.

Alternatively, if decisionmakers cannot justify the increased costs of significantly improving theater PSYOP capabilities, they can still take less onerous steps to improve PSYOP performance in stability operations. They can:

- mandate the revision of joint operating concepts to reflect the importance of infantry cooperation with PSYOP forces
- leverage an improved public diplomacy effort that conveys coherent national objectives and messages, thereby reinforcing persuasive communication toward foreign audiences. This would, in effect, de-obligate PSYOP from theater-level missions and promote its concentration on tactical-level missions.
- authorize eliminating potential competition from adversarial broadcasts. If PSYOP is supported with policies and capabilities that allow temporary disruption of adversary communication channels, it can compete more effectively.

*PSYOP is a major force multiplier in major combat operations.* PSYOP helps to reduce the effectiveness of adversary forces and deters escalation by adversary leadership, as illustrated in recent operations. Similar to PSYOP in stability operations, PSYOP effects in major combat operations are most discernable at the tactical level of engagement. PSYOP reform and improvements in tactical-level operations can be accomplished at relatively low cost by bolstering communication equipment that would better link theater and tactical forces, improving the quality of tactical products, providing better intelligence support, targeting audience analysis capabilities, and providing linguistic support. Justifying the war to general audiences could be left to the realm of public diplomacy, where integration of national themes and messages can best be achieved.

*Improvements in PSYOP decisionmaking are essential.* However senior decisionmakers decide on the relative merits of investing in theater and tactical PSYOP, some non-material fixes are required to improve it. National themes and coordinated information activities would improve PSYOP, but the most important decisionmaking reform is an improved product approval process. The PSYOP approval process essentially breaks down in two areas: between the JPOTF and the Pentagon, and between the JPOTF and tactical forces. Poor communication between the JPOTF and OSD Policy contributed to significant delays in the approval of theater-level PSYOP products during the initial phase of OEF. Similarly, tactical-level products encountered delays in obtaining JPOTF approval prior to development and distribution. Unless the approval process is reformed at both the theater and tactical levels, PSYOP effectiveness may be seriously compromised.

A three-pronged approach must be adopted to improve decisionmaking in PSYOP:

- First, the risk of an occasional poor product must be accepted and mitigated with a rapid effects assessment and product revision process that limits the damage by quickly

revising and reissuing an improved product. This approach should be codified in both policy and doctrine and resourced accordingly.

- Second, a process for preapproval of tactical programs and products should be adopted. Building on recent experience, and the success of recent efforts to pre-approve programs for some small contingency operations such as noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian, counterdrug, and maritime interdiction operations, a more discrete set of program and product categories with designated approval levels should be developed. Tactical products should be forwarded with product control sheets that log an expiration time, after which their approval is assumed and handled accordingly. The responsibility of the JPOTF should be to check for consistency with policy and the combatant commander's plan. The JPOTF would also review products for quality control but with assumed confidence in the tactical forces' knowledge of the specific target audience. For this approach to be effective, tactical PSYOP forces will need around-the-clock communication connectivity with the JPOTF.
- Third, the preferred solution at the theater level is to make the Policy approval process more responsive. The USD(P) should delegate the approval process to someone with day-to-day access to contingency policy who can review products expeditiously. As in the case of tactical PSYOP products, products that are not part of programs that have been preapproved for delegation or that the JPOTF deems as requiring review should be forwarded directly from the JPOTF to the Pentagon with product control sheets that log an expiration time, after which their approval is assumed and handled accordingly. The sole responsibility of the Policy official charged with approval should be to check for policy consistency, not quality; that would be the sole responsibility of the combatant commander. For this approach to be effective, the JPOTF would need direct liaison authority with the Policy official designated with product approvals in order to resolve outstanding issues expeditiously.

*Resources should be linked with reforms.* Finally, large and identifiable resource shortfalls notwithstanding, senior leaders should not simply allocate more resources to PSYOP. Improving the ability of PSYOP forces to produce desired effects is as much a matter of nonmateriel reforms as it is a matter of additional resources. Currently, the PSYOP mission is defined vaguely, and PSYOP resources are not focused where they have the greatest comparative advantages. PSYOP leadership resists integration with IO even though such integration disproportionately benefits PSYOP. A concrete plan that identifies and proposes affordable solutions to the greatest impediments to quality PSYOP programs and products is lacking. Absent a specific and abiding commitment to eliminate such shortcomings, additional investments in PSYOP are not likely to produce commensurate improvements in effects. Decisionmakers should solicit a reform plan from the PSYOP community and leadership that provides specific details and timelines for reform consistent with the recommendations in this report (the detailed set of recommendations outlined below offers a framework for the reform plan). Additional resources should be provided contingent upon the quality of the plan.

## 9. Recommendations

This report has provided an independent assessment of the lessons learned from OEF, OIF, OIF 2, and the stability operations of the past several decades, which have contributed to the body of understanding concerning PSYOP. The study team acknowledges that there may be multiple ways of addressing the issues raised below, depending on the level of political and fiscal capital available. For this reason, a set of recommendations has been crafted that would provide decisionmakers with a menu of options that, taken collectively, would substantially increase the quality of PSYOP performance.

*OSD field agency for support to public diplomacy.* Create an OSD-led field agency for support to public diplomacy (for example, the Public Diplomacy Support Agency [PDSA]) with a large contractor base in Washington, DC. The agency should be headed by ASD(SO/LIC) with content policy oversight administered by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and assisted by regional Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense (DASDs), as needed, depending on the contingency in question. The Public Diplomacy Support Agency's mandate should be to create commercial-quality, policy-consistent, radio/television and print content for general foreign audiences that supports public diplomacy, with priority given to support of U.S. military operations, and to help assess the effects of U.S. public diplomacy campaigns. The PDSA should have a "fly-away" capability to assist political authorities managing stability operations in the field (for example, the local ambassador or the ground component commander.) Additionally, content would be disseminated through PSYOP forces to ensure that national-level themes and messages are properly conveyed in tactical-level products. Eventually, this organization might be transferred to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as part of its Unified Command Plan responsibilities for information operations.

*Coordination of national themes.* Recommend the U.S. National Security Advisor establish an authoritative mechanism for determining longer-term national themes for information campaigns that would inform the content of the new PDSA. Developed themes and background research on potential target audiences should also be coordinated across all U.S. Government agencies to ensure consistency and continuity.

*Approval process.* Reform the PSYOP approval process by tasking ASD(SO/LIC) to author a DOD Directive and the Joint Staff to draft a CJCSI that would codify the following approach (the details of which are available in the body of this report). First, the concept for risk management would accept the possibility of an occasional poor product and would identify means of mitigating the consequences. Second, a general scheme for preapproval of tactical products would be adopted that includes a discrete set of product categories with designated approval levels. Third, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) would delegate the approval process to someone with day-to-day access to contingency policy who can review products for approval on a by-exception basis. PSYOP products forwarded from the JPOTF to the Pentagon with more detailed product control sheets would be logged in with an expiration time, after which their approval is assumed. The sole responsibility of the Policy official charged with approval should be to check for policy consistency, not quality, which would be the sole responsibility of the combatant commander. For this approach to work the JPOTF needs direct

liaison authority with the Policy official responsible for product approvals. If the Pentagon is unable to generate national-level themes and messages or participate in a process that allows expeditious, interagency review of themes and messages on a recurring basis, then all product approval should be delegated to the combatant commander. The assumption is that absent such themes and process, Policy guidance would be stable and broad enough that the Policy oversight provided in the original review and approval of the combatant commander's plan would be sufficient. The same general process should apply for tactical products. Those products not pre-approved for dissemination by tactical commanders should be forwarded to the JPOTF with product control sheets, and again logged in with an expiration time, after which their approval is assumed by the local commander. However, the JPOTF would check for consistency with policy and planning as well as for minimum quality standards since the JPOTF will presumably have more resources available for that purpose than individual PSYOP company commanders.

*Doctrine reform.* Direct the CJCS to have the Office of Joint Civil-Military Operations include a more specific definition of PSYOP mission, as outlined in the *IO Roadmap*, in the revised joint PSYOP doctrine. All relevant instructions and directives should be consistent with the new doctrine. Specifically, we recommend enumerating the set of tasks that PSYOP performs, as opposed to those typically conducted by public diplomacy and public affairs. This will facilitate distinction between the mission areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and PSYOP to eliminate potential duplication of efforts and mission confusion. Additionally, the revised doctrine should include the permissibility and the desirability of PSYOP cooperation with public diplomacy and public affairs to include exchanging information on target audience analysis, raw media materials such as video clips, and facilities, among others. The doctrine should address PSYOP operations at both the theater and tactical level.<sup>178</sup>

*PSYOP vision and concept of operations.* The results of this research support the observation that PSYOP would benefit from a revised and more detailed vision and operating concept than those produced in 2002.<sup>179</sup> Reportedly, SOCOM is currently revising the Joint PSYOP Vision Document and Joint PSYOP Operational Concept. The revised concept should explain how near-term reforms will permit PSYOP to operate, and the revised vision should articulate a future concept toward which SOCOM will build in accordance with the Department's push towards transformation.<sup>180</sup> A detailed operating concept would clear up any confusion over the PSYOP mission and how it related to public diplomacy and public affairs and how it can most effectively support them. It would also clarify the relative importance of PSYOP at the theater and tactical levels and in support of major combat operations and stability operations, and the differing requirements for success at each level and in each type of operation. Additionally, as many observers noted in interviews and discussions, it would be easier for PSYOP to harness technology if its concept of operation and a future vision for how that concept will evolve were clearer and more detailed.<sup>181</sup>

A well-defined and more detailed PSYOP operating concept and vision of PSYOP transformation would also be consistent with current Pentagon guidance on transformation and capabilities-based planning. The Pentagon evolution toward such planning requires that the development of military capabilities be linked to joint operating concepts and supporting concepts (or joint integrating concepts, as they are currently designated). The Transformation Planning Guidance also requires the development of these joint operating concepts and

supporting concepts. Consistent with these trends and guidance, the *Information Operations Roadmap* gives STRATCOM responsibility for an integrated IO concept that supports broader joint operating concepts.

The operating concept for PSYOP should support the information operations concept developed by STRATCOM. It would help to inform PSYOP planning, doctrine, and acquisition. Consistent with the findings in this report and DOD guidance, SOCOM should ensure that the revised concept encompasses the following concepts.

- Focused on support to the combatant commander: Consistent with the information operations concept, the PSYOP concept should emphasize providing three functions for the warfighter: deterring, discouraging, dissuading, and directing an adversary; protecting and misdirecting the adversary's plans; and controlling adversarial communications and networks while protecting our own. Properly construed and integrated with other IO core capabilities, PSYOP can make a contribution to all three of these goals.
- Fully exploiting cooperation with public diplomacy and public affairs: Consistent with the information operations concept, the PSYOP concept should delimit PSYOP by mission, tasks, audience, and operating milieu. Properly conceived and delimited, PSYOP is not a threat to the credibility of these other U.S. Government information activities. When relegated to its proper task set, PSYOP should be able to use public diplomacy materials for dissemination and to share analysis and raw materials (like video and photos) with public diplomacy and public affairs.
- Fully exploiting cooperation with other IO core capabilities: As the Defense Science Board noted, people increasingly are getting their information from a diverse set of technologies that exploit the electromagnetic spectrum. PSYOP must increasingly use computer network operations and electronic warfare to access its target audiences. Moreover, PSYOP can be far more effective if these other IO core capabilities are used to help temporarily eliminate adversary sources of information that compete with PSYOP for audience share and credibility.
- Full spectrum: PSYOP should seek to accomplish the four primary objectives identified in this report as historic priorities. In doing so, PSYOP will be able to render effects on every relevant target audience: the enemy commanders, the enemy soldiers, and the populations that support irregular forces.
- Multi-mission-capable: To reach full-spectrum capability, PSYOP must identify both the PSYOP sub-missions that vary according to the difference between major combat operations and stability operations (and other relevant major joint concepts validated by the Pentagon), and the standards for success in each (the relative importance of such factors as timing, cultural sensitivity, linkage with coercion, volume, and so on).
- Cross-cultural: Each mission and sub-mission should be characterized in advance for modification required by major cultural differences. In fact, organizing around different cultures rather than strictly by region may be a more effective way to bolster cross-cultural communications expertise.



- Theater-tactical balance: Currently, there is some concern that PSYOP is overly focused on the need to reach general populations. However, a close examination of the four major PSYOP objectives indicates that they break down into a set of difficult tactical tasks. The exception would be the theater PSYOP mission of isolating the adversary from popular support that is generally executed in support to public diplomacy. This is an important, but not dominant, concern of PSYOP, and it cannot be executed successfully absent close cooperation with public diplomacy.
- Diversified delivery: While target audiences increasingly have access to sophisticated technology as their information sources, there still remain many target audiences that can best be reached by simpler forms of media, including small printed materials. PSYOP must be adept in relaying messages to radio nets, computer networks, and cellular phones, while maintaining the capability of delivering leaflets if that is the best means of reaching the target audience.
- Fully integrated: PSYOP theater- and tactical-level efforts must be fully integrated and work toward common campaign objectives that are consistent with national guidance and information themes. This requires an integrated planning capability and a robust communications architecture that allows reachback from tactical to theater and to CONUS-based PSYOP forces to achieve a shared awareness of evolving planning objectives and PSYOP themes and messages.
- Expeditionary: PSYOP must be fully deployable, able to rapidly advance to the theater and penetrate denied areas to reach critical target audiences. It must strike a balance between reaching back to fixed installations for product development and having the agility to move the products rapidly forward to theater and on through tactical dissemination channels. The PSYOP concept must also account for the fact that it will be necessary to move quickly to locations where it does not have an existing audience share. It must be able to quickly reach the audience, establish credibility (often with the assistance of coercion) and assess effects, and, where necessary, work with other military instruments to reduce sources of information competition.
- Rapid, responsive end-to-end planning and product cycles: The PSYOP concept must fully reflect the importance of the six steps laid out in doctrine, from intelligence support for target audience analysis through delivery of products and their assessment for rapid revision and re-dissemination. Weakness in any step of the process will reduce the overall ability of the PSYOP effort to produce desired effects. Among other things, this means that PSYOP must have an established set of intelligence requirements that map audience information habits around the world. More specifically, PSYOP must identify key decisionmakers of interest and their decisionmaking processes so that it can perform well against those targets in the event of a contingency. PSYOP also must have a planned means of systematically assessing the effects of its products in support of its four major missions—for example, by observing adversary behavior with overhead systems, diverse polling and surveys, monitoring Internet habits, or interrogating prisoners.
  - The entire planning and product development (and modification) cycle must be rapid in keeping with PSYOP's expeditionary nature and in response to the sudden

emergence of specific contingency requirements. It must be responsive because the enemy will certainly counter PSYOP efforts, and all the more so as they are perceived to be effective.<sup>182</sup>

- Copyright exemption: Exempt PSYOP products from copyright laws. This would expedite product development and provide a broader array of potential themes, images, logos, and icons for use in leaflets and handbills.
- PSYOP reform: Test the willingness of the PSYOP community to enact reforms in exchange for additional resources. SOCOM should be directed to quickly produce a detailed reform plan that is consistent with recommendations proposed in this study. It would lay out a specific action plan to improve the quality of PSYOP products with estimated costs (assuming a tripling of PSYOP resources on an annual basis) that prioritizes the following concepts:
  - Rank reform, integration with IO, and representation on commander staffs. PSYOP personnel should have a prominent place in IO command slots and planning staffs. However, PSYOP personnel generally prefer isolation from IO despite the fact that their discipline increasingly needs the other IO core capabilities. PSYOP needs leadership willing to embrace IO, oversee a general reform of PSYOP, and, on occasion, deploy to command a JPOTF to ensure PSYOP is well represented at the combatant commander staff level. Serious consideration should be given to creating a flag officer for PSYOP to support the commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, for these purposes. If PSYOP standards for officer training rise, consideration should be given to adjusting rank structure to better reflect that deeper subject matter expertise (similar to that of Civil Affairs).<sup>183</sup>
  - A tactical JPSE. A plan is needed to integrate the JPSE into the Media Operations Center at Fort Bragg with a mission of immediate (less than 24 hours), tailored product support to tactical PSYOP forces in the field. Currently, the Media Operations Center is undermanned and underequipped to rapidly address PSYOP product requests from the field. Integrating the JPSE and the Media Operations Center would facilitate better response times and leverage limited resources that are currently available only within each organization. This integrated organization should also be required to maintain institutional knowledge of lessons learned and products and their effects.<sup>184</sup>
  - Direct accession. The recruitment and retention process should be revised to draw and retain more functional experts with experience in the field of persuasive communications and product design, a process similar to the direct accession program for Special Forces. This would better align personnel skill sets with specific mission requirements, such as product and message development or graphic design, which would contribute considerably to the quality of PSYOP products.
  - Revised TTPs and training. Tactics, techniques, and procedures should be reworked to provide more user-friendly templates for field use. In addition, a revised training

- program for both active duty and reserve personnel should include greater familiarization with cross-cultural communication techniques, overall multimedia campaign planning, and practical exercises with the TTP templates that are easily deployable to the field. The plan must also include the possibility of expansion to take in personnel from the other services, since at least the Marines and perhaps the Air Force appear ready to develop organic PSYOP planning and tactical capabilities. This effort should contribute to improvements in the quality of products.
- Force structure redesign. Options need to be developed that would make PSYOP units more modular while providing more tactical capability.
  - SSD redesign. The Strategic Studies Detachment should be reconfigured to better support tactical target analysis (deployable to theater during actual combat or stability operations), with the assumption that national-level institutions would conduct strategic studies and share with the 4<sup>th</sup> POG.
  - Increased planning expertise. The number of PSYOP planners available for contingencies should be increased, and the training of other service planners in the context of the IO career force should be facilitated. This is especially important since both the Marine Corps and the Air Force have expressed plans to develop their own PSYOP units, and joint training would increase the number of available planners and improve interservice coordination significantly.
  - Revised guidance. Specific revisions to all SOCOM and Army PSYOP doctrine mission statements should reflect the changes incorporated in the revised Joint PSYOP Doctrine and the *IO Roadmap*. Revisions to the TTP should include field-friendly templates for tactical product development.
  - Contract linguist services. Means should be available to contract for world-class translation and linguistic services, both domestically and internationally. This may include training, recruiting, and contracting initiatives.
  - Online personnel data management. A program that would include and track sociological profiles and professional skill sets for all active and reserve PSYOP forces would enable commanders to identify suitable PSYOP personnel to complete required missions. The database should reside at either Fort Bragg or the Army's Human Resources Command to facilitate quick access.
  - Long-term budget planning for expanded capabilities. Budget estimates for meeting the specific recommendations in this report should be produced. In particular, a budget plan should be prepared for exploiting the PSYOP ACTD for product dissemination in denied areas, expansion of the WSADS program so that every tactical company has three at its disposal, and a communications architecture study with options to fix the theater-tactical communications problem. Reportedly, the second POBs set is in SOCOM's FY06 POM, which will help PSYOP meet requirements for more than one contingency.

- Temporary suppression of adversary communications: Direct a team of national laboratories, led by Lincoln Labs and supported by service laboratories, to initiate an urgent examination of the technical challenges involved in interdicting an adversary's national communications infrastructure.
- Expanding joint dissemination capabilities: Direct the military services to develop concepts and requirements for new platforms that evaluate the feasibility of including PSYOP broadcast and leaflet delivery requirements.

## Glossary

ACTD	Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
AFIS	Armed Forces Information Service
AFRTS	Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AOA	Analysis of Alternatives
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARCENT	Army Command Central
ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CFACC	Combined Forces Air Component Commander
CFLCC	Coalition Forces Land Component Commander
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CNO	Computer Network Operations
CONUS	Continental United States
DAPS	Deployable Audio Production Service
ENG	Electronic News Gathering (Kits)
EW	Electronic Warfare
HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IO	Information Operations
JFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
JPOTF	Joint PSYOP Task Force
JPSE	Joint PSYOP Support Element
MARCENT	Marine Corps Command Central
MILDEC	Military Deception
MILDEP	Military Department
MPC	Media Production Center
OEF	Operation <i>Enduring Freedom</i> (Afghanistan)
OIF	Operation <i>Iraqi Freedom</i> (combat phase)
OIF 2	Operation <i>Iraqi Freedom</i> (stability operations phase)

O&M	Operations and Maintenance
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
O&S	Operations and Support
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	Public Affairs
PD	Public Diplomacy
PDS	Product Distribution System
POBS	Psychological Operations Broadcast System
POG	Psychological Operations Group
POW	Prisoners of War
PSE	PSYOP Support Elements
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PWB	Psychological Warfare Branch
SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
SOMS–B	Special Operations Media System–B
STRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
TPD	Tactical PSYOP Detachment
TPT	Tactical PSYOP Team
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UN	United Nations
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WSADS	Wind Supported Aerial Delivery System

# Appendix A: Study Terms of Reference



POLICY

## PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2100

I-04/004113-P&R

APR 2 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
NETWORK AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION

SUBJECT: Assessment of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Lessons Learned in  
Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

At the 9 March 2004 Information Operations (IO) Steering Group we agreed to undertake an assessment of PSYOP lessons learned during OIF and compare them to IO Roadmap recommendations. To achieve a more comprehensive review, we have since expanded the scope to include lessons learned from OEF. Dr. Chris Lamb, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans, will lead this effort.

Terms of reference for the assessment are attached. Target date for completion is 15 June 2004. The results will then be presented to the IO Steering Group. To achieve this objective, Dr. Lamb and the assessment team need copies of PSYOP planning and operations orders and formal lessons learned prepared for OEF and OIF by 16 April. Access to primary information (e.g.; individual after-action reports) may be required.

Please designate O6 and Flag level representatives to support the assessment by 9 April 2004. My point of contact for this effort is Brian Fredericks at 703-697-3024.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ryan Henry".

Ryan Henry

Attachments: as stated

## **Terms of Reference for Review of PSYOP Lessons Learned**

### **Mandate**

- The memorandum conveying the minutes from the 9 March DASD-level Information Operations (IO) Steering Committee record a decision by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ryan Henry, to conduct a review of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and compare them with the IO Roadmap recommendations on PSYOP. Dr. Chris Lamb of the Institute for National Strategic Studies will lead the review along with key stakeholders. These Terms of Reference codify the objectives, methods and expected output from the effort.

### **Objective and Scope**

- The purpose of the review is to assess from all available sources the lessons learned from PSYOP operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and compare them to IO Roadmap recommendations on PSYOP, and make observations on whether those recommendations should in any way be modified.
- The review will consider all issues associated with the planning and execution of PSYOP in support of OEF and OIF and the planning and execution of PSYOP in support of follow-on operations. It will also address current technology and enhancements that may improve production and dissemination of messages.

### **Leadership**

- Dr. Lamb will conduct the review with the assistance of the IO Roadmap Implementation Office in PDUSD(P), headed by Mr. Brian Fredericks, and with the active participation of all major stakeholders, that include but are not limited to representatives from:
  - Services, USD(P), USD(AT&L), USD(I), USD(P&R), ASD(NII), ASD(PA), CJCS, and Commanders CENTCOM, STRATCOM, SOCOM and JFCOM.

### **Output**

- The results of the review will be presented to the IO Roadmap Steering Group meeting on June 15, or as close to that date as possible.



- In the event that the work generated by the review merits more systematic treatment, a brief report may be produced as well.

### **Process and Method**

- Dr. Lamb will chair meetings that will be announced on a periodic basis until the conclusion of the review.
- To maintain transparency, minutes will be kept of meetings and all lessons learned reports obtained for this effort will be posted on the PDUSD(P) website under IO Roadmap Implementation.
- The review will include but is not limited to the following steps:
  - Identify what effects PSYOP is expected to produce for the Joint Force Commander in general, and in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, based on authoritative sources.
  - Obtain, review and discuss all available lessons learned on PSYOP (including coalition activities).
  - Produce a summary of generally agreed upon lessons, points of disagreement, and issues that require further investigation.
  - Obtain any primary sources such as after-action reports that would help clarify points of disagreement or resolve uncertainties.
  - Produce a final statement and summary of lessons learned and discuss it, refining as necessary.
  - Compare the lessons learned to the IO Roadmap recommendations.
  - Discuss the use of technology in support of PSYOP. Discuss what worked, what had operational shortcomings and why. Finally, identify what technology has yet to be fully exploited.
  - Make observations about the sufficiency of the IO Roadmap recommendations in light of lessons learned from OEF and OIF, recognizing that these are not the only cases, but are two recent and significant examples.
  - Discuss and refine those observations.
  - Draft, refine and give a briefing that summarizes the results of the review.

- The draft briefing will be presented to stakeholders no later than 27 May, thus allowing 3 weeks before the briefing to the IO Steering Group for their review and comment.
- In the event that a report is produced, it also will be presented to stakeholders at least 3 weeks prior to the briefing to the IO Roadmap Steering Group for review and comment.

## Appendix B: PSYOP Equipment Inventory

### CONUS

#### *Media Production Center (MPC)*

Quantity: 1 unit

- Resides with the 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (POG) at Fort Bragg, NC
- Reachback capability for PSYOP forces in theaters throughout the world
- Upgrades: modernize video and audio studios to commercial newsroom quality; automate data archive system; modernize and standardize deployable production and electronic news gathering capability



#### Capabilities

- Audio and video production
- Commercial-quality graphic and print media
- Print and digital imaging studio
- Parallel structure capabilities allow simultaneous support for multiple missions and provide redundancy of capability to minimize mission delay or abort due to equipment failure
- Dual PSYOP Product Distribution System dedicated for POBS MPC allows for dual major theater of war support
- Consist of four functional sections with multiple subsections: video section (production and edit); audio section (fixed and deployable); digital imagery section (graphic and imaging); and archive support section
- Video section allows acquisition, manipulation, and transfer of video material, and storage/archiving of video, audio, and digital imagery
  - Supports National Television Standard Code, Permissive Action Link, and SECAM
  - Two video studios with control rooms
  - Four electronic news gathering (ENG) kits
  - Two fixed video editing suites

- Duplication and format conversion
- TV standards conversion
- Cataloging and archiving
- Two deployable video editing systems
- Audio section allows acquisition, manipulation, transfer, and duplication/format conversion of audio material
  - Primary audio standard is CD quality
  - Two audio studios with control rooms
  - Four deployable ENG kits
  - Two deployable audio nonlinear editing systems
- Digital imagery section allows acquisition, development, and printing of still imagery and development of still and animated graphics
  - Two multimedia graphics workstations
  - Four crystal controlled diode digital still camera kits
  - Two digital workstations for processing, manipulation, and printing of photographs
  - One workstation for developing digital 3-D animation products

***Theater Media Production Center (TMPC) Air-transportable Tractor-Trailer***

- Transportable, modular system capable of producing, editing, and distributing broadcast-quality audio, video graphics, and other multimedia products
- Can function as a theater hub for PSYOP media production with the embedded assets to distribute these media products to other POBS subsystems
- Video and audio subsystems are each contained in an air-transportable tractor-trailer with a 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle tractor as its means of conveyance
- Multimedia/graphics and maintenance subsystem are each contained in Packhorse trailers conveyed by HMMWVs
- Each system has its own generator and environmental control units so it can operate as stand-alone unit



## Capabilities

- Video: contains the production, editing, and duplication equipment necessary to produce and distribute broadcast-quality PSYOP video products. It also will be outfitted with ENG kits and electronic field production equipment to allow incorporation of local, in-theater footage to enhance the effect of the video products.
- Audio (radio and loudspeaker): contains the production, editing, and duplication equipment necessary to produce and distribute high-quality PSYOP audio products
- Multimedia/Graphics: contains the graphics workstations, photographic equipment, scanners, and printers needed to produce high-quality PSYOP multimedia products
- Test/Repair: contains the equipment necessary to conduct preventive maintenance and repairs on the equipment contained in the other TMPC subsystem

## ***Heavy Print Plant***

Quantity: 4 units

- A group of printers that can mass-produce print media such as magazines, leaflets, and newspapers for reachback support for forces in theater
- Four heavy print press machines reside in the print plant at the 4<sup>th</sup> POG
- Heavy print press machines that can be used for PSYOP products also are on Navy ships
- Three heavy print plants are located around the country, although they are not all exactly alike. The Reserve units still have wet presses.
  - 3<sup>rd</sup> PSYOP Battalion, Fort Bragg, NC (Active Army)
  - 17<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion, Joliet, IL (Reserve Component)
  - 306<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Company, 17<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Battalion, Los Alamitos, CA (Reserve Component)



## Capabilities

- The facility's darkroom, layout, and plate-making section supports four large Heidelberg presses.
- The binding section is equipped with a paper folder, collator, paper drill, stitches, and cutters used to produce booklets, brochures, and PSYOP studies.

- Each press can produce up to 8,333 single-color (or up to four-color, single- or double-sided) leaflets per hour.

## **THEATER**

### ***Modular Print System (MPS)***

Quantity: 7 units

- Deployable light printing facility designed to produce mid- to high-quality multicolor products
- Consists of 2 light medium tactical vehicles (2.5-ton equivalent) and 2 medium tactical vehicles (5-ton equivalent) with 3 dolly sets (7.5 ton)
- Requires 22 soldiers to operate
- Broken down into 3 components:
  - Module A prepares duplicating capability
  - Module B has two shelters designed to take two colors in the 20 X 14 Heidelberg GTO2P process
  - Module C is finishing shelter, providing paper cutting



#### Capabilities

- Can print high-quality pictures in two colors
- Can print up to 550,000 single-color leaflets in 24 hours

### ***Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC)***

Quantity: 5 units

- HMMWV-mounted transportable print system
- System includes dual 200MHz pentium processors, with 128MB of RAM, scanner, and 600 dpi color laser printer
- GMS-1497 communication shelter
  - Commercial off-the-shelf components
  - Mounted on an expanded capacity vehicle HMMWV



- Trailer System
  - One 20KW turbo generator
  - One 3-ton ECU
  - One DHS model 2 Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelter (DRASH) tent
  - Associated peripherals

#### Capabilities

- HP Color Laserjet 5M Printer
  - Laser-quality proofs (600/2,400 dpi)
- RISO GR-3750 Duplicator
  - High-speed production (93,000 single-color leaflets in 24 hours)
- Triumph 3915 Paper Cutter
  - Electric paper cutter (11"x 17" paper)
- AN/VRC90 F VHF Transceiver
  - SINCGAR tactical radio
- AGFA ARCUS II Scanner
  - 600x1200 dpi optical
- PSYOP Product Development Workstations
  - Dual pentium 200MHz processor
  - 19" rack mounted, 20" monitor
  - 128MB RAM, 512 KB cache
  - 32-bit fast/wide SCSI III control
  - Adaptec ultra-wide SCSI
  - Integrated 64-bit graphics accelerator
  - 300W power supply
  - CD ROM, sound card, uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
  - Windows NT V4.0 operating system
  - Keyboard/touchpad pointing device
  - Two removable Seagate 4.3GB SCSI III HDDs
  - Iomega Jaz 2GB/Iomega ZIP 250MB
  - Internal 56K data/fax/voice modem
- Includes a paper cutter



### ***Risograph***

- Digital duplicator that combines the basic output speed of a small press (120 copies per minute) with the simplicity and features of a copier

#### Capabilities

- Can produce up to 93,000 single-color leaflets in 24 hours
- Can be run by one operator

### ***EC-130 Commando Solo***

Quantity: 6 units

- Airborne electronic broadcasting system composed of 6 EC-130s operating under the 193<sup>d</sup> Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, Harrisburg, PA
- Three Commando Solo aircraft will be configured with enhanced special mission equipment (SME) cross-decked from EC-130E donor aircraft (AM, FM, SW, and TV broadcast capability)
- Three Modular Commando Solo EC-130J aircraft will be configured to carry roll-on/roll-off SME modules (AM, FM, and SW broadcast capability)
- Modular acquisition strategy allows for expansion into future PSYOP capabilities (such as UAVs) and emerging broadcast technologies



#### Capabilities

- Broadcasts radio and TV frequencies in all formats and color
- Broadcasts PSYOP messages on standard AM, FM, HF, HF TV and military communications bands
- Flies as command, control, and communication countermeasures
- Can broadcast programming over all of its systems simultaneously, allowing multiple programs over several frequencies to be sent to the target audience



### ***AN/MSQ-85B Mobile Audiovisual Information Collection and Dissemination System***

Quantity: 2 units

- Mobile video unit contains TV monitors/receivers, videocassette recorders, video camera/projector, 35mm camera, projector/film processor, AM/FM/SW receivers, and a loudspeaker
- Operated by TPD personnel from a tactical PSYOP company

Capabilities

- Receive radio and TV signals
- Recording, editing, and production capability
- Still photographic reproduction
- Still picture and video projection for face-to-face communication with sound

### ***Special Operations Media System Bravo (SOMS-B)***

Quantity: 6 units

- PSYOP system housed in HMMWVs consisting of two mobile radio broadcast systems (MRBS) and a mobile television broadcast system (MTBS)
- MTBS is capable of producing high-quality audio and products for PSYOP requirements and then transmitting those products on commercial television channels using PAL, SECAM, or NTSC station
- Each SOMS-B carries a mission trailer containing a 33kW commercial generator, an ECU, and a DRASH tent system
- MTBS and MRBS can be deployed separately



Capabilities

- Capable of producing high-quality audio products for PSYOP requirements and then disseminating those products on commercial AM, FM, and SW frequencies
- One FM transmitter
  - One kW, 88–108 MHz range
- One SW transmitter

- One kW, frequency agile, military system
- Operates in the 3–30 MHz range
- Production/Editing Equipment
  - Samplitude 2496 audio non-linear editor with CD writer
  - One audio mixer
  - One standard audio cassette deck
  - Three digital mini-disc decks
  - One digital audio tape (dual deck) player/ recorder
- Two wideband receivers
  - Capable of receiving AM, FM, SW, and TV audio
- MTBS
  - One VHF television transmitter
  - 1kW, frequency agile, commercial system
  - Operates on commercial television channels 2–13
  - Operates in PAL, SECAM, or NTSC formats
  - Production/editing equipment
  - One AVID Xpress Elite video non-linear editor
  - One audio mixer
  - One multi-standard VHS video tape deck
  - One standard Beta video tape deck
  - Three Beta SX decks
  - One DVCAM tape deck
  - TV demodulator capable of receiving TV, VHF, and VHF video/audio signals in NTSC, PAL, or SECAM formats
- Both MRBS and MTBS contain
  - HF transceiver (used for command and control)
  - 125W military system (Improved Special Operations Forces High Frequency Manpack Radio System)
  - Operates in the 2–30MHz range
  - VHF transceiver (used for command and control)
  - Operates in the 30–88 MHz range

## *Product Distribution System*

- Sends audio and video products in and out of the JPOTF
- Electronically transmits and receives PSYOP product files and related information



## Capabilities

- Transmits and receives real-time/non-real-time PSYOP products (broadcast-quality digital video, CD-quality digital audio, print-quality graphics) to/from a forward-deployed PSYOP task force for the purpose of editing, approval, and dissemination
- Two-man lift transit cases
- National Security Agency (NSA)–approved encryption
- MPEG–2 4:2:2 or 4:2:0 sampling
- Variety of I/O ports for interfacing to various I/O devices
- Digital interface with SOMS–B non-linear editor
- Single channel per carrier (SCPC) or multi-channel per carrier (MCPC)

## Operations

- Multicast high-bandwidth IP data
- SIPRNET/NIPRNET connectivity

## Satellite Earth Terminal Design

- DMCS Satellite Communications Earth Terminal
- 450W TWTA
- Laptop PC for control
- DMD–15 satellite modem
- Up to 9.3 Mbps
- BPSK, QPSK, OQPSK, and 8PSK Modulation Schemes
- Veritibi and Reed Solomon concatenated FEC
- DM–240/DD–240 DVB satellite modulator/demodulator
- DVB compliant waveforms
- High data rate operations

### Encryption Devices

- KIV-19 NSA-approved encryption device
- Up to 13 Mbps throughput

### Audio/Video Design

- Production digital video server (PC-based)
- 3.5" floppy and 24X CD-ROM drive
- Shock isolated transit case monitoring, 2-man lift digital mass storage
- 432 GB useable storage minimum
- 52+ hours of video storage
- 2.0 KVA power conditioner/UPS

### Mass Storage Display

- BETA SX VTR player/recorder
- Mini-disc player/recorder
- MPEG-2 encoder/decoder
- SCPC or MCPC operations

### Power Generation and Distribution

- Multiple 6KW stand-alone GENSETS
- Compatible with SOMS-B GENSETS trailer
- Compatible with 3-phase 208 VAC shore power
- Power distribution unit for power distribution/conditioning
- UPS for video server/RAID

### ***Digital Video Distribution System (DVDS)***

Quantity: 3 units

- Creates and distributes copies of broadcast video
- Housed in the Media Production Center at Fort Bragg

### Capabilities

- Can record and broadcast video through the use of a satellite link or Commando Solo
- Can be placed in a SOMS-B
- DVDS 1 is fully operational and located at the OIF/ISO JPOTF

### ***Joint In-Theater Injection (JITI) System***

Quantity: 6 units

- Global Broadcast System (GBS) in two pieces: a satellite and a trailer van containing power supply and connectivity
- GBS network is designed to send broadcast audio and video directly to the warfighters



Capabilities

- Capable of a total broadcast of 48 Mbps with near-real-time dissemination from multiple sources
- Consists of 2 subsystems: the Receive Transmit (RT) and the Receive Only (RO)
- Transportable by a single C-130
- Self-sustaining power via integrated commercial generator (also allows for numerous shore power standards)
- Fault-tolerant transmission systems integrated into mission shelters
- Ability to accept numerous external audio, video, and data sources
- System designed as open architecture platform based on commercial technologies
- The RO is a lightweight flyaway system designed to receive audio, video, and data to include combinations of clear and encrypted broadcasts. It is a mission-scalable system allowing for flexibility in special circumstances to accommodate video and audio-only missions.

### ***Improved Special Operations Communications Assemblage***

Quantity: 6 Units

- Global radio communication device

Capabilities

- Provides voice, cipher, and encryption

### ***Audio/Video Production Equipment***

Quantity: 3 units

- Audio and video relay

Capabilities

- Can transmit to the EC-130 Commando Solo or to the JPOTF from Fort Bragg

### ***Deployable Audio Production System (DAPS)***

Quantity: 4 units

- Audio production system that can be moved around in the theater

Capabilities

- Mini-disc recorder and player
- Sound editing equipment
- CD player

### ***Leaflet Delivery Systems***

- Provides accurate dissemination of large quantities of leaflets in denied areas from short- and long-range off-sites
- Currently there are 2 short-range variants:
  - Precision guided canister bomb (PGCB)
  - Wind supported aerial delivery system (WSADS)

### ***M129E1 Leaflet Precision Guided Canister Bomb***

- Munitions-based delivery system with standoff distance of up to 40 nautical miles

Capabilities

- Can be deployed from a fixed wing aircraft and is used to disseminate PSYOP products
- Can hold up to 30,000 machine- and hand-rolled leaflets
- 3 to 4 soldiers needed to assist in loading leaflets

- Can be mounted on F-16, B-52, and FA-18

### ***Wind Supported Aerial Delivery System (WSADS)***

- Powered parafoil UAV platform integrated with an airborne guidance unit and a payload dispensing system that can drop leaflets or other materials

### **Capabilities**


- Capable of both ground launch and air launch
- Autonomous landings in a wide variety of unprepared terrains
- 600 pounds total fuel and cargo
- Maximum airspeed of 50 km/hr
- Can fly more than 19 hours carrying 75–100 pound of cargo
- Autonomous payload deployment directly from cargo bay



## **TACTICAL SYSTEMS**

### ***Family of Loudspeakers (FOL)***

- Group of modular amplifiers/speakers forming loudspeakers
- Provides spot and large-area broadcast capability
- Enables communications with large audiences or harassment and deception of enemies or target areas, either close in or at significant distances from operator
- Portable, self-contained, high-performance loudspeaker systems capable of disseminating high-fidelity live and recorded messages from the mobile PSE in varied geographical areas and climatic conditions worldwide
- Capable of broadcasting live or prerecorded messages from a cassette player, MP3 player, mini-disc, internal digital voice recorder, or wireless microphone providing flexibility to the end user
- Ruggedized to withstand adverse environmental conditions
- Meets MIL-STD 461 EMI requirements



## Capabilities

- Broadcast range of up to 2–3 miles
- Provides capability to transmit audio (up to 144dB)
- Operation temperature  $-13^{\circ}\text{F}$  to  $+131^{\circ}\text{F}$
- Altitude function up to 15,000 ft
- Relative humidity up to 100%
- Amplifier distortion less than 0.5%

## *Manpack (TPT-TPD)*

- 2 battery-operated loudspeakers weighing 27 pounds that can easily be carried in soldier's modified rucksack

## Capabilities

- Designed to make PSYOP messages mobile with PSYOP forces
- Broadcast range of 700–1,000M
- Power output of 132dB@1m
- Power source 3 BS 5590 or BA 590 batteries
- Battery endurance of 8+ hours
- Frequency response of 580 to 6000Hz
- Ground reliability of 4,900 hours mean time between failure (MTBF)



## *Vehicle (Tactical PSYOP Team [TPT]/Tactical PSYOP Detachment [TPD])*

- FOL attached to M-1025 or M-1114 HMMWV; maritime version is mounted on the Special Operations Mark V patrol craft, perfect for detaining or instructing suspicious watercraft
- Shock mounted speakers
- Six-speaker configuration for ground and water vehicles





- Each system can be rotated 360° to reach target audience

#### Capabilities

- Mobile PSYOP messages
- Broadcast range of 1,000–1,800M
- Weighs 146 pounds
- Power output of 137dB@1m
- Power source of 24 to 32 VDC
- Frequency response from 400 to 6,000 Hz
- Ground frequency response of 2,200 hours MTBF
- Naval frequency response of 1,500 hours MTBF

#### *Aerial Loudspeaker System*

##### Description

- FOL mounted on Blackhawk helicopter
- One of the highest-powered FOLs



##### Capabilities

- Weighs 290 pounds
- Power output of 144dB @1m
- Power source of 24 to 32 VDC
- Frequency response between 580–6,000Hz
- Rotary frequency response 1,000 hours MTBF

#### *Electronic News Gathering Kit*

- 1X Beta SX, SP, HI8, or DV camcorder
- Associated equipment
- 1 night vision lens
- 1 light kit



##### Capabilities

- Collect digital video footage in all conditions for incorporation into PSYOP spots or news features

### Appendix C: PSYOP On-Hand Inventory

Item Name	Number Authorized	Funded Through 2005	Quantity to Date	Unit Cost (\$K)	Fielded Inventory Cost (\$K)	SOCOM Cost (MFP-11)	Non-SOCOM Cost (MFP-4)
EC-130J	3	3	3	\$132,000	\$396,000	\$0	\$396,000
EC-130J Modular (no TV)	3	3	2	\$117,000	\$234,000	\$60,000	\$174,000
EC-130E	2	2	2	\$74,000	\$148,000	\$0	\$148,000
EC-130J Modular SME	2	2	0	\$30,000	\$0	\$0	\$0
Media Production Center	1	1	0	\$11,376	\$0	\$0	\$0
Theater Media Production Center	2	1	0	\$8,918	\$0	\$0	\$0
Flyaway Broadcast Systems	12	4	0	\$3,572	\$0	\$0	\$0
Special Operations Media System B (SOMS-B)	12	6	6	\$6,090	\$36,540	\$36,540	\$0
SOMS-B High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)	48	24	24	\$35	\$840	\$0	\$840
Production Distribution System (PDS) R/T	18	10	5	\$1,385	\$6,925	\$6,925	\$0
PDS R/O	38	17	0	\$1,002	\$0	\$0	\$0
Long Range Broadcast System							
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Payload	21	7	0	\$6,000	\$0	\$0	\$0

Deployable Print Production System (DPPC)	20	5	5	\$675	\$3,375	\$3,375	\$0
DPPC HMMWV	20	5	5	\$35	\$175	\$0	\$175
Wind Supported Aerial Delivery System	74	40	2	\$350	\$700	\$700	\$0
Family of Loudspeakers (FOL)*	0				\$0	\$0	\$0
Manpacks	424	424	424	\$11	\$4,664	\$4,664	\$0
Vehicle/watercraft	352	352	352	\$26	\$9,152	\$9,152	\$0
Vehicle FOL HMMWV	352	352	90	\$180	\$16,200	\$0	\$16,200
Aircraft	22	22	9	\$138	\$1,242	\$1,242	\$0
TOTAL					\$857,813	\$122,598	\$735,215

\*Helicopters used for FOL operations frequently are used for other operations and are not counted as PSYOP inventory. In cases where the PSYOP equipment carrier is not used for other purposes (C-130, SOMS-B, DPPC, FOL HMMWV), the carrier cost is included as part of the PSYOP inventory.

## **Appendix D: Hardware Performance in Recent Operations and Recapitalization Plan**

This appendix reviews the performance of PSYOP equipment (including some items that were not designed for extensive use and harsh weather conditions) during OEF, OIF, and OIF2. It also provides information on SOCOM's current plans to recapitalize equipment based on the figures and data collected from OIF and OEF and makes some summary observations.

### **Specific Equipment Performance**

SOCOM reports that the equipment performed well considering that it was subjected to harsh environments of heat, dust, sand, shock, and vibration. Some items were operated more hours than had been planned for, resulting in deterioration beyond reparability.

*Commando Solo Aircraft.* Commando Solo supported both operations with numerous sorties. The aircraft logged 3,974 flight hours in OEF and 1,278 in OIF. No missions were lost due to maintenance, reflecting good reliability. Maintenance hours were about 9.5 per flight hour, which is normal.

The EC-130E airframe that flew during OEF and OIF is almost 30 years old and requires extensive maintenance. The Commando Solo special mission equipment that flew during both operations represented 1970s technology. The excellent reliability rates experienced during both operations were due to very senior and talented O&M Air National Guard personnel.

EC-130E altitude limitations forced Commando Solo to fly within the threat environments of antiaircraft and man-portable infrared surface-to-air missiles. Its simultaneous (multifrequency) radio broadcast capability provided broad-spectrum coverage that increased its effectiveness. However, its omnidirectional antennas precluded targeting of broadcasts into specific enemy areas. During broadcast, the antennas saturate the aircraft's front-end electronics, resulting in limited situational awareness information that increased risks to aircraft survivability.

*PSYOP Broadcasting Systems.* SOCOM reports that SOMS-B and PDS operated around the clock for more than 2 years in harsh environments, resulting in increased maintenance. Civilian maintenance technician work hours increased from 40 to 112 per week, and an average of 3 full-time civilian maintenance technicians (a maximum of 6) were deployed to the war zone. Iridium satellite phones provided a 24-hour-a-day communication link between maintenance technicians in the United States and overseas. Considering the operational environment, the equipment failure numbers are acceptable.

SOMS–B failures characterization:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>
2002	183
2003	247
2004	61

Mean time between failures (MTBF): 20 days  
Mean time to repair (MTTR): 2 hours

Two of five SOMS–B systems deployed in OEF were declared beyond economic repair upon their return to CONUS.

Product Distribution System (PDS) failures characterization:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>
2002	28
2003	70
2004	32

MTBF: PDS (1,2,3)—14 days  
PDS (4,5)—35 days  
MTTR: PDS (1,2,3)—4 hours  
PDS (4,5)—3 hours

Systems 4 and 5 incorporated base band enhancements based on lessons learned.

Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC) failures characterization:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>
FY02	47
FY03	30
FY04	6 (to date)

MTBF: 11 days  
MTTR: 6 hours

*Family of Loudspeakers.* All FOL variants experienced heavy use in support of operations. Reports indicate that more desirable characteristics for FOL would be:

- smaller size and lighter weight manpack loudspeakers
- multidirectional broadcast capability
- extended range and increased power output for increased standoff distance
- more durable loudspeaker systems to withstand military operations in urban terrain and desert environments.

*Ancillary Equipment.* Printers, laptops, and all other COTS electronic equipment had a common performance characteristic: they all suffered from the heat and the dusty, sandy environment. Some equipment, such as the Product Work Station (light) Lunchbox System, was also exposed to vibration because of installation in HMMWVs and broke down within 2 weeks of deployment. Failures due to such environmental factors can be fatal, resulting in the need for replacement rather than repair.

## Recapitalization Plans Based on OEF and OIF Data

*Broadcast Systems.* Two Psychological Operations Broadcast Systems (POBS), six SOMS–B and PDSs, and one DPPC are currently fielded. SOMS–B has a life expectancy of 10 years. The first set of SOMS–B systems will reach life expectancy in FY07. A capital equipment replacement plan (CERP) has been developed and will be addressed in the FY08 POM. The plan would procure two replacement SOMS–B systems in FY09 and two in FY10. Four SOMS–B were refurbished in FY04. Two systems were considered beyond economic repair after their return from OEF and will be replaced in FY05. Consequently, their replacements will not need to be recapitalized until FY15.

*Distribution Systems.* Five PDSs are currently fielded. They will receive a complete overhaul and upgrade in FY05; hence, they will not require replacement until the FY09 timeframe. A recapitalization plan has been developed that assumes commencement in FY09.

*Print Systems.* Five DPPC systems are fielded; their life expectancy is 10 years. DPPC has recently undergone a complete refurbishment and upgrade. This system will not require replacements until the FY14 timeframe. A CERP plan will be addressed in the FY10 POM.

*Commando Solo.* There are no current plans to recapitalize Commando Solo, since the EC–130J is considered a bridge mission until the full capabilities of the long-range broadcast mission are realized.

*Family of Loudspeakers.* PSYOP strategy is to replace existing FOLs, which are late 1980s technology, with new technology when approved and funded in future POM cycles.

*Leaflet Delivery System.* The wind-supported aerial delivery system has a predicted use expectancy of 7 years. The first system was scheduled to be fielded in October 2004. Recapitalization has not yet been considered. The traditional leaflet bomb, MK–129, is no longer suitable for operational use due to its age, lack of compatibility with current aircraft, and potential collateral damage to populations. The PDU–5B was heavily used at the onset of operations in OEF/OIF.

## Summary

The reported performance indicates that the equipment was used intensively and in an environment that exceeded the design specifications. This raises the question of whether

reliance on COTS equipment is appropriate in all cases of PSYOP equipment acquisition. It is a quick solution and an effective way to keep introducing new technology at the rate delivered by industry. It would be interesting to compare the total life cycle cost of a series of COTS systems to meet a mission to the cost of a smaller number of “ruggedized” and more serviceable equipment. The cost of configuration management required for logistics and for ensuring interoperability would have to be balanced against the benefit of new technology introduction. As noted in the body of the report, however, there is a severe lack of funds for such acquisition studies for PSYOP equipment.

**Appendix E:  
PSYOP Basis of Issue Plan and Unit Procurement Costs Rollup**

System name	Authorized	Funded through PB 05	Quantity to Date	Unit Cost (\$K)
EC-130J Commando Solo	3	3	3	132,000
EC-130J Modular Commando Solo (No TV)	3	3	2	117,000
EC-130J Modular Commando Solo SME	2	2	0	30,000
Media Operations Center	1	1	0	11,376.40
Theater Media Operations Center	2	1	0	8,910
Flyaway Broadcast Systems	12	4	0	3,571.69
Special Operational Media System Bravo	12	6	6	6,090
Print Distribution System R/T	18	10	5	1,325
Print Distribution System R/O	38	17	0	1,002
Long Range Broadcast System UAV-Payload	21	7	0	6,000
Deployable Print Production System	20	5	5	675
Wind Supported Aerial Delivery System	74	40	2	350
Family of Loudspeakers				
Manpacks	424	424	424	11.382
Vehicle/ Watercraft	352	352	352	26.257
Aircraft	22	22	9	137.815

*Shaded areas indicate funding shortfalls*



## **Appendix F: Review of the Defense Science Board Report, the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, and *Information Operations Roadmap* Recommendations**

The terms of reference for this report (see appendix A) required a review of opportunities to exploit advanced technology for PSYOP. Accordingly, special consideration was given to the Defense Science Board (DSB) and the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) reports, both of which took a detailed look at means to absorb new technology into the PSYOP program. This appendix provides a brief summary of the DSB report and current ACTD activities and compares current SOCOM PSYOP technology development efforts with recommendations from the *IO Roadmap*.

### **The DSB Report**

In May 2000, the Defense Science Board issued a report prepared by its task force entitled “The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict.” We reviewed the report in the context of lessons learned from OEF and OIF. While the scope of the DSB report is broader than the focus of this report, we believe the DSB findings related to technology are still valid. In fact, recent evidence from events during OEF and OIF help validate the findings of the task force and give added force to its recommendations. The reader is referred to the original report for details; only the more significant points are highlighted in this appendix.

The task force was originally created to review the alleged limitations of the Commando Solo aircraft in disseminating TV and radio broadcasts in the Balkans. The scope of the study was expanded to cover all radio and TV uses as an information instrument and the adequacy of U.S. Armed Forces to make use of such a tool during conflicts.

### **The Present**

#### **State of Technology Adoption in U.S. PSYOP**

The DSB task force reported that it had received many briefings that emphasized the increasing importance of PSYOP in the success of any action the U.S. Government undertakes overseas, whether diplomatic or military. The task force also pointed out that, unlike our strong lead in military equipment, foreign competitors in PSYOP are on par with or arguably more sophisticated than the United States. While the United States has, and maintains, a lead in world commercial media technology and development, foreign rivals are often more flexible and less restricted by outdated equipment and policy.<sup>185</sup>

## Technological Environment for Peacekeeping PSYOP Operations

The report explains that during peacekeeping operations, PSYOP forces would often have to compete against sophisticated, robust, indigenous media and with numerous hostile or neutral international media. It states that in this environment, military PSYOP would not have the ability to control the adversary's information outlets through destruction or jamming.<sup>186</sup>

### Technology in Theater PSYOP

The panel found that “U.S. PSYOP forces cannot readily disseminate materials over the Internet or via commercial broadcast satellites.” Competitors are better funded and freer of restrictive policies. Personnel are generally unsophisticated in this area, not trained in civilian marketing, polling, and media production skills.<sup>187</sup>

The report called Commando Solo's ability to broadcast from only 18,000 feet and its use of SME with decades-old technology vulnerable to jamming inadequate. It also concluded that reliance on extensive reachback (supporting forward troops by dissemination of products developed in Fort Bragg) requires an enormous bandwidth through secure channels, which has often been very difficult to institute and support.<sup>188</sup>

### Technology in Tactical PSYOP

The panel identified loudspeaker operations, handbills, local radio broadcasts, and television programming as typical tactical PSYOP operations. It further pointed out that the tactical segments of the PSYOP force are the most heavily tasked, and yet their tools could be overwhelmed by the power of electronic media that is now proliferating. The task force also expressed concern about the survivability of tactical PSYOP groups in a modern battlefield when deployed in a lightly armored HMMWV equipped with loudspeakers capable of only short range. The panel recommended remote accomplishment of the mission via a heavily armored manned vehicle or unmanned vehicles—capabilities we do not currently have.<sup>189</sup>

## **The Future**

### Vision for Technology for Operational PSYOP

The panel envisioned a future PSYOP force using a variety of manned and unmanned vehicles, some based in space, some commercial, and some owned by DOD or other agencies. Tactical units will be able to use these capabilities as well as perform newsgathering duties for transmission to Fort Bragg for further processing. The panel concluded that the rather small Army PSYOP forces have a “Cold War-oriented structure, often antiquated equipment, and limited financial support [and] yet, PSYOP is inundated with requests for support from the geographic combatant commanders to get information to foreign target audiences—audiences that are being served by an ever expanding array of information dissemination options.”<sup>190</sup> It further stated that “Until a ‘road map’ for the future of PSYOP is drafted and implemented, it is difficult to see how PSYOP can remain relevant and develop the capabilities to best serve

the geographic combatant commanders. As the first step to remedy the deficiencies within military PSYOP, the DSB recommended that the Department of Defense draft a military PSYOP Vision as well as an accompanying future PSYOP Operational Concept.”<sup>191</sup> SOCOM has done so, as indicated in the body of this report.

### Measures of Effectiveness for PSYOP Technology

The panel recommended using the following measures of effectiveness.<sup>192</sup>

- **Receivability:** How well did the physical message propagate to the intended area? Could it be jammed?
- **Receipt:** How often did members of the target audience tune in to the message? Did they have the right receivers? Could they read? Did they read and speak the language, dialect, and argot in which the message was framed?
- **Receptivity:** How favorably did the target audience respond to the message? Did they change their behavior in a favorable direction? Did it matter?

### The Specifics

The task force reviewed technological trends for mass media dissemination and then specifically addressed the dissemination of radio and TV from aircraft. The task force believes technology is moving toward systems and means of dissemination unfavorable to current PSYOP equipment:

- Cable transmission is quickly becoming the preferred mode for (terrestrial) TV in most developing countries. Further, high-definition TV seems to be the next improvement for the medium. Transmission is now available in both analog and digital protocols, but the task force believes that transition to digital format is inevitable. Both cable and digital transmission are incompatible with current Commando Solo equipment.
- Radio is quickly converting to digital transmission mode, making it incompatible with Commando Solo as well.
- Space-based TV and radio are becoming popular in the developing world, and their transmission method is creating problems for PSYOP equipment. It is mostly digital, quite directional (which would require very special positioning of Commando Solo or other equipment), and uses frequencies not used by existing PSYOP equipment.
- Telephony is also expanding rapidly and becoming very adept at incorporating multimedia capabilities in its cellular structure. This may be an area that can be exploited with new equipment.

- The Internet is a major new information transition method, and the task force makes a point of the need to exploit it with new systems and approaches.

To summarize the breadth of possibilities, the report includes a table of various distribution methods made available by the new technologies and the possible associated content:<sup>193</sup>

Channel / Content	Broad cast?	Video	Audio	Text / Photo	Short Message	Interactive Voice	Interactive Web	Video Game
<b>Radio</b>								
AM / FM	Y		Y					
Shortwave	Y		Y					
Digital	Y		Y		Y			
Satellite	Y		Y					
<b>Television</b>								
VHF / UHF	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Cable	a	Y	Y	Y	Y			
HDTV	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			
Satellite	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			
<b>Internet</b>								
Classic Web	b			Y	Y		Y	Y
Streaming Media	b	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y
Email	c	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y
Chat / Messaging	d				Y		Y	
<b>Telephony</b>								
PSTN			Y			Y		
Cellular	e		Y		Y	Y		
Satellite	e		Y		Y	Y		
Fax	e			Y	Y			
Paging	f				Y			
<b>Physical Media</b>								
Leaflet				Y	Y			
Cassette			Y					
CD			Y					
CD-ROM		Y	Y	Y				Y

Table 4.4 Content types and distribution channels

Notes:

- Cable is typically transmitted through coaxial cables. This would make it hard to insert content without permission from the cable's operator. Some parts of cable distribution systems are microwaves, however. In addition, some distribution to users is via RF (for example, MMDS and LMDS in the United States).
- Although these media appear to be broadcast, in fact they are implemented by a number of individual sessions much like individual phone calls. These individual sessions are generally traceable by the operators of the local Internet service; hence, privacy cannot be guaranteed. In addition, entire web site addresses can be blocked rather easily by a local Internet service.
- These media can be broadcast by the repeated sending of the messages to individual destinations. Since this is automated, it takes little trouble, but it does take a certain amount of transmission capacity to send so many duplicated messages. In addition, these transmissions can easily be monitored and/or blocked by the local Internet and telephone service providers.
- As with the classic web, these features are easily monitored and/or blocked, assuming that the local Internet service provider can determine the addresses of the chat / messaging sites.
- Basic cellular and satellite telephone service is one-to-one rather than broadcast. However there might be certain features of some cellular technology that would allow insertion of broadcast messages (audio or text).
- Basic paging service is one-to-one rather than broadcast. However many pager technologies include groups (for example, for stock market or news updates). These could probably be used for short message delivery.

The report also briefly addressed the underlying physics of transmission of radio and TV signals from aircraft. It points out that the distance a signal can reach is controlled by the height of the antenna, the effective power (power and antenna gain), the frequency, and the receiver's own noise characteristics. The discussion focuses on the fact that the range is proportional to the square root of antenna height—and therefore a 100 percent increment in height implies only a 40 percent increase in range. Given the power available in Commando Solo and the increase in altitude possible by upgrading from the C-130E to the C-130J

aircraft, the task force recommended against the expenditure of funds for this transition. (Nonetheless, Congress funded it, and the C-130J is now in the inventory.)

## **Recommendations**

Finally, three of the task force's recommendations deal specifically with technologies. They are reproduced verbatim as follows:

### **A. Recommendation 6**

The Task Force recommends that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) work with the Department of State to fund, position, exercise, and maintain suitable distribution channels and brand identities, insofar as these can be reasonably anticipated for future PSYOP requirements. Policies with respect to the use of new and emerging transnational media need to be developed or refined. Liberal reliance on recognized professionals and the generous use of highly qualified commercial entities are highly recommended. Buying good content on which the messages will "ride" is a necessary and desirable expenditure. The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately \$10 million per year.<sup>194</sup>

### **B. Recommendation 7**

The Task Force recommends that DOD acquire the technical capability to understand emerging media dissemination techniques and technologies. Furthermore, DOD should provide the resources to acquire (rent or purchase) emerging media content and dissemination channels from commercial organizations. Here, DOD may be able to acquire good channels very cheaply by means of being an "anchor tenant." The Task Force estimates this investment to be approximately \$10 million per year.<sup>195</sup>

### **C. Recommendation 8**

The Task Force recommends that DOD maintain the current EC-130E Commando Solo fleet with existing Special Mission Equipment (SME). The estimated cost of \$250 million to cross-deck the SME to a EC-130J platform is not justified by the marginal increase in performance offered by this option. In addition, future worldwide media dissemination trends will limit the effectiveness of radio and TV broadcasts. The Task Force recommends that USSOCOM investigate the creation of small and easily reconfigurable information-dissemination packages that would be compatible with multiple platforms, including UAVs and leased aircraft, for a variety of missions. The Task Force estimates the initial investment for design and development of these packages to be \$10 to \$20 million per year.<sup>196</sup>

## **Summary of the DSB Report**

The task force identified several dissemination technologies and trends in their growth. To a large degree, current PSYOP capability is not well positioned to exploit these trends. The task

force recommended against expenditures for Commando Solo upgrades and instead proposed expenditure on small, modular information disseminations packages. It also made recommendations regarding the access and exploitation of commercial channels, using strong U.S. marketing skills.

## The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration: PSYOP Global Reach

This section of the appendix reproduces the rationale for the ACTD and summarizes its essential characteristics. The premise of the ACTD is that joint PSYOP forces lack sufficient capabilities to access audiences in denied areas. Current capabilities consist of leaflets and handbills (legacy technology, high risk in denied areas), AM and FM radio (extremely limited range), and Commando Solo (slow response, resource-intensive, limited range, vulnerable). Additionally, joint PSYOP forces lack critical analytical tools to plan, develop, coordinate, execute, and evaluate (by specific measures of effectiveness) PSYOP missions across the entire spectrum of conflict.

Started in FY04, the ACTD is to identify, assess, and field a limited number of equipment demonstrating technological solutions for warfighter needs. It will improve joint PSYOP capabilities to disseminate information across extended ranges into denied areas and improve planning and analytic capability.<sup>197</sup>

Measures of success for long-range dissemination include:<sup>198</sup>

- distance
- ability to penetrate denied areas
- ability to operate/disseminate continuously in denied areas
- dispersion area of a message in urban and rural areas.

Measures for planning and assessment tools are:<sup>199</sup>

- rapid identification of the proper target audience and cultural message
- measurement of message dispersion via various media
- measurement of message reception by the target audience
- measurement of the effectiveness and speed of planning approval, production, and dissemination
- ability to leverage other sectors of knowledge and expertise (Hollywood, Madison Avenue, academia, industry).

Several future technologies have been mentioned as potential candidates, such as holographic image projection, laser light messages, automated PSYOP decisionmaking tools and software, advanced sound projection, and language translation and replication. While these future technologies will be monitored, the ACTD will assess and evolve nearer-term technologies, characterized by a technology readiness level of 5.<sup>200</sup> These include:

- satellite broadcast and receivers
- direct TV
- text messaging to cellular phones
- Internet broadcast
- advanced delivery methods (Helios solar wing aircraft and high-altitude aircraft system)
- air-deliverable scatterable media (pre-programmed loudspeakers and re-transmitters)
- PSYOP planning software.

Technologies being reviewed by the ACTD will replace aging technology and will be incorporated into existing SOCOM acquisition programs. Residuals of the various demonstrations will be supported by regular SOCOM contracts.

### **Funding and Schedule**

Funding for these technologies under the ACTD will focus on long-range dissemination of PSYOP in denied areas and planning and assessment collaborative planning tools. The concept of operations of the technologies to achieve these will include employment from CONUS as well as in-theater. Development of refined joint tactics and procedures will be an integral part of the ACTD.

A phased spiral development approach will be used to demonstrate the technologies and, through the residuals of the ACTD, improve warfighter capabilities. Several exercises have been identified as possible testing events.

Phase 1 (second quarter FY06) will be a combination of off-the-shelf commercial packages that are tailored to the job at hand. It will focus on getting the message to target audiences in permissive and nonpermissive environment through demonstration of a network of UAVs or airships and other platforms with PSYOP broadcast/repeater payloads and current system (Commando Solo, SOMS-B, Theater Media Production Center, satellite systems) to provide full-spectrum PSYOP capability (digital, audio, visual, and printed).<sup>201</sup>

Phase 2 (first quarter FY07) will explore available and adaptable technologies to enhance PSYOP capabilities to provide data mining to analyze target audience; tailor and choose mission-enabling PSYOP themes and messages; review results; provide information management tools; and enhance PSYOP capabilities and decisionmaking.<sup>202</sup>

Phase 3 (third quarter FY09) will integrate and demonstrate a smoothly functioning system of PSYOP systems/technologies through all phases of PSYOP from analysis of audience to development of message, distribution, and dissemination and analysis of results.<sup>203</sup>

Schedule/Spend Plan<sup>204</sup>

<b>SOURCE</b>	<b>FY04</b>	<b>FY05</b>	<b>FY06</b>	<b>FY07</b>	<b>FY08</b>	<b>FY09</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>SOCOM</b>	<b>3.0M</b>	<b>3.0M</b>	<b>6.0M</b>	<b>6.0M</b>	<b>6.0M</b>	<b>5.0M</b>	<b>29.0M</b>
<b>SOCOM *In-Kind</b>	<b>8.2M</b>	<b>17.2M</b>	<b>11.5M</b>	<b>4.9M</b>	<b>3.6M</b>	<b>3.1M</b>	<b>48.5M</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11.2M</b>	<b>20.2M</b>	<b>17.5M</b>	<b>10.9M</b>	<b>9.6M</b>	<b>8.1M</b>	<b>77.5M</b>
<b>ACTD/OSD</b>	<b>2.9M</b>	<b>6.65M</b>	<b>3.95M</b>	<b>2.0M</b>			<b>15.5M (20%)</b>

\* Represents funding associated with technology prototypes and hardware/software from SOCOM acquisition programs that will be used in ACTD demonstrations and assessments

**Risk Assessment**

Highlights of the ACTD’s risk assessment follow:

- “Funding risk is low to medium. USSOCOM funding (\$29M) is based on a program decision memorandum (PDM) specifically detailed for a PSYOP ACTD.”<sup>205</sup>
- Funding from OSD must support the schedule as well. “Should these funds not be forthcoming, the demonstrations of the ACTD will be forced into a lengthy schedule to comply with the funding profile dictated by the PDM as well as the decreasing the residuals and technologies to be demonstrated.”<sup>206</sup>
- “Risk associated with availability of unmanned platforms for use in the ACTD is low to medium for various tactical UAVs, medium to high for other UAVs, HAA, and other platforms such as the Helios solar wing.”<sup>207</sup>
- “Schedule risk is low to medium, depending on availability of unmanned platforms to demonstrate PSYOP payloads and networking concepts, and on the OSD funding as mentioned above.”<sup>208</sup>

**Residuals**

A key part of any ACTD is that it develops for use, demonstrates, and leaves behind a number of operational units of equipment. This provides some usable capability immediately and gives the operating forces some items to experiment with, thus providing a robust avenue for feedback. It also provides for the beginning of a transition from R&D to acquisition in support of the validated requirement on the basis of which the ACTD was established.



For this ACTD, residuals include:<sup>209</sup>

Satellite broadcast/radios	500 units	FY04
Satellite service (radio)	60 days	FY05
Satellite service (TV)	60 days	FY04
UAV payload (FM/TV/AM)	2 units	FY05
UAV rebroadcast (satellite)	2 units	FY05
Scatterable media (transmitters)	500 units	FY06
(loudspeakers)	500 units	FY06
PSYOP Planning Software	1 unit	FY06

(Includes Internet/text messaging integration)

### **Notable Opportunities and Programmed Improvements**

The constant flow of commercial off-the-shelf and non-developmental items technology is improving current capability of PSYOP forces. Beyond this welcome, modest, and routine upgrade, some programs are more noteworthy in that they provide a more significant increase in capability. Given the problems identified as particularly onerous shortfalls in this study, we believe that the following developments provide the more significant advances in capability:

- **Product Distribution System:** Video transmission among systems is very resource-intensive at 6-8 megs/second. Accordingly, the JPOTF and higher command often reserve the use of bandwidth (and MILSAT) for uses other than PSYOP. The PDS, using improved video compression techniques recently developed, will be able to transmit information between systems in theater and systems in CONUS (using significantly less bandwidth) instead of relying on MILSAT exclusively, and thus enhance communications and product distribution.
- **The Leaflet Delivery System:** Using a wind supported aerial delivery system (a parafoil and guided UAV combination) will provide the ability to deliver payloads to multiple areas flying as high as 18,000 feet, for distances up to 800 miles, at speeds up to 35 miles per hour (trades between these parameters will be made depending on the mission).
- **Commando Solo:** Transition to the C130-J aircraft (by Congressional support) provides the option to upgrade and modularize the existing payload. Of more significance, the new aircraft, given additional funding, can be able to control a UAV that can then penetrate disputed area without endangering personnel.

- Family of Loudspeakers: While technologically more mundane, reduced weight speakers will increase the usability of FOL systems.

## Summary of the ACTD Report

This ACTD is providing needed capability extension to PSYOP systems. The need to reach deeper into contested territory was demonstrated in both OEF and OIF, and this R&D and acquisition effort will help meet that need. The ACTD also addresses the need to improve communications between tactical units and provide reachback to CONUS. In addition, a tool for more effective campaign planning is also being developed and will be tested under this ACTD.

## Comparison of SOCOM Program and ACTD with *Information Operations Roadmap*

The *IO Roadmap* issued by the Secretary of Defense on October 30, 2003, identified several PSYOP shortfalls. Here is how the SOCOM program for PSYOP and the ACTD currently address those shortfalls.

Shortfall 1: Rapid generation and dissemination of quality products against diverse audiences

- The POBS program is funded and is actively procuring equipment and systems against validated requirements.
- With a view to FY08 funding, a formal requirement for PSYOP print systems is being reviewed by the user community for submission to SOCOM. Until that time, the PSYOP acquisition program is seeking via the SOCOM unfunded requirement process.
- Wideband satellite capability on the Commando Solo EC-130J will allow receipt of PSYOP products and updates of products while the aircraft is en route to or executing its mission. Wideband satellite compatibility for Commando Solo will be fully funded with \$6 million in procurement funds in FY06-07.

Shortfall 2: Dissemination of products into denied areas

- Enhanced altitude capability of the Commando Solo EC-130J is increasing transmitter range. While this is an improvement over C-130E capability, it is a small step, since the increase in altitude is only 7,000 feet (less than 50 percent), and the range increase is governed by a square root function (that is, a 14 percent increase in range.)
- The PSYOP Global Reach ACTD is addressing area dissemination concerns as one of its primary pursuits. It is investigating various unmanned vehicles that may meet the requirement. Initial broadcast payload and UAV integration are being conducted on the WSADS UAV. This system can carry up to 575 pounds (or increase its range by reducing payload weight) to deliver products into denied areas to a diverse audience.

Shortfall 3: Timely, long-range dissemination with a variety of delivery systems

- A long-range broadcast system analysis of alternative study is currently under way. This study will provide alternatives to providing long-range broadcast dissemination.

---

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Chris Lamb is a Senior Military Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or positions of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

<sup>2</sup> See appendix A for the tasking letter and terms of reference for the study.

<sup>3</sup> A wide variety of insights about PSYOP performance in recent operations that might constitute “informal lessons learned” were made available to the study team, some from organizations and individuals in the PSYOP and Special Operations community, but also from the services and other institutions charged with capturing lessons on recent operational experience. See the bibliography for specific sources.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, March 23, 1994.)

<sup>5</sup> Headquarters, United States Army Special Operations Command, Special Operations Forces Information, Primer. Available at <http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/primer.shtml>.

<sup>6</sup> United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (ACAPOC), “Psychological Operations Fact Sheet.” Available at <[http://www.soc.mil/usacapoc/capoc\\_default.htm](http://www.soc.mil/usacapoc/capoc_default.htm)>.

<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, September 5, 2003), I-5 (hereafter cited as JP 3-53).

<sup>8</sup> United States Army, Field Manual 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 2000), 1–2, 1–3 (hereafter cited as FM-3-05.30).

<sup>9</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group, Mission Statement. Available at <<http://www.poas.socom.smil.mil/misc/mission.html>>.

<sup>10</sup> Department of Defense, *Information Operations Roadmap*, October 30, 2003 (hereafter cited as *IO Roadmap*). SECRET.

<sup>11</sup> Department of Defense, “Psychological Warfare Fact Sheet.” Available at <<http://korea50.army.mil/index.html>>.

<sup>12</sup> Dorothy E. Denning, *Information Warfare and Security* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1999), 7.

<sup>13</sup> LTC Frank G. Hoffman, USMC (ret.), “One Decade Later—Debate in Somalia,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 130, no. 1 (January 2004).

<sup>14</sup> See Stephanie R. Kelley, CPT, USAF, “Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds,” master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2004. Kelley identifies how rumors in Iraq function and what we can learn from them. With attention to differing American and Arab cultural communication styles, she recommends tailored rumor remedies (classified as proactive, reactive, and damage control), including observations on how the coalition information campaign could tailor messages to address significant Iraqi concerns and fears.

<sup>15</sup> JP 3-53, 13–14; FM 3-05.30, A-1; United States Army, Field Manual 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 2003 [hereafter cited as FM 3-05.301]).

<sup>16</sup> Dr. Kelton Rhoads provides an interesting overview of sources and varying taxonomies of persuasive communication tactics at <[www.workingspsychology.com](http://www.workingspsychology.com)>. Dr. Rhoads teaches at the Annenberg School for Communication and in the Psychology Department at the University of Southern California. See also the lists of techniques in FM 3-05.301, 5-11, 5-12, 11-22–11-26.

<sup>17</sup> Source documents for the following sections include Charles Swett, “Principles of Effective Information Campaigns,” prepared for the Department of Defense in 1995; COL Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., USAFR, “Blending Military and Civilian PSYOP Paradigms,” in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. COL Frank L. Goldstein, USAF (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996), 51–65; Robert H. Gass and John S. Seiter, *Persuasion, Social Influence, and Compliance Gaining*, 2<sup>d</sup> ed. (Boston: Pearson Education, 2003); Erwin P. Bettinghaus and Michael J. Cody, *Persuasive Communication*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Wadsworth, 1994); and Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 2<sup>d</sup> ed. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992).

<sup>18</sup> This point raises delicate policy issues about restrictions on information sources when it is within the

power of the United States to do so. The conclusion of the report argues that one way to improve the competitiveness of PSYOP is to temporarily disrupt adversary communication channels.

<sup>19</sup> FM 3-05.301. Chapter 5 on target audience analysis and Chapter 11 on propaganda analysis and counterpropaganda demonstrate significant functional expertise.

<sup>20</sup> There is disagreement as to whether PSYOP more closely resembles commercial marketing or social marketing. It might be observed that audience- and behavior-specific PSYOP has much in common with commercial marketing and its bottom line: buying behavior. In contrast, general audience- and non-behavior-specific PSYOP has more in common with social marketing, which attempts to change attitudes or beliefs as an inducement to behavioral change. In any case, it is not necessary to elaborate on these distinctions here, since despite differences in market environment and definitions of “customers” and “competition,” commercial marketing and social marketing rely on the shared principles and best practices enumerated above.

<sup>21</sup> United States Army Special Operations Command Web site. One PSYOP professional asserts that “PSYOP alone accomplishes little. PSYOP is dependent upon the credibility and truthfulness of the message.” MAJ Stephen C. Larsen, USA, “Conducting Psychological Operations in Sophisticated Media Environments” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1999), 25.

<sup>22</sup> The study team agrees with Gass and Seiter (28–30) that there is not a distinct difference between persuasion and coercion, but rather a continuum of variation between the two.

<sup>23</sup> Gass and Seiter, 29–30.

<sup>24</sup> Referred to in PSYOP TTPs as “psychological agents of action.” See FM 3-05.301, 6–25.

<sup>25</sup> Charles H. Briscoe, Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroeder, and Kaley I. Sepp, *Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press), 113.

<sup>26</sup> For more details, see United States Central Command, “Campaign Plan: *Enduring Freedom*,” annex C, tab D.

<sup>27</sup> United States Central Command, “Campaign Plan for *Enduring Freedom*: Information Operations,” appendix 3 to annex C (Operations), C-3-8.

<sup>28</sup> Herbert A. Friedman, “Psychological Operations in Afghanistan,” in *Perspectives* 14, no. 4 (2002). Also available at <<http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan.html>>.

<sup>29</sup> Briscoe and Kiper, 102.

<sup>30</sup> Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “On Point: The United States Army in *Iraqi Freedom*” (Fort Leavenworth, August 11, 2004), chapter 4 (hereafter cited as “On Point”). Also available at <<http://onpoint.leavenworth.army.mil/>>.

<sup>31</sup> Joint PSYOP objectives are taken from JP 3-53, chapter 4, 2, and chapter 6, 2. For Army doctrine, see FM 3-05, A-1-A-5.

<sup>32</sup> JP 3-53, chapter 4, 2. The most notable similarity between the list used in this research and the five joint PSYOP general objectives is the emphasis on reducing the capability of opposing forces. However, joint PSYOP doctrine states that PSYOP should reduce the “efficiency,” and we thought “effectiveness” was more to the point. The five general objectives for PSYOP in joint doctrine are:

- support and enhance foreign humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense, and/or foreign national assistance military operations
- reduce the efficiency of opposing forces
- obtain the cooperation of allies and neutrals in any psychological operations effort
- further U.S. and/or multinational effort by modifying, changing or reinforcing attitudes and behavior of selected foreign [audiences]
- facilitate reorganization and control of occupied or liberated areas in conjunction with civil-military operations.

<sup>33</sup> Army PSYOP doctrine also does a good job of providing illustrative lists of sub-objectives or tasks, albeit organized under discussion of “functions” and as examples in “planning.” See FM3-05, chapter 4, and chapter 7, 7–11.

<sup>34</sup> The Chairman’s instruction notes that in lesser or complex contingencies, “PSYOP forces are often critical to success,” and that in declared war, “PSYOP is a proven force multiplier that enhances the effectiveness of other combat capabilities.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.05C, “Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002,” July 18, 2003 (hereafter cited as CJCSI 3110.05C).

<sup>35</sup> Venerable sources on stability operations agree on this point, as do more recent reviews of requirements for success in stability operations. There is less agreement on the tactics used to influence popular will. For example, C.E. Callwell, a veteran of British colonial wars, argues in *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996) that while regrettable, it was occasionally necessary to tolerate greater amounts of punitive strikes against economic targets and associated collateral damage. In contrast, the *Marine Corps Small Wars Manual* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940) argues for much more restraint and minimizing collateral damage. The approach of the Marines seems more appropriate for American social and cultural norms. For an argument that PSYOP in particular is critically important in stability operations, see Chris Lamb, "Information Age Technology and Operations Other Than War," in *War in the Information Age* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1997).

<sup>36</sup> A recent Army lessons learned effort underscores the point that the behavior of the ground forces in general sends powerful messages and provides an example of how PSYOP helped communicate U.S. intent when entering mosques in OIF 2 in search of imams preaching violence. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR)," report no. 04-13 (May 2004), 16, 25–26 (hereafter cited as OIF IIR).

<sup>37</sup> "Allied Views on PSYOP Operational Lessons Learned," commentary from allied information operations experts in response to inquiry on U.S. PSYOP performance in OEF and OIF, August 27, 2004 (hereafter cited as Allied Views on PSYOP): "On occasions U.S. PSYOPS appeared to be too focused on 'warfighting' issues rather than wider issues and could therefore be too direct and aggression to the detriment of the overall long-term mission objectives."

<sup>38</sup> Cable from USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB to RUFDAVC/CDRVCORPS HEIDELBERG GE//J3/IO//RUESOC/COMJPOTF CC FT BRAGG NC; Subject: CFC FRAGO 09-304 to OPORD 09

<sup>39</sup> A more detailed review and actual excerpts from the objectives are available in the classified annex to this report.

<sup>40</sup> See CALL, OIF IIR, 4.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., iii, 5.

<sup>42</sup> The Defense Intelligence Agency's Human Factors Analysis Center produced some survey reports on Iraqi attitudes during OIF, but in our estimation the information is too scant to support generalized conclusions.

<sup>43</sup> As one PSYOP commander noted, asking for money for a survey in a military headquarters is at best considered unusual. As a public affairs official responsible for information activities noted, PSYOP forces lack the training to do polling systematically and professionally so that effects can be more reliably measured. Therefore, even if the environment is stable enough to permit outsourcing, the costs are considerable.

<sup>44</sup> CALL, "On Point." The report observes that: "the majority of Iraqi soldiers just melted away, offering relatively light, if any, resistance. Yet, it was unclear whether this was a deliberate tactic to preserve the force, the result of the extended PSYOP campaign, the result of the ongoing attacks on their command and control systems, the result of their fear of coalition combat power, or simply as close as the soldiers could come to a formal capitulation given the tight control imposed by the layers of security services."

<sup>45</sup> See the previous note. It should be added, as the Army report notes (chapter 7, "Implications"), that Iraqi security forces took U.S. PSYOP efforts quite seriously. They not only worked hard to collect leaflets as quickly as they fell, they exacted steep penalties for those caught with the leaflets. The report concluded that:

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) achieved important success but experienced some disappointments as well. PSYOP units can point with satisfaction to success in minimizing damage to the oil fields and keeping civilians off roads. However, they do so with risk since there is very little evidence available yet to support that contention. It is entirely possible that the Iraqis chose not to fire their oil wells for their own reasons. Moreover, the PSYOP effort enjoyed far less success in encouraging Iraqi units to surrender. Clearly the regime respected the effort since Iraqi security forces worked hard to collect leaflets as quickly as they fell. Nonetheless, it is clear that on the whole, PSYOP produced much less than expected and perhaps less than claimed.

<sup>46</sup> Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 449.

<sup>47</sup> Based on classified sources.

<sup>48</sup> Of the services, at the time the report was completed, only the Air Force appeared to have completed

official lessons learned that discussed psychological operations. However, representatives from all the services provided the study effort with input on lessons learned.

<sup>49</sup> See the bibliography for informal sources of lessons learned.

<sup>50</sup> Joint Staff Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned. (SECRET/NOFORN)

<sup>51</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, “Joint Lessons Learned: Operation *Iraqi Freedom* Major Combat Operations Briefing,” March 1, 2004.

<sup>52</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operation Group (ABN), “Lessons Learned OIF and OEF Briefing,” March 12, 2004.

<sup>53</sup> See section on “Observations on Reasonable Goals for PSYOP Effects” in this study for details.

<sup>54</sup> The bibliography to this report cites all the lesson learned studies.

<sup>55</sup> The classified annex to the report enumerates the specific lessons learned, classified and unclassified.

<sup>56</sup> PSYOP lessons learned from Somalia (4<sup>th</sup> POG) ;Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Haiti, “PSYOP Lessons Learned Operation *Uphold Democracy*,” October 16, 1994 (hereafter cited as JPOTF Haiti).

<sup>57</sup> Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Operation *Just Cause*: Lessons Learned, Volume II: Operations,” October 1990; Liberia; and Somalia (4<sup>th</sup> POG).

<sup>58</sup> Lessons learned from Kosovo.

<sup>59</sup> For example, lessons learned from Somalia; see Company B, 9<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion, “Lessons Learned for Tactical Psychological Operations in Somalia (After-Action Review),” March 10, 1994.

<sup>60</sup> For example, lessons learned from Bosnia; see 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group, “USASOC Bosnia-Herzegovina After-Action Report,” April 22, 1998.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> PSYOP lessons learned from the first Persian Gulf War included

- the approval process was not responsive and needs to be improved
- PSYOP needs to be employed earlier in a conflict to improve deterrence and decrease the adversary’s will to resist
- PSYOP needs more qualified linguists
- more active duty PSYOP forces are needed in order to be able to cover more than one contingency.

The report to Congress on the first Gulf War can be found at <<http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf>>; PSYOP lessons learned are on page 623.

<sup>64</sup> JPOTF Haiti.

<sup>65</sup> Joint Staff Message, dated 072138Z OCT 01, Subject: Approved Strategic Information Campaign Objectives and Themes for Operation Enduring Freedom, (S/REL USA/GCTF).

<sup>66</sup> Commander in Chief, United States Central Command (USCINCCENT), “Campaign Plan For *Enduring Freedom*: Psychological Operations,” November 19, 2001, tab D, appendix 3, annex C.

<sup>67</sup> USCINCCENT OPLAN 1003V—Change One, Psychological Operations, 24 January 2003; USCINCCOM Message, dated 171441Z July 03, Subject: CFC FRAGO 09-304 to OPORD 09, OIF, Tab D to Appendix 3 to Annex C.

<sup>68</sup> Presumably, the lack of national guidance on themes might also make commanders more risk adverse in approving PSYOP products that might have some blowback potential. This in turn might delay approvals and disrupt the timing that is an important element in a quality PSYOP effort. This observation is conjecture; it did not emerge from the data we were able to collect.

<sup>69</sup> It seems safe to assert that inconsistent themes and messages are much less likely to produce desired effects. Theoretically, it might be argued that inconsistent themes could still be applied for desired effect if they could be isolated within target audiences, but this possibility is increasingly remote in a world of global communications.

<sup>70</sup> CALL, “On Point.” Quote is from chapter 7, “Implications.”

<sup>71</sup> Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Initial Impressions Report: Operation *Iraqi Freedom* Information Operations, Civil Military Operations, Engineer, Combat Service Support: Stability Operations—Support Operations.” Report no. 04-13. Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2004; 7, 16 (hereafter cited as IIR: OIF Information Operations).

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, 28ff.

The brigades are not staffed with IO personnel, and have limited IO assets, with the core capability of PSYOP (five TPTs) and related elements of CA and PA. They are also not authorized a PAO, but most commanders have designated one. IO in the division is mainly

decentralized. The guidance they receive from division is the weekly talking points. This has been a common thread with all the BCTs. They use these as general guidance in developing their own talking points specific to their AOR, as well as their engagement plan. The talking points are used at all levels of command, from brigade to company, in their engagements with tribal and local leaders and Imams. The CA teams use them as well. Again, the most effective means of getting the message out seems to be with face-to-face and word of mouth.

<sup>73</sup> See the classified JULLS report for the statistics on Iraqi access to television and radio. JULLS Number 42937-11189 (02568).

<sup>74</sup> CALL, "On Point." The report notes how the destroyed radio stations affected V Corps efforts to restore order:

V Corps moved rapidly to restore internal security. Looters, opportunists, and regime die-hards all threatened to gain control of the cities in the power vacuum left in the aftermath of the Ba'ath regime's collapse. To counter this, V Corps seized the radio station at Abu Ghurayb to provide a means to disseminate messages to the people of Baghdad. Unfortunately, the station was too damaged to broadcast, so PSYOP teams resorted to mobile transmitting equipment instead.

<sup>75</sup> Allied Views on PSYOP.

<sup>76</sup> Franks, 377. General Franks' emerging concept for OIF included five fronts, one of which was reserved for psychological operations.

<sup>77</sup> Our interviews also underscored the difficulties associated with reestablishing trust and a good working relationship with the land forces component commander.

<sup>78</sup> One Army assessment made this point in particular with respect to stability operations in OIF 2, noting that "U.S. commanders grapple with the concept of information operations across the range of military operations. While some affirm that this [i.e. OIF 2] is an IO fight and that it should be the priority for Coalition efforts, others believe that IO is not an option, but that offensive operations should be the main effort of this stability operations phase. See CALL, OIF IIR, 5.

<sup>79</sup> Disparaging comments about PSYOP activities are not hard to uncover. One Air Force flag officer reportedly referred to M129 leaflet bombs as "litter bombs," but this comment should not be taken as a statement on the Air Force's interest in PSYOP. Similar expressions of skepticism can be found among other service general officers.

<sup>80</sup> Deployment of some PSYOP units to theater in OIF was delayed. As a result, they were not able to integrate well with some ARCENT and MARCENT maneuver units. Reportedly, the decision to assign a late, or lower priority, deployment sequence for these PSYOP forces was made by a relatively junior officer in Army's Forces Command headquarters. CENTCOM leaders corrected the problem once they understood what had happened, but the delay, coupled with the decision to launch the war before all forces were in position, meant the some ground units initially had to operate with limited or no PSYOP support. This fact contributes to, but does not fully explain, the dissatisfaction of Army and Marine commanders with PSYOP support. See issue seven on the theater-tactical gap in PSYOP capabilities in this section of the report.

<sup>81</sup> It is not clear from interviews whether this is a function of the importance attributed to public affairs by commanders or their skepticism about the importance of PSYOP. Some sources suggest it is because it is easier to get approval for public affairs products than for PSYOP products.

<sup>82</sup> JP 3-53, I-5.

<sup>83</sup> United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), "Joint Psychological Vision, July 2002," Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command, Intelligence and Information Operations Center, Information Operations Directorate (July 19, 2002), 1 (hereafter cited as SOCOM Joint Psychological Vision).

<sup>84</sup> *IO Roadmap*.

<sup>85</sup> SOCOM Joint Psychological Vision, 2.

<sup>86</sup> It is interesting to note that the United States ended up with three different information efforts in World War II because of debate over the appropriate roles and themes for each organization. Notably, the U.S. Army, not trusting the civilian-controlled Office of Strategic Services with sensitive invasion plans, created its own psychological warfare organization, the Psychological Warfare Service, to support tactical- and operational-level



military operations. Timothy J. Doorey, CDR, USN, "Role of Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations in Winning the War against Islamist Terrorism," research project, Naval War College, Newport, RI (June 5, 2002), 48.

<sup>87</sup> It is surprising that some PSYOP officers casually brush over these distinctions since the PSYOP community so frequently receives direct evidence of just how sensitive government-managed information is in American social and political culture. For example, in 2000, the Cable News Network (CNN) and National Public Radio (NPR) terminated an intern program in which members of the 4<sup>th</sup> POG were involved because "media analysts" expressed concern that rather than learning technical skills, the young soldiers might inappropriately control and spin the content of these news programs. This example, as well as the demise of the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Influence discussed in this report, underscores the sensitivity of government-managed information to the American public. See Jon Elliston, "Target Audience: Fort Bragg's Propaganda Troops at Work on the Home Front," *The Independent Weekly* (Durham, NC), July 5, 2000.

<sup>88</sup> Joint Publication 3-61, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, May 14, 1997), v (hereafter cited as JP 3-61).

<sup>89</sup> This definition is taken from the Planning Group for Integration of the United States Information Agency into the Department of State (June 20, 1997), available at <<http://www.publicdiplomacy.org>>. The Planning Group distinguished public affairs from public diplomacy as follows: "Public Affairs is the provision of information to the public, press, and other institutions concerning the goals, policies, and activities of the U.S. Government. Public affairs seek to foster understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens and other groups and institutions, and domestic and international media. However, the thrust of public affairs is to inform the domestic audience."

<sup>90</sup> Advocates of "strategic" PSYOP are not able to identify PSYOP tasks that can only be performed under the rubric of "strategic" PSYOP. Two frequently cited examples are "wanted" posters and Web sites. Yet there is no reason that these functions cannot be performed by PSYOP forces in support of military missions. In allied and neutral areas where military forces are not engaged, wanted poster dissemination can be carried out appropriately by diplomatic personnel working with host nation officials or by public affairs officers. Web sites are trickier since anyone can visit them. While this is clearly an area requiring policy review, an acknowledged PSYOP Web site that clearly is aimed at a target audience in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment where there are ongoing military operations (such as Iraq) would seem to meet the criteria of the *IO Roadmap* delimitation of PSYOP.

<sup>91</sup> JP 3-53, I-11: "As one of the core capabilities of IO, PSYOP must be integrated with the other IO capabilities providing mutual benefits for both."

<sup>92</sup> USCENTCOM Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned, 16 June 2003, 6. SECRET/REL USA GBR AUS.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>94</sup> Franks, 157.

<sup>95</sup> See section C on assessment of effects, based in part on conversation with PSYOP participants in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* at the TOP SECRET level.

<sup>96</sup> Reportedly, an IO officer at the division level decided it would be a good idea to poke fun at Saddam by creating posters of him as Elvis Presley, Madonna, and Homer Simpson. He was able to put the product on the street without submitting it to a product approval process and without input from PSYOP personnel. The posters enraged Iraqis and led to conflict that resulted in casualties for U.S. forces. PSYOP survey responses from currently serving PSYOP officers and enlisted soldiers commenting on the 10 critical hypotheses identified in the body of this report (hereafter cited as PSYOP Survey Responses).

<sup>97</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group, "OIF PSYOP Lessons Learned draft," accessed at <[http://recluse.centcom.smil.mil/crisis/catdesks/info\\_ops/other/Subpages/J3-PI%20PSYOP/PSYOP%20LL%20unfiltered%20\(4%20POG\).doc](http://recluse.centcom.smil.mil/crisis/catdesks/info_ops/other/Subpages/J3-PI%20PSYOP/PSYOP%20LL%20unfiltered%20(4%20POG).doc)>.

<sup>98</sup> Allied Views on PSYOP: "PSYOPS integration into Info Ops has helped PSYOPS within the [allied country] by bringing it into core planning, the targeting process and operational business. On some occasions, a lack of knowledge/understanding by Info Ops staff officers was found to make the job of PSYOPS more difficult."

<sup>99</sup> CALL, "IIR: OIF Information Operations," 11:

IO doctrine is still in its infancy, with tremendous potential as a combat multiplier. To bring about change within the Army as a whole, IO must be incorporated into all phases of the OES. It must receive equal attention and detail in the POI as the battlefield operating systems. IO functional area training must include more training and education in the synchronization of IO elements. IO training for officers needs to encompass more than integrating IO into the MDMP [military decisionmaking process]. If they are to integrate, synchronize, and coordinate all the IO elements in combat operations, then these officers need to have full understanding of the scope, capabilities, and limitations of those assets. Unit level exercises—warfighters, mission rehearsal exercises, and combat training center operations—need to have all elements of IO incorporated into the scenario. Commanders need to exercise their staffs in an environment which produces second and third order effects based on kinetic operations.

<sup>100</sup> PSYOP previously was not part of the Officer and NCO Education System, and was not included in Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (now FM 3-0). However, that is changing, and in part because of greater attention to information operations in general.

<sup>101</sup> Typically, a JPOTF will be commanded by an O-5 or an O-6, who must then compete for attention on a combatant commander's staff dominated by flag officers. At lower levels, PSYOP is again typically outranked. See, for example, CALL, "IIR: OIF Information Operations," 2, 25. At brigade level, fire support officers (FSOs), civil affairs, or public affairs are often in charge of IO:

There is no doctrinal method for the format or conduct of the IOWG [information operations working group]; it is unique to each unit's area of operations (AO). At the brigade and below level, for example, the PA officer and CA planners/executers have a much bigger role in the conduct of IO, often in its execution. The IO cell has no dedicated IO officer, so the command typically designates an officer to fill that function. At one brigade, the FSO filled the function of the IO officer.

The problem exists at the division level as well:

Before deploying to Iraq, the commanding general of one U.S. division sent a request to the Department of the Army (DA) G-3 requesting additional IO support for the division. This request was denied by Central Command. As a result, this division did not have the resources to conduct IO properly. The IOCOORD [information operations coordinator] does not believe the mission was properly resourced or supported by DA or IO proponentcy. The IOCOORD firmly believes that they need an FA-30 trained officer at the brigade level and not someone who has the job as an additional duty. Another staff officer is going to focus on his primary role and think about IO secondarily. The S-2s and fire support officers (FSOs) have done a very good job in Iraq as the IO officers in their brigades. The FSOs were underemployed in some areas and have done well with targeting. However, they do not understand the interrelationships of all the components of IO. IO is much more than targeting.

<sup>102</sup> This is changing. The Marine Corps recently established the 9955 PSYOP Officer Additional Military Occupational Specialty to identify and track PSYOP-trained personnel. Marine PSYOP officers will be sent to the U.S. Army PSYOP Officer Course at Fort Bragg, NC. See J. R. Wassink, COL, USMC, HQMC, PP&O/PLI Information Paper, Subject: USMC Psychological Operations, September 27, 2004.

<sup>103</sup> Even so, senior leaders in the Pentagon remained interested in PSYOP products. For example, reportedly during OIF, "the Joint Staff prepared daily briefing books for the Chairman and the Secretary on PSYOP activities. These books included examples of the products, radio wheels, scripts, and schedules. MAJ Ben Robertson was TDY to the Joint Staff from CENTCOM to work that issue." PSYOP Survey Response.

<sup>104</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.01 series, "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002" (hereafter cited as CJCSI 3110.01).

<sup>105</sup> Telephone interviews and written responses to survey questions.

<sup>106</sup> JP 3-53, chapter V, "Psychological Operations Approval Process"; see also FM 3-05.30, "Psychological

Operations,” 1-8-1-10.

<sup>107</sup> Interview with retired PSYOP O-6, currently serving in the Pentagon. The instruction codifying this guidance is CJCSI 3110.01.

<sup>108</sup> Tony Normand, former 4<sup>th</sup> POG commander and senior executive at United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, email to author, October 10, 2004. Mr. Normand pointed out the connection to the peacetime PSYOP program but did not approve of the Pentagon oversight.

<sup>109</sup> Somewhat ironically, they dispute the value of oversight from the Pentagon to ensure policy consistency but insist on oversight of tactical commander products to ensure consistency with combatant commander objectives.

<sup>110</sup> This debate takes place in stability operations as well as major combat operations such as OIF. See Larry Wentz, ed., *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Security Studies, 1997), available at <<http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/smo/docs/ifor/index.html>>. See in particular chapter VIII, “Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle,” 189–224. The authors note that

Because Task Force Eagle could not always obtain the type of PSYOP support it desired, COMEAGLE [Commander, Task Force Eagle] turned to other organizations to convey information to the local population. . . . This type of independent, U.S.-only information campaign did not sit well with some in the CJICTF [Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force] who were concerned about the consistency of the IFOR [Implementation Force] message. Indeed, some might argue that the CJICTF correctly emphasized tight control over the development, approval, and dissemination of products because the mission itself was so political that any mistake at the tactical level would have enormous implications at the strategic level.

<sup>111</sup> CJCSI 3110.05C.

<sup>112</sup> This tension between the JPOTF and tactical PSYOP units was also evident in Bosnia. See Wentz, in particular chapter VIII, “Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle,” 189–224. The authors note that “Information regarding the nature of the PSYOP mission did not flow uninhibited from either the 2<sup>d</sup> POG to the deploying units or from the incoming CJICTF to the troops once they were deployed. This was due to physical and interpersonal communications problems at all levels of the PSYOP task force.”

<sup>113</sup> Ibid. “Several U.S. commanders, including GEN Crouch (COMSFOR [Commander, Stabilization Force]), MG Nash (COMEAGLE, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division), and MG Meigs (COMEAGLE, 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division), clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the degree and nature of PSYOP support in their AORs.” The issue was very much one of support to the theater as opposed to tactical commanders and their specific needs.

<sup>114</sup> In some cases, timeliness may be a problem in stability operations for lack of dissemination assets. One respondent wrote that it would take 4 weeks to go from request for product to delivery of a leaflet bomb during OIF stability operations. However, this would seem to be a function of priorities rather than inherently slow approval and production processes.

<sup>115</sup> Normand, email to author, October 10, 2004. Normand is the primary source for these insights on the rationale behind changes to PSYOP force structure in the 1980s and 1990s.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. Normand also notes that this approach “reduces the number of personnel required if employed smartly. A study showed that one new support person is required for every six additions to the force structure.”

<sup>117</sup> More geographically diverse product development capability was provided in summer 1997 when manning spaces were subtracted from each existing regional battalion to build a task organized regional battalion dedicated to United States Pacific Command. This task organization reduced the number of authorized personnel allotted to each PSYOP regional battalion from 151 to 126. Jack C. Guy, LTC, USA, and Steven Collins, LTC, USA, “Current Challenges and Future Roles for US Army Reserve PSYOP Forces,” *Special Warfare* (Summer 2000). Also available at <<http://www.psywarrior.com/ReserveRole.html>>.

<sup>118</sup> Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict), statement before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, concerning Special Operations Forces Acquisition, April 1, 2003. Available at <<http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-04-01billingslea.html>>.

<sup>119</sup> The Defense Science Board Task Force, *The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, May 2000; hereafter cited as Defense

Science Board Task Force) makes this point, as do Guy and Collins.

<sup>120</sup> Wassink.

<sup>121</sup> This proved true in Bosnia as well. See Wentz, chapter VIII, 189–224. The authors note, “Communications difficulties exacerbated real and perceived problems between the various PSYOP elements and constrained mission capability and performance. PSYOP units must have state-of-the-art communication for voice and data transmission to include satellite communications, LAN, and telephone connections.”

<sup>122</sup> CALL, “IIR: OIF Information Operations,” 10:

Doctrinal IO focuses on the operational level, that is, the combatant commander, land component commander (LCC), and corps levels. Resources follow doctrine, and the operational levels are where the scarce IO resources have been applied. In IOE [Iraqi operational environment], however, the focus of stability operations IO is appropriately placed on the civilian populace, tribal leaders, mullahs, and other unconventional warfare leadership. It is precisely at these critical nodes that their sources are either nonexistent or extremely scarce—the very levels at which they are needed the most. This doctrinal disparity precludes consistent, programmatic application of IO throughout the various organizational levels of IO planning and execution.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 22–23. Commenting on OIF 2, the report notes that units lacked the ability to print newspapers or broadcast radio or TV:

When the brigades began conducting CMO [civil-military operations] in conjunction with peace enforcement operations, there were virtually no newspapers or radio stations operating within their AORs. . . . the only means of delivering PSYOP and command messages is through face-to-face meetings, PSYOP leaflets, and minimal newspaper coverage. The television capability in these areas is from al Jazeera and al Arabia. These stations provide only negative content with regards to U.S. presence in Iraq. This is the best medium for distributing messages in the area, just as it is in the United States, but is only available in limited areas. During the previous regime, satellite TV was prohibited amongst the local populace. Now that they are liberated, nearly every household has a TV and satellite dish. This provides the Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) with a great method for delivering negative information messages to the public. The best deception is reinforcement of an already preconceived perception. An overwhelming number of Iraqis/Arabs believe that the U.S. is there to steal oil and Iraq’s resources and has no intention of leaving. Since this is the mindset of the average Arab, this is what the media presents in TV coverage. The media selectively pursues only stories that support this angle. You will not find local media portraying stories of Coalition forces rebuilding schools, hospitals, or other infrastructure improvements. These stories do not reinforce the understood perception. Without the capability to present information in this medium, it is very difficult to counter their campaign messages. Units have had to aggressively pursue the use of leaflets to counter FRLs information. However, this cannot match the distribution of TV.

<sup>124</sup> Allied Views on PSYOP, August 27, 2004. Allied lessons learned also underscore the value of tactical PSYOP. Commentary from allied information operations experts note that “We did not have [TPTs] prior to Iraq and therefore senior commanders seeing them in action convinced our leadership that they were required. This means personnel, vehicles, and PSYOPS kit. In particular, vehicle mounted loudspeaker systems were seen as invaluable. Previously [we] only had dismantled sets.”

<sup>125</sup> Alan Varvil, response to request for input on PSYOP Lessons Learned.

<sup>126</sup> See Arthur Tulak, “Improving Tactical PSYOP Video Dissemination in Media-Austere Operating Environments,” research report, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, March 25, 2004. A longer version of the paper, presented to the 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium on the Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies, is available at <[http://dodccrp.org/events/2004/CCRTS\\_San\\_Diego/CD/papers/253.pdf](http://dodccrp.org/events/2004/CCRTS_San_Diego/CD/papers/253.pdf)>. Tulak makes a most persuasive case for the need for a follow-on to the now-antiquated AN/MSQ-85B system for use in austere environments where television broadcasting cannot reach the target audience.

<sup>127</sup> United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), “Joint Lessons Learned: Operation *Iraqi Freedom* Major Combat Operations (FOUO),” March 1, 2004, 5–13, 5–18 (hereafter cited as “Joint Lessons Learned: OIF”); and

4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (ABN), “Lessons Learned OIF & OEF,” May 12, 2004, 2.

<sup>128</sup>CALL, “IIR: OIF Information Operations,” 14.

<sup>129</sup>PSYOP Survey Response, August 15, 2004.

<sup>130</sup>Larsen, 87.

<sup>131</sup>Robert D. Jenks, Deputy Commander for Research, Analysis, and Civilian Affairs, 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (ABN), email to author. Dr. Jenks notes that the 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group is responsible for all Department of Defense (DOD) production of certain categories of intelligence under the DOD Intelligence Production Program. Thus, anything that is coded in those categories is automatically sent to his Strategic Studies Detachment. He estimates that more than 90 percent of the longer studies his team undertakes (production requirements) come from sources other than PYSOP units, mainly from regional combatant commands to support planning and operational requirements. Deployed units (PSYOP and others, such as special organizations and units that stay away from the usual channels) request the remaining 5–10 percent. In contrast, Dr. Jenks estimates that more than 70 percent of requests for specific information that is tactically relevant come from deployed units, both PSYOP units and others.

<sup>132</sup>Charles P. Borchini, LTC, USA, “Psychological Operations Support for Operation *Restore Hope*, 9 December 1992–4 May 1993,” Personnel experience monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 15. LTC Borchini notes that the Strategic Studies Detachment personnel “proved to be the backbone of our operation; not only did they edit virtually every article for the newspaper and radio, but they wrote many of the articles themselves.”

<sup>133</sup>Detachment 920, 9<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion, “Preliminary After-Action Report, Operation *Continue Hope*, 9 October–12 December 1993.”

<sup>134</sup>According to one source, the Office of the Secretary of Defense became interested in intelligence produced by PSYOP forces during OIF 2 and requested regular updates. In addition, CALL, “OIF IIR,” 15, notes with respect to OIF 2:

It is typical for many different staff sections (S–2, IO, S–3, etc.) to request the tactical PSYOP team (TPT) to collect information in different areas. Some of these requests were specific questions and some were ongoing collectables. The TPT detachment commander, working with the staff representatives, would develop his own priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) that would cover the spectrum of the information required by the different staff elements. One example of this PIR occurred after the lead Iraqi Shia cleric, Sistani, issued a press statement calling for immediate elections. They developed and answered these PIRs and passed the information up through the daily PSYOP situation report (SITREP). This information was valuable not only to the higher HQ, but also to national strategists.

<sup>135</sup>For example, during Operation *Urgent Fury*, the 1<sup>st</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion did not receive any PSYOP-relevant information.

<sup>136</sup>Larsen, 17.

<sup>137</sup>JFCOM, “Joint Lessons Learned: OIF,” chapter 7, “Enemy Capitulation Concept.”

<sup>138</sup>The benefits of red-teaming can range from mundane procedures to profound insights on local culture. An example of the mundane is the need to have local authoritative sources conduct a final quality check before dissemination. An illustration from OIF 2 makes the point: “During a recent sweep through villages north of the nearby Euphrates River, the Marines distributed handbills that were supposed to tout the coalition’s good intentions and to invite tipsters to anonymously call a hotline to report anti-coalition plotters. But before printing them, the Marines enlarged the font size of the flowing Arabic script, inadvertently separating all of the letters. Recipients looked at the handbill in confusion and politely tried to hand it back.” Michael M. Phillips, “Iraq’s War of Words: The Handbill Battle for Hearts and Minds,” *The Wall Street Journal*, June 7, 2004, 1.

<sup>139</sup>CALL, “On Point,” chapter 3. According to the report: “The leaflet effort to induce capitulation was a high priority prior to breaching the berm. But, due to the speed of the subsequent ground advance, the program did not have adequate time in which to work. In many cases, efforts to deliver capitulation instructions to units failed outright, or the target audience did not easily understand messages that were delivered.”

<sup>140</sup>PSYOP Survey Response from PSYOP enlisted soldier, September 13, 2004; Allied Views on PSYOP, August 27, 2004.

<sup>141</sup>Email from enlisted PSYOP participant in OIF, August 26, 2004.

<sup>142</sup> Coalition PSYOP officer, September 2, 2004.

<sup>143</sup> Lessons learned from numerous stability operations indicate as much; see sections C3 and D3 of this report. One example from Somalia is a leaflet intended to convey the message of humanitarian relief to the Somali people. The leaflet had been drafted to say, “The forces of the world (United Nations) are here to assist in the international relief effort for the Somali people. We are prepared to use force to protect the relief operation and our soldiers. We will not allow interference with food distribution or with our activities. We are here to help you.” Instead, several early versions of the printed leaflets contained misspelled words, words that did not exist in the Somali language, and perhaps the most critical mistake: use of the word for “slave” instead of “world” in the opening words of the leaflet. See Herbert A. Friedman, “United States PSYOP in Somalia,” available at <<http://www.psywarrior.com>>.

<sup>144</sup> Ronald E. Sortor, “Reserve Component Linguists in Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations,” RAND, 1996. A summary of this report is available at <<http://www.rand.org/ard/summaries/linguists.html>>. The full report is also hyperlinked at the site: “Reserve Component Linguists in Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations,” [DB-186-A](#).

<sup>145</sup> A recent report for the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) also concludes that greater use of contract linguists will be necessary to meet demand for such services in future contingencies. See Science Applications International Corporation, “The Cutting Edge: Transforming Language Capability in Operational Units: Defense Language Transformation Task 5,” September 2003. One conclusion from the report was that the Defense Department should “direct the rationalization and expansion of current linguist contract programs to enable greater breadth and depth of linguist support to meet language and regional expertise capability needs identified through the JCIDS [Joint Capability Integration and Development System] process.”

<sup>146</sup> Allied Views on PSYOP, September 6, 2004: “It was suggested that some U.S. PSYOPS lacked the flexibility to produce more simplistic illustrations/drawings (if this was what was required) and relied too heavily on computer graphics.”

<sup>147</sup> Sociological Profile of Enlisted Active Duty PSYOP Soldiers, Career Management Field 37 Career Advisor/Assignment Manager of the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, June 30, 2004.

<sup>148</sup> Kelly Broome, Dan Gallagher, and Mark Schlottach, “Information Operations Measures of Effectiveness Monitoring and Assessment,” ManTech Security & Mission Assurance, August 13, 2004. To request copies, contact Ed Glabus at: [ed.glabus@mantech.com](mailto:ed.glabus@mantech.com)

<sup>149</sup> Larsen, 13, citing after-action report of MAJ Glenn James, chief of PSYOP Doctrine Branch at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC, 1998.

<sup>150</sup> Allied Views on PSYOP, August 27, 2004:

Interference by Senior Commanders/Washington. It has been suggested that product development was made more difficult by those in the chain of command considering products from their “western” point of view or with the U.S. home audience in mind. This is not helpful, as the product must be designed to resonate with target audience in terms of sophistication and message—and is not necessarily what we would react to. This is an education process, where commanders should ask for an “effect” and leave it to expert PSYOP personnel on how best to achieve that “effect.”

<sup>151</sup> This point was recently made well by an internal Army study on OIF 2, which noted:

The divisions are inadequately staffed to conduct the appropriate link and pattern analysis to benefit commanders at the tactical level who are conducting IO, and there is limited capability to maintain a central database for capturing all information pertaining to all leaders within the division’s AOR. As a result, battalion and brigade commanders are learning the AOR by simple trial and error. To be successful at the operational and tactical levels, human factors analysis level of information must be available to division, brigade, and battalion commanders and staffs. Currently, all human factors analysis is conducted by the Defense Intelligence Agency on strategic or national-level personalities.

It recommended adding “appropriate personnel and equipment to unit organizations/MTOEs in order to accomplish the IO mission, to include the link and pattern analysis process.” See CALL, “IIR: OIF Information Operations,” 15.

<sup>152</sup> Department of the Army, Field Manual 33-1-1, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.

<sup>153</sup> 4th POG OEF/OIF After-Action Report comments, available at <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf>>.

<sup>154</sup> JFCOM, "101st Assault Division After-Action Report."

<sup>155</sup> Defense Science Board Task Force.

<sup>156</sup> See note 152.

<sup>157</sup> 4th Psychological Operations Group.

<sup>158</sup> Joint Publication 3-13.1, *Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C<sup>2</sup>W)* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, February 7, 1996), is 8 years old but reflects a general planning parameter that is still extant.

<sup>159</sup> JFCOM, "101st Assault Division After-Action Report."

<sup>160</sup> Response to survey questions, active duty PSYOP officer, August 17, 2004.

<sup>161</sup> Defense Science Board Task Force.

<sup>162</sup> Telephone interview with source at 4<sup>th</sup> POG, September 14, 2004.

<sup>163</sup> United States Army, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, MOS 37F, *Psychological Operations Specialist, Skill Levels 1 Through 4* (STP 33-37F14-SM-TG), April 2004, 2–5 (hereafter cited as Soldier's Manual).

<sup>164</sup> Telephone conversation with PSYOP Staff Sergeant, September 8, 2004.

<sup>165</sup> For example, one PSYOP soldier recounted in an interview that the reported failure of a short-wave radio on board a SOMS-B was in fact due to user error. The operator was unaware that geographical conditions affect radio transmission; he was simply using it in a bad location. Telephone interview with PSYOP soldier, July 7, 2004.

<sup>166</sup> Normand, personal interview with and email to author, October 1, 2004. Normand provides examples of poor planning, including a large amount of resources wasted on development of loudspeaker capabilities that could be better provided for with commercial sources.

<sup>167</sup> Normand argues that:

there must be some controlling mechanism with a long-term focus outside the 4<sup>th</sup> Group to manage the traditional procurement-type programs. The "off the shelf" leasing and purchase of rapidly evolving products should be significantly increased and controlled by the 4<sup>th</sup> Group. By doing this, you reduce the losses generated by mismanagement and rapidly changing priorities which negatively impact traditional procurement programs, and provide a rapid capability to keep up with technology at the group level, unencumbered by a habitually slow bureaucracy. Since most technological change today occurs as rapidly as a two-year command tour, each new commander can effectively refresh the technology without jeopardizing the large, slowly evolving programs existent in traditional procurement management cycles.

A former PSYOP O-6 with many years of oversight experience in the Pentagon agreed that PSYOP planning needed to be improved. He also noted, however, that PSYOP budgets tended to be cut at SOCOM because it is difficult for PSYOP to demonstrate that it can produce effects. Unless PSYOP can better demonstrate the effects it creates and SOCOM values those effects, the long-range acquisition oversight advocated by Mr. Normand still may not lead to increased PSYOP capability. Normand, email to author, October 10, 2004.

<sup>168</sup> Wassink's information paper provides an overview on Marine Corps PSYOP initiatives. Currently the Marines only intend to establish a tactical PSYOP capability sufficient to support forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Units.

<sup>169</sup> Initial Navy lessons learned observed that "OIF is watershed event to change view that NAVY is not critical part of Joint PSYOP campaign," and noted that the Navy provided radio broadcasts, leaflets, support to Coalition Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander objectives. The lessons learned effort recommended that the Navy develop PSYOP capabilities. However, subsequent discussions with Navy staff concluded that the Navy lessons learned material was too tactical and that "conceptually, the Navy staff would not emphasize [tactical] PSYOP as a naval mission, we would look to the joint community as a natural and more efficient provider." Email communication with Navy staff point of contact, August 3, 2004.

<sup>170</sup> Air Force interest in greater PSYOP capability was related in conversations with COL William Astley (Chief, Psychological Operations Division) and LTC Carl Stanford (Chief, PSYOP IO Analysis), both from the

Directorate of Operations, Headquarters, Air Intelligence Agency, and clarified in subsequent email exchanges.

<sup>171</sup> See Tulak.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid. Tulak is quite convincing on this score.

<sup>173</sup> Defense Science Board Task Force.

<sup>174</sup> The Defense Science Board also noted that the Internet is a major new information transition method and makes a point of the need to exploit it with new systems and approaches. We conclude that the Internet would be an appropriate PSYOP vehicle, but only in specific circumstances. See note 90 of the report.

<sup>175</sup> U.S. Special Operations Command, "Special Operations Technology Execution Plan, Annual Report," 2004.

<sup>176</sup> Incidentally, this recommendation was reinforced in a recent Army study that concluded the service should: "Develop and resource the force with Joint and Army IO automation tools that provide commanders and staff a common IO operational picture and uniform IO planning tool." CALL, "IIR: OIF Information Operations," 24.

<sup>177</sup> Jenks, email to author. Dr. Jenks explains that his analysts currently are stretched thin providing support for more than just PSYOP forces.

<sup>178</sup> There is some concern that Army IO doctrine is focused too much on the strategic level, and PSYOP doctrine should not replicate this error. CALL, "OIF IIR," 10:

Most of the current doctrine in FM 3-13 includes only broad philosophy on IO full-spectrum operations at the strategic level. Changes to the POI [program of instruction] should include a better understanding of the implementation of the core, supporting and related roles of IO, such as TPTs, CA teams, PA, EW, and military deception (MD). There should also be sufficient practical exercises in the art of non-lethal targeting and setting measures of effectiveness (MOE).

<sup>179</sup> Both SOCOM's vision and concept identify the wrong scope for PSYOP since they reflect guidance from the 2004 Defense Planning Guidance, which predated the *IO Roadmap*. They have many laudable qualities; for example, emphasizing full-spectrum operations using comprehensive reachback and detailed intelligence and human factors analysis to support target audience analysis. However, they generally are not detailed enough to chart a way ahead for PSYOP. In some cases, they seem to obscure the full range of tactical missions for PSYOP. For example, the concept emphasizes the importance of PSYOP in reducing casualties, whereas in some cases PSYOP may be used to increase enemy casualties (for example, by encouraging the public to reveal the enemy's whereabouts or by goading the enemy to reveal himself). The real goal is to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy and thereby improve the effectiveness of U.S. forces.

<sup>180</sup> The Department's Transformation Planning Guidance notes that, among other things, pursuing transformation means "the Department must align itself with the on-going information revolution, not just by exploiting information technology, but by developing information-enabled organizational relationships and operating concepts." This is certainly true for information operations in general and would hold true for PSYOP more specifically. Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance* (April 2003), 3-5.

<sup>181</sup> A similar observation was made in the Defense Science Board study.

<sup>182</sup> For example, in OEF, the Taliban spread reports that U.S. meals airdropped to Afghans did not meet the dietary requirements of observing Muslims. In OIF, Iraqi leaders worked hard to counter PSYOP leaflets by claiming that they were contaminated with chemical or biological poisons. To reinforce this impression, they wore protective suits as they disposed of the leaflets. See Melissa Dittman, "Operation Hearts and Minds," *Monitor on Psychology* 34, no. 6 (June 2003); available at <<http://www.apa.org/monitor/jun03/operation.html>>. The enemy can also try to counter PSYOP more directly. During the Kosovo contingency operations, Serb agents reportedly contacted Serbo-Croatian translators working with the U.S. Army at Fort Bragg and threatened harm to them and their families if they continued to support U.S. information efforts. PSYOP personnel at Fort Bragg, conversation with author.

<sup>183</sup> An argument has been made that PSYOP (along with Civil Affairs) should be made a branch. This report is agnostic on the subject, seeing both pros and cons. See Francis P. Landy and Rene B. Porras, "The Utility of Making Functional Area 39 a Branch," master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1999.

<sup>184</sup> It has been suggested that automated decisionmaking aids can facilitate the PSYOP impact analysis process and help preserve institutional knowledge. See Brian A. Haugh, "PSYOP Impact Analysis White



Paper,” Institute for Defense Analyses, August 2000.

<sup>185</sup> Defense Science Board Task Force, 7.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., 13, 14.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> PSYOP Global Reach Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, Fiscal Year 2004 Proposal to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Advanced Systems and Concepts, January 28, 2003, 2.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., 2–3.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., 7.

## Bibliography

### AFTER-ACTION REPORTS

3<sup>d</sup> Infantry Division (Mechanized). “Operation *Iraqi Freedom* After-Action Report (FOUO).” Available at <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf>>.

4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group. “Internal BiH After-Action Review Results.” May 15, 1998.

———. “Operation *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom* Consolidated Psychological Operations Lessons Learned.” September 24, 2003.

———. “USASOC Bosnia-Herzegovina AAR.” April 22, 1998.

9<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion. “After-Action Report—Operation *Continued Hope*, Somalia.” January 3, 1994.

10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light Infantry). “U.S. Army Forces, Somalia: 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (LI), After-Action Report Summary.” June 2, 1993.

10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group, Headquarters. “Operation *Support Hope* After-Action Report.” August 5, 1994.

305<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Company. “Mobilization and Combat Operations during Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, 3 January 2003 through 29 May 2003.” June 17, 2003.

———. “Mobilization and Combat Operations during Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, 3 January 2003 through 29 May 2003, After-Action Report.” June 17, 2003.

312<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Company. “Mobilization and Combat Operations during Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, 16 February 2003 through 1 October 2003, After-Action Report.” August 29, 2003.

362<sup>d</sup> Psychological Operations Company. “Psychological Operations in support of 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.” After -ction report comments in “Task Force Iron Horse, Point Paper: Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.”

C Company, 9<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion. “Operation *Assured Response* (Liberia NEO) After-Action Report.” May 3, 1996.

———. “After-Action Report for PSYOP Assessment Mission to Operation *Assured Response* (Liberia NEO).” June 25, 1996.

Center for Strategic Leadership. "Somalia After-Action Review." Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, September 16, 1994.

Detachment 920, 9<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion. "Preliminary After-Action Report, Operation *Continue Hope*, 9 October–12 December 1993." Date unknown.

Gabriel, Joseph, MAJ, USA, Tactical Psychological Operations Detachment 1560. "AAR Comments for Operation *Iraqi Freedom*." January 30, 2004.

G-1. "Operation *Iraqi Freedom*: Lessons Learned." Date unknown.

Joint Forces Command. "101<sup>st</sup> Assault Division After-Action Report." Date unknown.

Psychological Operations Support Element Operation *Southern Watch*. "Annual After-Action Report for PSYOP Support Element in Support of Operation *Southern Watch*." December 17, 2002.

## ARTICLES

Borchini, Charles P., LTC, USA. "Psychological Operations Support for Operation Restore Hope, 9 December 1992–4 May 1993." Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 1, 1994.

Bowdish, Randall G., CDR, USN. "Information Age Psychological Operations." *Military Review*, December 1998–February 1999, 28–36.

"Compass Call was Key to Special Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan." *Insidedefense.com*, April 2, 2004.

Dittman, Melissa. "Operation Hearts and Minds." *Monitor on Psychology* 34, no. 6, June 2003.

Doorey, Timothy J., CDR, USN. "Role of Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations in Winning the War against Islamist Terrorism." Advanced research project, Naval War College, Newport, RI. June 5, 2002.

"Draft JFCOM OIF Assessment Outlines Logistics Failures, Success." *Insidedefense.com*, March 25, 2004. Available at <[http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense\\_docnum.asp?f=defense\\_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON-20-13-3](http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON-20-13-3)>.

Elliston, Jon. "Target Audience: Fort Bragg's Propaganda Troops at Work on the Home Front." *The Independent Weekly* (Durham, NC), July 5, 2000.

- Findley, Benjamin F. Jr., COL, USAFR. "Blending Military and Civilian PSYOP Paradigms." In *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, ed. Frank L. Goldstein, COL, USAF. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1996.
- Friedman, Herbert A. "Psychological Operations in Afghanistan." *Perspectives* 14, no. 4, 2002.
- Guy, Jack C., LTC, USA, and Steven Collins, LTC, USA. "Current Challenges and Future Roles for U.S. Army Reserve PSYOP Forces." *Special Warfare*, Summer 2000.
- Hoffman, Frank G., LTC, USMC (ret). "One Decade Later—Debate in Somalia." U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 130, no. 1, January 2004, 66.
- Kelley, Stephanie R., CPT, USAF. "Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2004.
- Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Haiti. "PSYOP Support to Operation Uphold Democracy: A Psychological Victory." Fort Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps, 1996, 7–8.
- Lamb, Chris. "Information Age Technology and Operations Other Than War." In *War in the Information Age: New Challenges for U.S. Security Policy*, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1997.
- Landy, Francis P., and Rene B. Porras. "The Utility of Making Functional Area 39 a Branch." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1999.
- Larsen, Stephen C., MAJ, USA. "Conducting Psychological Operations in Sophisticated Media Environments." Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1999.
- "OIF Review Trumpets CENTCOM's Functional Joint Force Commands." *Insidedefense.com*, March 25, 2004. Available at [http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense\\_docnum.asp?f=defense\\_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON-20-13-7](http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/defense_docnum.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docnum=PENTAGON-20-13-7).
- "Operation Enduring Freedom—Afghanistan." *Globalsecurity.org*, April 29, 2004.
- Phillips, Michael M. "Iraq's War Of Words: The Handbill Battle For Hearts And Minds." *The Wall Street Journal*, June 7, 2004.
- Sortor, Ronald E. "Reserve Component Linguists in Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations." Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996. Summary available at <http://www.rand.org/ard/summaries/linguists.html>. [DB-186-A](#).

Summe, Jack N., LTC, USA. "Information Warfare, Psychological Operations, and a Policy for the Future." Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 27, 1999.

Tulak, Arthur. "Improving Tactical PSYOP Video Dissemination in Media-Austere Operating Environments," Research report, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, March 25, 2004. A longer version of the report is available at [http://dodccrp.org/events/2004/CCRTS\\_San\\_Diego/CD/papers/253.pdf](http://dodccrp.org/events/2004/CCRTS_San_Diego/CD/papers/253.pdf).

Whitley, Gary L. "PSYOP Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," Strategy research project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, April 10, 2000.

## **BOOKS**

Bettinghaus, Erwin P., and Michael J. Cody. *Persuasive Communication*. 5<sup>th</sup> ed. New York: Wadsworth, 1994.

Briscoe, Charles H., Richard L. Kiper, James A. Schroeder, and Kalev I. Sepp. *Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

Callwell, C.E. *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*. 3<sup>d</sup> ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996.

Denning, Dorothy E. *Information Warfare and Security*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1999.

Franks, Tommy, GEN, USA (ret.). *American Soldier*. New York: HarperCollins, 2004.

Gass, Robert H., and John S. Seiter. *Persuasion, Social Influence, and Compliance Gaining*. 2<sup>d</sup> ed. Boston: Pearson Education, 2003.

Jowett, Garth S., and Victoria O'Donnell. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. 2<sup>d</sup> ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992.

Schultz, Richard H., Jr. *In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama following Just Cause*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, August 1993.

U.S. Marine Corps. *Marine Corps Small War Manual*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940.

Wentz, Larry, ed. *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*. Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program. Washington, DC: Institute for National Security Studies, 1997. Available at

<http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/smo/docs/ifor/index.html>>.

## **BRIEFINGS**

4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (ABN). “Lessons Learned OIF and OEF Briefing.” March 12, 2004.

———. “Organization and Capabilities (FOUO).” Date unknown.

———. “Psychological Operations Lessons Learned/*IO Roadmap* Visit.” May 11, 2004.

Booz Allen Hamilton. “Discussion Document: The Science and Art of Persuasive Communications.” McLean, VA, September 2, 2004.

Commander, United States Sixth Fleet. “Navy Lessons Learned Program.” October 21–22, 2003.

Defense Intelligence Agency Human Factors Analysis Center. “Intelligence Assessment of the Effectiveness of Psychological Operations in Iraq, 1 Oct 2003–20 Feb 2004.” Date unknown.

*Enduring Freedom* Combat Assessment Team. “Information Management Issues Emerging from USMC Experience in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.” October 28, 2003.

Swart, Bill, and Greg Gibbons. “Operation *Iraqi Freedom*: Information Operations Lessons Learned.” Joint Information Operations Center. Date unknown.

United States Joint Forces Command. “Joint Lessons Learned: Operation *Iraqi Freedom* Major Combat Operations Briefing.” March 1, 2004.

United States Special Operations Command. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. January 28, 2003.

———. “ARSOF—ARFOR Conference.” Date unknown.

———. PSYOP Briefing for Dr. Paris Genalis. July 9, 2004.

## **CABLES**

Joint Staff Message, dated 072138Z OCT 01, Subject: Approved Strategic Information Campaign Objectives and Themes for Operation Enduring Freedom, (S/REL USA/GCTF).

USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB to RUFDAVC/CDRVCORPS HEIDELBERG

GE//J3/IO//RUESOC/COMJPOTF CC FT BRAGG NC; Subject: CFC FRAGO 09-304 to OPOD 09.

USCINCCENT OPLAN 1003V – Change One, Psychological Operations, 24 January 2003; USCENCOM Message, dated 171441Z July 03, Subject: CFC FRAGO 09-304 to OPOD 09, OIF.

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORTS AND INTERNAL DOCUMENTS

Broome, Kelly, Dan Gallagher, and Mark Schlottach. “Information Operations Measures of Effectiveness Monitoring and Assessment.” ManTech Security & Mission Assurance, August 13, 2004.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. “Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002.” Instruction 3110.01.

———. “Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002.” Instruction 3110.05C, July 18, 2003.

Defense Science Board Task Force. *The Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict*. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. May 2000.

Department of Defense. *Information Operations Roadmap*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 2003. SECRET

———. Joint Publication 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: Joint Staff, March 23, 1994.

———. Joint Publication 3-13.1. *Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C<sup>2</sup>W)*. Washington, DC: Joint Staff, February 7, 1996.

———. Joint Publication 3-53. *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*. Washington, DC: Joint Staff, September 5, 2003.

———. Joint Publication 3-61. *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Joint Staff, May 14, 1997.

———. *Transformation Planning Guidance*. April 2003.

Haugh, Brian A. “PSYOP Impact Analysis White Paper.” Institute for Defense Analyses, August 2000.

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Haiti. “PSYOP Support to Operation Uphold

*Democracy: A Psychological Victory.*” May 4, 1995.

*Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination.*  
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.  
October 2001.

Science Applications International Corporation. “The Cutting Edge: Transforming Language Capability in Operational Units: Defense Language Transformation Task 5.”  
September 2003.

Swett, Charles. “Principles of Effective Information Campaigns.” Prepared for the Department of Defense as part of a study on the Revolution in Military Affairs and Low-Intensity Conflict, 1995.

United States Army. Field Manual 3-05.30 (FM-33-1). *Psychological Operations*. Department of the Army, June 2000.

———. Field Manual 3-05.301 (FM 33-1-1). *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*. Department of the Army, December 2003.

———. Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 37F, *Psychological Operations Specialist, Skill Levels 1 through 4* (STP 33-37F14-SM-TG). Department of the Army, April 2004.

United States Special Operations Command. “Joint Psychological Operations Operational Concept, July 2002.” Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command, Intelligence and Information Operations Center, Information Operations Directorate. July 19, 2002.

———. “Joint Psychological Vision, July 2002.” Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command, Intelligence and Information Operations Center, Information Operations Directorate. July 19, 2002.

———. “USSOCOM Psychological Operations Study Final Report.” September 1, 2002.  
SECRET

———. “Psychological Operations during Operations *Just Cause* and *Promote Liberty*.”  
March 1994.

———. “Special Operations Technology Execution Plan, Annual Report, 2004.

Unified Task Force Somalia. “Psychological Operations in Support of Operation *Restore Hope*.” May 4, 1993.



## **INTERVIEWS AND SURVEYS**

“Allied views on PSYOP operational lessons learned.” Commentary from allied information operations experts in response to inquiry on U.S. PSYOP performance in OEF and OIF. August 27, 2004. Delivered by email on September 1, 2004.

Sociological Profile of Enlisted Active Duty PSYOP Soldiers. Career Management Field 37 Career Advisor/Assignment Manager of the U.S. Army Human Resources Command. June 30, 2004.

Telephone interviews with numerous active, reserve, or former members of PSYOP units. Many of those who did not prefer to remain anonymous are mentioned by name in the foreword to the report. Interviews took place from March 2004 through October 2004 and often were followed up by email for clarification of specific points.

Telephone interview with Tony Normand, former 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group Commander, United States Army Special Operations Command Chief of Staff and vice-United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. Mr. Normand clarified points in written products submitted by emails in September and October, 2004.

Pentagon conversation with PSYOP participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom at the TOP SECRET level. This meeting was called to clarify issues surrounding the use of PSYOP disseminated through classified means.

PSYOP survey responses from currently serving PSYOP officers and enlisted soldiers commenting on the 10 critical hypotheses identified in the body of the report. Received via email, July through September 2004.

Robert D. Jenks, Deputy Commander for Research, Analysis, and Civilian Affairs, 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (ABN). Responses via email to questions about Strategic Studies Detachment workload.

## **LESSONS LEARNED REPORTS**

4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group. “Operation *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom* Consolidated Psychological Operations Lessons Learned.” September 24, 2003.

4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (ABN). “Lessons Learned OIF & OEF.” May 12, 2004.

———. “OIF PSYOP Lessons Learned draft.” Date unknown.

———. “PSYOP Lessons Learned in Somalia.” 19 Apr 1994. SECRET

CCJ3-PI Information Paper. "Operation Iraqi Freedom AAR (PSYOP)." 21 April 2003.  
SECRET

Center for Army Lessons Learned. "Initial Impressions Report: Operation *Iraqi Freedom* Information Operations, Civil Military Operations, Engineer, Combat Service Support: Stability Operations – Support Operations." Report no. 04-13. Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 2004.

———. "On Point: The United States Army in *Iraqi Freedom*." Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 11, 2004.

———. "Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions Report (IIR)." Report no. 04-13. May 2004.

———. "Operation *Just Cause*: Lessons Learned, Volume II: Operations." October 1990.

———. "Operation *Uphold Democracy*: Initial Impressions: Haiti D-20 to D+150, Volume II." April 1995.

———. "The United States Army in *Iraqi Freedom*." Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 11, 2004.

Company B, 9<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Battalion. "Lessons Learned for Tactical Psychological Operations in Somalia (After-Action Review)." March 10, 1994.

Department of Evaluations and Standardization. "Operation *Provide Comfort* Lessons Learned Observations." John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Date unknown.

Joint Staff. "Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned." Unknown date.  
SECRET/NOFORN

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force. "*Noble Anvil* and *Allied Force* After-Action Review/Lessons Learned." May 22, 2000.

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Haiti. "PSYOP Lessons Learned Operation *Uphold Democracy*." October 16, 1994.

Joint Universal Lessons Learned System. Report no. 42937-11189 (02568). Date unknown.

United States Central Command. "Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned." 16 June 2003.  
SECRET/REL USA GBR AUS

United States Joint Forces Command. "Joint Lessons Learned: Operation Iraqi Freedom Major Combat Operations (FOUO)." March 1, 2004.

## MISCELLANEOUS

Billingslea, Marshall, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict). Statement before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities. House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives Concerning Special Operations Forces Acquisition, April 1, 2003. Available at <http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-04-01billingslea.html>

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force. Situation reports. October 12, 2001–November 2, 2003.

PSYOP products from recent operations. All PSYOP products used in OEF and OIF 1 & 2, except for the radio programs from OIF 2, were reviewed along with product control sheets when they were available.

Shachnow, Sidney. Letter with attachments to Senator Edward Kennedy, May 31, 1985.

United States Central Command. “Campaign Plan: *Enduring Freedom*.”

———. “Campaign Plan for *Enduring Freedom*: Information Operations.”

———. “Campaign Plan for *Enduring Freedom*: Psychological Operations.” November 19, 2001.

Wassink, J. R., COL, USMC. HQMC PP&O/PLI; information paper on United States Marine Corps Psychological Operations, September 27, 2004.

## WEB SITES

4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group Web site. Available at <http://www.poas.socom.smil.mil/misc/mission.html>.

Department of Defense. Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Report. Available at <http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf>. PSYOP lessons learned are on page 623.

———. “Psychological Warfare Fact Sheet.” Web site for 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration. Available at <http://korea50.army.mil/index.html>.

Headquarters, United States Army Special Operations Command. Special Operations Forces Information, Primer. Available at <http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/primer.shtml>.

Home of the Psywarrior. Available at <http://www.psywarrior.com>. Unofficial but quite

informative Web site for learning about the history of PSYOP.

Planning Group for Integration of the United States Information Agency into the Department of State (June 20, 1997). Available at <<http://www.publicdiplomacy.org>>.

Rhoads, Kelton. Working Psychology Website: An Introduction to Social Influence. Available at <[www.workingpsychology.com](http://www.workingpsychology.com)>.

United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command Homepage. Available at <[http://www.soc.mil/usacapoc/capoc\\_default.htm](http://www.soc.mil/usacapoc/capoc_default.htm)>. Site includes the “Psychological Operations Fact Sheet.”